


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9 JANUARY 1990



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# ***JPRS Report—***

# **Soviet Union**

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## ***Political Affairs***

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# Soviet Union

## Political Affairs

JPRS-UPA-90-001

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9 January 1990

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### Supreme Soviet's Most Frequent Topic

18120027A Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 48,  
28 Nov-4 Dec 89 pp 34-37

[Article by Nikolai Andreyev: "Of Power: The Supreme Soviet's Most Frequent Topic"]

[Text] The problem of Article 6 of the Soviet Constitution, which defines the leading and guiding role of the Communist Party, has been brought up once again in the Supreme Soviet. When MPs discussed the agenda for the Second Congress of People's Deputies, Deputy Nikolai Fyodorov said that no such article had been included in either Lenin's or Stalin's constitutions. Deputy Victor Gubarev was even more outspoken when he said: "If Article 6 is to remain intact than the slogan 'All Power to the Soviets' will be declarative and impossible to implement." Deputy Nikolai Kutzenko believed the party had to secure its right to lead the country not by a constitutional article but by concrete actions. This would only boost the party's authority, echoed Deputy Victor Chelyshev.

Only very recently any doubts as to the necessity of Article 6 seemed heretical. Those who did have such doubts were persecuted as criminals. The very thought that Article 6 could be redundant seemed to have been erased from public awareness. It transpired, however, that doubts had survived. The first indications of this appeared at the First Congress of People's Deputies. The question was brought up at the first session of the new-type Supreme Soviet, although the debates were artfully curtailed. Passions flared when MPs started discussing the agenda for the second congress. The idea of discussing Article 6 won the support of many people's deputies.

What's behind these developments? Some deputies tend to think a desire to divert the attention of the parliament and society from solving urgent problems is at the root of it. Others believe the aim is to undermine people's confidence in the party. Still others contend that personal ambitions are involved.

### To Feel in Power

We are witnessing the unique experience of ruling the state when two forces are trying to steer the country out of the impasse: Soviet power and that of the party, the Supreme Soviet and the Politbureau.

The new Supreme Soviet had nothing in common with its decorative and docile predecessor. Today's MPs have been called up by the democratic drive and they try to serve it. The parliament's power, however, remains disorganized and dissipated. Most of the deputies are well aware that the bureaucratic apparatus is impotent and lying idle, but they've been brought up inside this apparatus and now they are not always able to renounce their superstitious submissiveness. That might be why our parliament suddenly gets stubborn in absolutely harmless situations.

The parliament's plight is lack of experience. This could be the reason why it is rushing from one bill to another, raising a multitude of problems without analyzing or deciding anything. Debates in the Supreme Soviet are often irritating and disappointing. There are endless discussions about issues that seem obvious, but when really thorough consideration is needed (as was the case with the Law on Property) the debates are promptly curtailed.

Sometimes our Supreme Soviet behaves as if somebody had cast a spell on it. It is enough to recall the most heated debates around the proposal to increase the prices of tobacco and beer. Some deputies drew quite far-reaching conclusions. The male part of the population gave a sigh of relief after it turned out that only 54 MPs opposed beer-drinking.

It is impossible to imagine an issue like this being discussed at a Politbureau sitting. Things are much more serene and serious there. I say so as if I had attended such a sitting myself. I haven't any, and my impressions derive solely from PRAVDA's accounts, which used to be brief and succinct in the past. We were all delighted when the press started publishing more detailed reports of Politbureau meetings specifying concrete problems discussed there. Today one can read extracts from speeches and feel how the discussion went.

But why should the Politbureau bother itself with economic matters? Because the Supreme Soviet doesn't possess the power it should possess. The Supreme Soviet has yet to feel its rights, its duties and its prerogatives. So far this hasn't been feasible because we still don't have a law on the status of people's deputies. "An onlooker could reproach us for not adequately using our power," said Deputy Anatoly Denisov. "But the fact is that we still haven't learned to use it. That's why party bodies have to tackle problems for us, to which we don't object. We even expect party bodies to do our work, because we ourselves don't know how to do it."

All this is true. But questions remain, nonetheless. The Politbureau has considered the shortage of medicines in the country. The problem is undoubtedly pressing. But it was considered at the Supreme Soviet when it appointed the ministers for public health and the medical industry. And is it really the business of the Politbureau of the party's Central Committee to deal with what seems a purely economic problem? More than a weighty justification for bringing up the issue at a Politbureau sitting...

The Politbureau's strength lies in its resoluteness which the parliament dramatically lacks. On September 8, for example, the Politbureau considered the outrageous shortage of soap, detergents, toothpaste, school exercise books and batteries. A number of Communist Party members who held high posts in the government were severely reprimanded. It was said that CPSU member and Deputy Head of the State Planning Committee Yefimov might be happier in another job. Naturally

Yefimov is no longer employed by the Planning Committee. If only the Supreme Soviet could be as resolute.

And still the impression is that the main aim of the leading party bodies is to rule the country. Our state is organized on the pattern on which the party is organized. That's why it is sometimes difficult to draw a distinction between the power of the party and the power of the Soviets. Besides feeling responsible for the country's progress, the party wants to control the economy, where the success of perestroika is forged.

"The Politbureau and local party committees are dealing precisely with the problems we deal with," said People's Deputy Yuri Ryzhov, Chairman of the Committee for Science, Public Education and Culture. "But this is the result of the fact that the economic mechanism is getting increasingly out of control. The fact that the Politbureau has to bother itself with economic matters indicates that we are still in a situation where extraordinary measures are needed."

#### **Truth Above All?**

One of the fundamental ideas of perestroika was that the party ought to drop its economic functions. The developments showed, however, that such distancing was almost impossible. With economic affairs out, what will the party deal with? Ideology? But ideology alone is too small a matter for the gigantic and comprehensive system of democratic centralism that embraces all the state's activities and every individual. Besides, it is too generous to use the mammoth party machinery for ideology alone.

Another idea was put forward: the party should influence the Soviets via Communists working in them. It sounds perfect, but how can it be implemented? Fundamentally, the question is whether a deputy is subordinate to the will of the party or the will of his constituents. "How can the deputies work when the functions of the state and the party bodies are separated?" asks Deputy Vadim Medvedev. "If every move is determined by party decisions, then representative bodies of state power obviously become redundant. I believe party decisions must concern political questions of the utmost importance. As for less important problems, here the deputies must be given a free hand to choose, reflect and analyze."

As far as I understand it, the message is that after the party's line on key political issues has been defined, deputies who are party members are to pursue this line in the Soviets. When it comes to smaller issues, here the deputies are completely independent. There is one complication, though—things are developing so rapidly today that the party line has to be adjusted now and then. What is the mechanism for such adjustments and who is responsible for them? How should the latest party decisions be conveyed to deputies who are communists? What if constituents see that their deputy, who is also a party member, isn't free in his decisions? Won't they prefer a non-party candidate at the next elections?

It must be remembered that a deputy enjoys a certain autonomy. Here is the opinion of Deputy Anatoly Denisov: "As a deputy I first serve the truth, then the people and only then the party." What about this stand? What is to be done with party member Denisov if he refuses to honour a party decision for the sake of the truth?

Deputy Iren Andreyeva said that though a non-party member herself she supported Article 6 because, in her opinion, honest party members are the only force capable of taking strong measures against those who are sabotaging perestroika.

Complications and even dangers are inevitable here as well. Even if a totalitarian war is declared on sabotage, party members will hardly win. Because it is not party members who are to fight saboteurs and injustice, but legal norms and laws. The law must be uniform and indivisible everywhere in the Soviet Union and in every office. All people are equal before the law. As for honest, incorruptible and just people—they should wear judges' robes.

#### **Hierarchy or Initiative?**

Another vital question. How can the party influence economic matters? The party tries to do so, but doesn't always succeed. Last year Europe's largest dairy plant was built in Moscow. It was one of those "turnkey" projects on which hopes of solving all problems are naively pinned in this country. The plant was built and equipped with equipment imported from Sweden and designed to turn out, using modern Swedish techniques, thousands of tons of sour cream, curds and yoghurt for the people of Moscow. Nearly a year has passed but the plant isn't working. Lev Zaikov, the then Moscow party leader, went there in person to inspect the site. He toured the workshops, spoke to the workers and listened to Swedish experts. Then he convened a meeting at which he briefed the audience on the ways to remedy the situation. "We can't put up with such irresponsible attitudes any more," he has been quoted as saying. "Those guilty of shortcomings will be severely punished according to party norms and the demands of perestroika." And further: "I most earnestly request that priority attention be paid to personnel, and first of all to Communists working here." If even this doesn't help, serious measures will be taken, Lev Zaikov promised. "Economic managers who are party members will be responsible for their actions as Communists—and this responsibility will be as heavy as party discipline commands. Everyone will have to account personally for carrying out the plan. We don't have any right to permit further derangement."

Naturally, both responsibility and discipline are needed. But how are they achieved at a similar undertaking abroad? Obviously, there must be certain economic incentives that make people work without calls for more responsibility. The best thing to do is study the experience and use it here. But in this case much will have to be changed and not at the milk-packing plant alone.

Our economy is based on a rigid hierarchical dependence. At the same time every worker is required to display initiative, inventiveness and skill. Very often dependence and initiative can't be combined. Perestroika gave rise to the hope that people would be more emancipated in their actions and ideas. If this happens, the people will feel their strength and believe in it, they will have confidence in life and not wait to be reprimanded for ideologically incorrect behavior. A free man is the backbone of a prosperous economy. Party committees continue to uphold responsibility in the old way. It is believed that once there is a problem, a high-ranking party official must come to the site, look into the problem wisely, call for more responsibility, wag an angry finger, warn about possible consequences and everything will be OK. But aren't we mistaken?

Let's return to the Supreme Soviet once again. With all its lack of experience and uncertain position in the power structure, the Supreme Soviet is trying hard to lay the foundations for the law-governed state, primarily in the economic sphere. The bills discussed at the session are designed to support free economic activities by the people. If passed, the laws on property, rent relations and land will be serious steps towards economic emancipation. Then perhaps there will be no need for party reprimands. Perestroika is carried out by independent people who don't need to be supervised.

Today we have dual power. The power of the party is more efficient at the moment. It is the skeleton of our system. If we remove it, the whole system will collapse and the consequences will be unpredictable. "Political upheavals that in other countries lead to the resignation of governments or the dissolution of parliaments are unacceptable in this country. Society is in a state where any political excesses can drown what the party and the parliament are trying hard to keep afloat," said Deputy Konstantin Lyubchenko.

The undefined role of the Council of Ministers in today's structure of power is felt in the government's condescending attitude to the parliament. The government drafts laws, its representatives take part in parliamentary debates, ministers lecture MPs on what they should know and how they should work.

However surprising it may sound, the Supreme Soviet is financed by the government and the money for its upkeep is an item on the budget of the Council of Ministers. Perhaps this is the reason why the Council of Ministers refuses to be satisfied with the role of an executive appendage. The Government Herald carried an article that said in part: "Some theoretical works contain suggestions that the USSR government be constitutionally defined as the highest body of state management or the highest executive body of the USSR Supreme Soviet. In our opinion, such suggestions can't be agreed with..." However, these are not "theoretical suggestions" but a constitutional norm: the Council of Ministers is the executive body of the Supreme Soviet.

Meanwhile, the economic authorities are showing their inability to cope with the economic situation. The Supreme Soviet isn't able to cope either. Just as in good old days, party functionaries have to engage in "functions that are not inherent in those of the party," and have been condemned at the highest possible level. The party's management of the economy is commonly acknowledged to be inefficient, but in the circumstances we are forced to resort to it. This situation, probably, will remain unchanged until the local elections. The local Soviets that will hopefully emerge renewed and active after the elections will become power, a support for the Supreme Soviet.

In my opinion, the deputies' repeated interest in Article 6 mustn't be viewed as an attack on the party or its leading role. The deputies are guided by the desire to have a clear picture of who the power in the country really belongs to.

Much will depend on Mikhail Gorbachev's stand when the future of Article 6 is discussed. Gorbachev is the man who embodies both the power of the party and the power of the Soviets and one can only guess which power he prefers himself. Gorbachev maintained he respected Article 6 and the Constitution at large, but he noted further (at the Moscow students' forum) that any article in the Constitution, including Article 6, could be transformed, reassessed or rewritten as society developed.

Will Article 6 continue to exist? The final answer is likely to be heard not at the session or the Second Congress of People's Deputies, but at the 28th Congress of Soviet Communists.

#### Deputies' Election Techniques Assessed

90UN0433A Moscow PARTINAYA ZHIZN in Russian  
No 22, Nov 89 pp 8-13

[Article by V. Komarovskiy, department director at the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences (AON) "Opty" Scientific Research Institute, and Professor A. Kostin, leading scientific collaborator at the same institute: "Elections to Soviets: For Agitation and Propaganda Work—A Modern Level"]

[Text] This problem was a subject of discussion by participants in a "roundtable" on improving the qualifications of managing party, soviet, and ideological cadres which was held at the CPSU Central Committee's Academy of Social Sciences. Present were heads of the ideological departments of republic, kray, and oblast party committees, scholars from the CPSU Central Committee's Academy of Social Sciences "Opty" scientific research institute, and responsible workers from the CPSU Central Committee apparatus.

The elections of USSR peoples deputies demonstrated the fundamental changes that have taken place in the socioeconomic and spiritual life of society. The voters decisively supported perestroika and came out in favor of its acceleration, of achieving practical results more

quickly. In connection with this, the work of party, soviet, and economic organs, as well as of management personnel, has been subjected to demanding evaluation. Analysis has been made of the mistakes and omissions committed by party committees in the course of the recently held elections of USSR peoples deputies and of the main reasons for the lack of success of a number of party candidates in them.

This was of course, the speakers said, a reflection of an unfavorable socioeconomic background, a growing lack of confidence in the abilities of certain party leaders to solve vital problems, a lack of understanding on the part of the latter of the deep meaning of the changes that are taking place, and a lack of readiness to work in a new way. But not least important was the dilettante approach taken toward the organization and planning of the election campaign, as a result of which it was impossible to provide skilled assistance to candidates or to correctly focus on the moods and state of public opinion of the voters. Mass agitation work in preparation for the elections was also weak. This effected such things as mistakes in preparing the biographies and programs of the candidates, undervaluation of such elements in the election campaign as personal meetings with voters, leaflets and posters, and an inability to establish permanent partnership relations with the mass information and propaganda media.

The speakers noted that lessons must be drawn from all this when preparing for the upcoming elections to soviets, that we must renounce passivity, and must overcome confusion in the face of possible difficulties. Indeed, necessary organization of the election campaign and its energetic and skillful conduct can to a large degree predetermine its result, can contribute to its becoming a good school for acquiring a still higher level of political culture, to realization of the second stage of political reform, as this relates to establishing the soviets as an authoritative and competent power at the local level. The participants in the "roundtable" emphasized that the upcoming elections to the soviets open great prospects for expression of a broad spectrum of public opinion, for development of the principle of presenting alternatives. Under these conditions, actions of the party committees that follow the old methods, an attempt to foist off its own opinion on others, will surely end in failure. Therefore, the development of a new style and methods for conducting the election campaign by the party committees is a central question. The main thing here is to take into account the state of public opinion and also methods of persuasion.

There is every basis for asserting that the population's level of activity will not be lower in the forthcoming elections than in the preceding ones and that positions will be more radical. It is important also to note that the election campaign and the work of the first Congress of People's Deputies represent a milestone in democratization and perestroika as a whole. A new political situation

has developed in our country. An extremely important step has been taken toward an assertion of popular power.

The flexible organizational structures, which were created in the course of the election campaign and which, in many cases, did not later disintegrate, are being readied (at least in a number of places) for the next elections, which testifies to their stability, their tendency for transformation into politicized formations. One cannot but see that their platforms do not always and in all ways correspond to the CPSU Platform. This circumstance should find appropriate expression in the methods and style of conducting propaganda, and also in practical steps directed toward finding a common language with those informal organizations that firmly stand for perestroika.

In the course of discussions it was also noted that the growing strength of public opinion, the level of politicization, the activity and self-organization of the masses, does not in all ways adequately match the level of their competence, maturity, and independence, their ability to make a correct choice corresponding to the interests of perestroika. As a whole, the voters have expressed their preference for those candidates who, in their opinion, have their own positive, constructive, and concrete programs of actions, particularly in the social sphere; who possess needed and bright personal qualities (political boldness, an ability to defend their own point of view, decency and honesty, decisiveness, purposefulness, openness, democratism, etc.); who know the needs and requirements of the voters, who are close to them psychologically, who know how to carry on a dialogue with them.

It is important to keep in mind that the course of the past election campaign was basically differentiated, depending, first of all, upon where the voters live (large city—small city—village). In the recent election, for example, the village population reacted in a way that, to a large extent, has been characteristic in our country. The situation was more complex in the cities. And in the upcoming elections, a sharp political struggle, apparently, will unfold mainly in the cities, especially in the big ones.

Regional differences are also significant. The voters in Moscow and Riga, for example, are fundamentally different from the voters of other regions that have been studied. This poses the problem of developing specific election tactics in each region (and in part, apparently, strategies as well). These questions must necessarily be decided by the local party committee itself and right today, without waiting for some sort of additional indications.

The conclusion was also expressed that, in the course of the pre-election struggle, in organizing and carrying out the campaign, it is important in the first instance to find those groups of voters who can be relied upon, and also

those who will exercise a greater influence on the outcome of the voting than others.

The intelligentsia had a great influence on the course of the past elections. It was specifically their representatives who succeeded in promoting their own ideas and positions, ones that attracted other groups in the population. Besides this, their representatives were the most active and skillful in conducting their campaigns. Certain party committees underestimated the significance of the positions of the intelligentsia. On the other hand, party committees in local areas far from always provided necessary and, most important, skillful help to representatives of the working class, and resulted in definite dissatisfaction on their part. A large part of the working class and the peasantry (about 40 percent of them) is firmly inclined to vote in the upcoming elections to soviets mainly for their own representatives.

Although there are more persons among members of the CPSU who were inclined to vote for the candidates of the party committee than among non-party members, a large number were also found among them who voted "against", and attention should be paid to this.

Analysis of the programs of the candidates (including also those who won), of their speeches, showed that in a number of cases they departed from the pre-election Platform of the CPSU Central Committee or did not take it into consideration. Data which has been received indicates that, in the public mind (and, in part, in fact), a "split" has occurred between the leadership of some party committees and rank-and-file party members, and even party organizations of enterprises and institutions as a whole (in the elections, CP members frequently voted their own directors). Attention must be given also to judgments of the following sort. Among the answers to a question in a questionnaire about the fundamental lessons of the past elections (a written survey was conducted in the course of preparations for a discussion among those who managed them), the following can be found: these lessons are still being drawn slowly and insufficiently.

The most important part of the "roundtable" discussion, in our opinion, was devoted to the special features of the upcoming elections to republic and local organs of power. We wanted particularly to isolate those points which to the greatest degree characterize them specifically, that distinguish them from the elections of USSR peoples deputies. Attention was turned to the fact that it is the oblast, city, and rayon levels that are competing for the voters' ballots, levels that have been targets of particular criticism for their conservatism and inability to construct their work in the spirit of perestroika.

Analysis shows that a number of local party committees are focusing their attention solely on the election of leading individuals, of nomenklatura workers in management organs. This mistake will have undesirable consequences: in an election, simultaneously, of a large

number of deputies, a concentration of effort on only a few people means that the election campaign will end up being a haphazard one.

The criterion for evaluating candidates, the epicenter of the election campaign, we suppose, will come to be the ability of a candidate to propose an effective path for solution of the immediate, urgent problems in the lives of the population of the corresponding rayon, city, town, and village (transportation, construction of children's institutions, stores, etc.). And general political orientation will be important, as before. And program support for the candidates should be prepared correspondingly.

Voters will receive very extensive information about most of the candidates either directly or via acquaintances, friends, and comrades at work. In these conditions, the role played by ordinary personal qualities (honesty, decency, modesty, etc.) increases in the eyes of the voters. Therefore, when nominating candidates, it is necessary to select people who are beyond reproach from this point of view and who have the reputation of being attentive to the needs of the workers.

Considering the tendency toward radical change, it can be said that a greater preference will be shown for new candidates than for ones who have already been a member of previous soviets. In the eyes of many voters, the latter are bearers of the traditions of stagnation. New persons, besides high political and moral qualities, should know how to associate with people, to win their sympathies. It is natural that the majority of them will require assistance during the election marathon (since they have no experience in election campaigns). First of all, in the selection of a "team" that should be representative not from the point of view of ranks and services, but with regard to its ability to conduct a pre-election campaign (one that could help to shape the theses of addresses, with how to conduct oneself in public, etc.). There need to be journalists, sociologists, psychologists, and social scientists on this "team."

The party committee must extend fundamental assistance to its own candidates, correctly orienting them to the moods of the voters and the course of the pre-election struggle, helping them to make more effective use of various means (to write their biographies, to conduct interesting meetings with voters). The main contribution to victory in the elections must be made by the candidate himself. Therefore, it is a task of primary importance to select real political fighters as candidates. In our view, the selection of candidates under existing circumstances is often a compromise choice between someone whom the party committee would like to see among the deputies and someone who can actually win the sympathies of the voters. Ideally, each candidate should pass through a special kind of "preview commission" and specific data should be obtained concerning his potential popularity, depending upon which he would be nominated in one or district or another, or not nominated at all.

## NATIONAL PARTY AND STATE AFFAIRS

Fundamental changes should be anticipated in the significance and tactics of using certain forms of conducting an election campaign. Considering the large number of candidates, it will hardly be possible for each of them to make broad use of the mass information media. The same thing can be said about rallies. A decisive role will be played by "small" forms (pamphlets, posters) and by personal meetings. Particular attention needs to be given to compiling the biographical information and programs of the candidates, to getting away from standard formats and stereotyped patterns (that have been seen everywhere), to showing in them the personal qualities and the political and organizational skills of the candidate, and to demonstrating the ability of the candidate for people's deputy to see the problems (and first of all local ones) and paths for their solution and his ability and desire to carry out a consistent and persistent campaign for election.

Naturally, the changed socioeconomic, political, and spiritual and moral conditions in which elections to the soviets will take place today demand that party committees introduce important corrections to the election campaign. The participants in the discussion noted that new principles for organizing an election campaign are needed, ones which would permit the party committee to follow its general tonality and direction and to control its key aspects, its general course, but not the successes or mistakes of individual persons.

Let us recall that, as a whole, the tasks and functions of local party committees in the election campaign were defined in an address by M.S. Gorbachev at a meeting in the CPSU Central Committee on 18 June 1989. These are: developing a strategy for the election campaign that takes into account the special features of local conditions; study of public opinion; selection, preparation, and nomination of candidates; program support of the election campaign; appropriate ideological work; technical support.

As regards new approaches in the organization of all agitation and propaganda work in connection with the elections to soviets, the party committee department chiefs noted that scientifically-based evaluation of the situation and of the dynamics of public thinking is taking on prime significance in the restructuring of ideological work today.

Under present conditions, when exaggerated hopes for a speedy solution to social problems are not justified (and engender more than a few negative judgments), agitation and propaganda work should be built not on promises but on realistic prognoses for the staged solution of economic and social problems, as applied to specific regions, labor collectives, and micro-rayons.

The entire system for keeping people informed during the course of the election campaign is in need of considerable improvement. Analysis of the results of a series of studies, conducted during April-June 1989 by the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences "Opyt"

scientific research institute, shows that only a little more than half of those voters were surveyed stated affirmatively that there had been sufficient information about the pre-election programs of the candidates during the last election campaign, less than one third responded positively concerning the candidates' political and practical qualities, and one out of five took a positive view of the personal qualities of the chosen representative of the people.

In the course of the discussions, the view was expressed that traditional means of ideologically influence have not justified themselves, particularly the institutions of agitators, consultation points, and social and political centers. Television debates, agitation buses, and informational meetings at places of residence with the candidates for deputy and their trusted representatives [doverennoye litso] have turned out to be much more effective. To the questionnaire question: "From what kinds of sources did you obtain information about the course of the election campaign?", the answers of the respondents, for example, in Moscow, were distributed as follows: 86 percent answered that they received information from reports in newspapers and on radio and television, 16.2 percent—from comrades at work, 11.1 percent—from family members, 10.0 percent—from lectures and discussions, 6.2 percent—from acquaintances and neighbors, 3.8 percent—from the trusted representatives of candidates for deputy, and 2.6 percent—at social and political centers.

Under the new conditions, it is important to flesh out the staffs of all ideological links, and particularly of agitation collectives, with personnel who are capable of working actively and energetically among the masses, of participating in discussions, of skillfully defending party positions, of exerting needed influence on public opinion, and of giving a rebuff to demagogues and to opponents of participatory democracy. Considering the experience gained in holding the elections of USSR people's deputies, the recommendation has been that, rather than an overall agitation collective, individual propaganda groups be established for each candidate on the basis of the collectives which have nominated and supported him. These groups can also include the candidates themselves and their representatives, the role of whom is growing considerably under present conditions.

The very character of the pre-election campaign is undergoing fundamental change; an element of competitiveness is manifesting itself, a struggle for the voter's vote. In connection with this, appropriate corrections need to be made to the activities of the agitation collectives. They need to be freed from inappropriate but deeply ingrained functions—compiling and verifying lists of voters, disseminating invitations to events and the balloting, etc. Other people should be doing this. The main task of the agitators is to carry on specific agitation for the deputy candidates. Emphasis should be placed on discussion forms, on constant, individual efforts to educate and explain.

Today, as never in the past, it was noted at the meeting, what is needed is careful, well thought-out, purposeful work that takes into consideration the actual situation and the interests and requirements of the voters and of various categories of the population. Party committees must help the primary party organization in organizing precisely such work. It is useful to send propaganda groups of party and soviet workers from republic, kray and oblast centers to give addresses and extend assistance in local areas. To develop a reliable mechanism for providing timely information and for feedback. To establish a system for recording the mandates, complaints and suggestions of the workers, of reacting to them in a timely and businesslike way, and of providing information on measures taken.

Using political methods, it is important for the party organizations to be able to consolidate within a single social platform the healthy part of the informal organizations and movements, many of which represent a real political force. Preparations for the elections should not contribute to a split, to an intensification of differences, to an overemphasis on contradictions, but to a consolidation of all the forces of society in the struggle for perestroika and renewal. Therefore, a thorough analysis of the programs of the "informals", a dialogue, a search for points of commonality, compromises, and well-founded criticism should find a place within organizational and propaganda work.

The difficult field of pre-election battle, of the clash of various positions, will be the place of residence, the participants in the discussion stressed. This is also the most vulnerable sector for many party committees. Therefore it is necessary to have groups of well-prepared ideological workers who are capable of taking into consideration the special characteristics of various population strata, of effectively influencing public opinion, and of neutralizing negative phenomena and processes.

These and other special features of the upcoming election campaign, in the opinion of the "roundtable" participants, presuppose the provision of reliable and effective leadership of all pre-election agitation and propaganda work. It would be useful to establish, under the party committees, special groups or coordination councils for the exercise of daily control, for study of public opinion and the developing situation, for fine coordination of all forces and means, and for taking necessary measures to oppose extremist elements and to ensure unwavering observance of constitutional requirements regarding elections to soviets. Within these groups, it is desirable to also include the party workers and ideological cadres who are best prepared to conduct discussions. In this connection, criticism was levied at the meeting against a number of party committees which were not able to ensure coordination of the activities of local organs during the last election campaign.

In the course of discussions, it was also noted that methodological and informational assistance extended by local party committees to "their own" candidates is

becoming extremely important in pre-election campaigns. Program support, skillful correction of the course of the election campaign, just as the solution of all other questions that arise in connection with planning and carrying it out, require, as a fundamental principle, scrupulous study of the problems and questions which disturb the voters of the corresponding districts. To know their needs, demands, and aspirations, their social-demographic and professional make-up. The program of a candidate for deputy and other actions stemming from it should serve as it were as an answer first of all to the needs of the population and should correspond in terms of style and form to the level and special characteristics of the mass consciousness specifically of the given election district. At the same time, the pre-election platform should not only outline solutions to problems, but also the search for ways of resolving the questions which most disturb the voters in the district, and it also must be extremely convincing, concrete and understandable to each voter.

On the whole, the informational and methodological support prepared by party committees with the help of outside specialists to meet the needs of their candidates should, in our view, include the following components: methodological recommendations for the compilation of the biographies and programs of the candidates and analysis of their comparative merits and shortcomings; analysis of the social-demographic composition of the population of the respective election districts, their requirements, interests and needs, and of the special features of their everyday existence and way of life. Reflection of these in the program of a candidate and consideration of them in addresses, interviews, meetings, and the like, is one of the absolutely necessary components of success. Further, it is important to study the sympathies and ideas of the voters of corresponding districts with regard negative and positive characteristics of nominees, their model of the "ideal" candidate, which will make it possible to deploy candidates in terms of districts in such a way that each of them ends up with the most favorable conditions (of course, taking account of existing possibilities).

It is necessary to study the course and tone of reporting on the election campaign in the mass information media, the reactions of the population to corresponding coverage by the newspapers, radio and television, and their comparative effectiveness. This makes it possible to make corrections both in the course of the election campaign as a whole and in the pre-election work of the candidates themselves, to react quickly to the changing situation and the arguments of an opponent, and to make broadscale use of individual propaganda approaches found to be successful. Analysis is required of the intentions of the voters to vote for one or another specific candidate (by periodic measurements, beginning from the moment of nomination), as are methodological recommendations for interviewing potential candidates.

There is a need for fundamental change in the style of the mutual relationships between the central apparatus and

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the local party committees. If a command, directive style of work earlier prevailed, then, at the present time, the other extreme sometimes is present—the activities of some party committees have been set adrift.

This cannot but have an effect on the elections to soviets, when the emphasis during the pre-election campaign may be swept in the direction of criticism of central organs. The informal organizations are intensifying their activities at places of residence, the speakers said, and therefore thought should be given to strengthening territorial primary party organizations, to reinforcing them with party members who live in the micro-rayons.

A thorough analysis of the past elections and of the work of party committees and primary party organizations during them was made on 11 October at a meeting of the CPSU Central Committee commission for questions of party construction and cadre, legal and ideological policy. Questions of preparations for the elections to republic and local organs of power were examined from all sides and specific recommendations were made. And these should undoubtedly become the basis for the practical activities of the party organizations.

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### Preparations for Upcoming Election Examined

*90UN0415A Moscow AGITATOR in Russian No 21 Nov 89 pp 49-51*

[Interview with A.D. Kuvshinova and T.K. Serogodskaya, by N. Morozov: "Election Without Vacation"]

[Text] Soon there will occur the election of the Supreme Soviets of the union and autonomous republics and the local soviets of people's deputies. How is the preparation for this very important political campaign proceeding? What are the party organizations and the agitation and propaganda aktiv engaged in during this period? What conclusions have been made from the campaign to elect USSR people's deputies? These were the first questions in an interview that N. Morozov, a correspondent of this magazine, had with secretaries of the Aleksandrov (Vladimir Oblast) and Pereslavl-Zaleskiy (Yaroslavl Oblast) KPSS gorkoms, A.K. Kuvshinova and T.K. Serogodskaya.

[A. Kuvshinova] I shall begin with the lessons of the past election, with an analysis of the shortcomings. Probably the chief shortcoming was the slow start, to use the athletes' expression. The communique about the purpose of the election remained almost unnoticed, and the electoral commissions were created in accordance with the customary procedures. They were frequently formed from those who "had experience," without any broad publicity.

[T. Serogodskaya] It took a long time for the agitation aktiv to get rolling. And the party organizations staffed

the agitation collectives in accordance with the "left-over" principle: they assigned to those collectives the persons who did not have any other assignments. Thus they entered the next election campaign with old baggage. Many voters had to "grope" their way through the details of the new, democratic election mechanism and to assimilate them in a short period of time. They did not sense immediately that their right to self-expression had become a reality. The profound inertia of the past also let itself be known: the organizers, in the customary way, were waiting for instructions "from above," and the voters were waiting for election day.

[Kuvshinova] But the candidates' meetings with the voters can be boldly called the hottest stage. Crammed auditoriums were the scene of the public comparison of the claimants' platforms, the competition between intellectuals, the singlehanded combat of proxies, and various kinds of activities by agitation groups. All this resembled a fascinating mass lesson in state thinking, civic boldness, and initiative. At least for those who were present at such meetings or watched them on television. Understandably, there was a considerably larger number of persons who wanted to meet the candidate, to ask a question, or state a request. Here too there is food for thought when preparing for the new election.

[Correspondent] Apparently the forthcoming election campaign will be considerably hotter than the previous election. Because now we will need deputies who will become the protectors and the expressors of the interests of the voters in their village, workers settlement, or hometown. The public will take a more responsible attitude toward the nominating and the choosing of claimants. Consequently, there will be more concerns for the party organizations and for the soviet aktiv.

[Serogodskaya] We sense that already. Familiarization with the draft versions of the laws governing elections to republic and local agencies of authority is in progress. There has been a tremendous amount of interest. A large number of questions arise. People ask those questions of lecturers and propagandists, party and soviet workers, and the deputies and agitation specialists. Recommendations are made. And they deal with the broader representation of the workers and peasants in the Soviets, with the procedure of nominating candidates from production collectives and the public at their place of residence, and with the consolidation of the electoral okrugs and the refining of their boundaries. It has been ascertained that people take a different attitude toward the okrug pre-election meetings and to elections from public organizations. A large number of voters take a negative attitude toward these procedures.

[Kuvshinova] One also sees the effect of the heated discussions provided by the deputies at the Congress and at the summer and autumn sessions of the Supreme Soviet. The direct rebroadcasts over radio and television and the items published in the press influence the acceleration of the process of the politicizing of society.

You can see what mature judgments are expressed at citizen rallies and at sessions of local Soviets concerning the role and place of the deputies in resolving the social, economic, and educational problems. Open criticism is leveled at inactive deputies and agencies of authority, and alternative solutions for resolving various questions are proposed. On the initiative of the inhabitants and their elected representatives in the Soviets, attempts are being made to create public agencies of local self-government.

It is noteworthy that the inhabitants link their effective work with the need to elect deputies from their own housing area, and to take their own active participation in commissions, public soviets, building committees, etc. In their opinion, it is time to form territorial deputy groups from the deputies residing on the particular territory, so that each of them will become part of the appropriate public agency. It is proposed that the persons delegated there should also include representatives of organizations that are engaged in the satisfying of the public's vital needs (trade, transportation, personal services), as well as sponsoring enterprises. This will make it possible to resolve effectively many social questions that are linked with bringing people closer together and educating them at their place of residence. But if, by the moment of the election, there appears a law about local self-government and management, the Soviets' authority will increase and many problems will be resolved on a legal basis.

[Serogodskaya] In a word, the organizers of the election campaign should not approach it with old measuring sticks: the election date has been designated; therefore, it is time to engage in that election. The organizing and political work is now proceeding without any interruptions. No one will allow himself to take a vacation. So the reports by the deputies to the public, and the sessions of the local Soviets, are currently in progress. Are we really to believe that the party organizations can fail to notice these events? They are rendering assistance to the deputies in preparing their reports, and the agitation aktiv is carrying out explanatory work. The voters are making their conclusions about who should be newly elected and who will have to be given powers.

[Correspondent] We have become accustomed to agitating "in favor of elections in general." There has been experience of agitation for specific persons. What is an agitator supposed to do if there prove to be two or three claimants for the one mandate in his okrug?

[Kuvshinova] We do indeed have a certain amount of that experience. In the last election, two candidates ran in each of the territorial and national-territorial okrugs. Of course, things will be more complicated now. First, the large number of mandates: on the territory of our rayon there are more than 500 for all the Soviets—rural, settlement, city, rayon, oblast, and republic. Secondly, we are waiting for alternative candidacies. As of now, it is difficult to say how many of them there will be.

But agitation "in general" is already under way, and we have already spoken about this. At seminars with agitators we remind them of the observance of the moral and ethical standards in agitation, so that they will remember the inadmissibility, when agitating against "outsiders," of digging into their private life. The struggle for the deputy mandate must be waged within the confines of a political discussion, and each of the sides is obliged to remember the cultivated nature of those discussions.

Understandably, the agitation activists will have to acquaint the voters with the claimants' on-the-job and political qualities, and their election platforms. Probably a few of the agitators will not be able to conceal their sympathies toward one of the claimants. There is nothing bad about this. The final choice will be made by the voters themselves. It is a matter of their conscience and political maturity.

[Serogodskaya] Let's not forget that, in addition to the agitators, the proxies will also be operating. The claimant's coworkers or his neighbors can become such proxies, at his discretion. Their functions are considerably broader than the agitators' functions. According to law, they have the right to represent the candidate's interests in interrelationships with the local agencies of authority, with the electoral commissions and voters, and with public organizations. I think that a rather large number of persons who are currently agitators will become proxies. It will, of course, be more convenient for them to agitate also against another claimant to the mandate, but, once again, within the confines of the law.

It is not precluded that independent agitation groups will appear, to support the candidates from the so-called informal organizations and movements.

[Correspondent] What are the relationships that the party's gorkom has with them? And who are they, and what are their goals?

[Serogodskaya] They all work at enterprises and institutions. They have some good ideas. They differ from others, perhaps, by their excessive fervor and impatience. Some are worried about the protection of the environment; others are worried about preserving the monuments of history and culture; and still others are fighting to restore justice toward the innocent victims of Stalinist repressions. The representatives of these movements have a large number of ideas. True, they do not always have an idea of how, by what efforts, or at whose expense a particular concept can be carried out.

We are attempting to find a common language with them and to cooperate with them. I am convinced that they need attention. Because it is axiomatic that a shortage of attention paid to public movements gives rise to a shortage of trust in party agencies and in the party. In the consolidating of public forces lies the success of perestroika. We are ready to cooperate with any public movement whose goal is to promote perestroika and to work jointly to resolve the ecological, social, and other problems.

Incidentally, a working group to coordinate the actions of all the public forces during the period of preparation for and the conducting of the election has been created under the CPSU gorkom. Coordination centers and agitation-propaganda groups within the boundaries of the electoral okrugs are being created in the housing areas in the city and the rayon. No one is prohibited from being part of them.

[Kuvshinova] There are a lot of things to do, and we are always pleased to have voluntary assistants, who want to move the perestroyka ahead on socialist principles. But, of course, we do not want to associate with extremists. In March in Aleksandrov, a group of emissaries appeared in the station area, bearing leaflets from the not exactly unknown Democratic Union. They were attempting to "correct" the voters' opinion about the candidates who were running for election as USSR people's deputies. The inhabitants gave those individuals "the bum's rush," and made an indignant statement in the newspaper. People understand who is hiding between the perestroyka slogans, thus hoping to earn political capital.

[Correspondent] Since you have mentioned the press, I would like to say something. In your newspapers, GOLOS TRUDA and KOMMUNAR, topics dealing with the election are poorly represented. There is no "Discussion Club" or "Dialogue" between the deputies and the voters. And why not open up, for example, a "direct line" with the mandatory participation of the party gorkom's secretaries and members and the managers of the soviet agencies? One can scarcely believe that they do not have anything to discuss with such a broad audience! Why are you losing the opportunity to show who is who and what position he occupies with regard to the acute problems of party life and soviet work? Those problems exist, and people gossip about them everywhere, a few people exert a negative influence on public opinion about the party and the Soviet authority, and they are not rebuffed.

[Serogodskaya] That's a true statement. Actually, the party is being criticized on the pages of publications that are the press organs of party committee, but we have decided not to say a single word. We do not fight back against the extremists. The initiative is being lost, and the discussions—if such occur—are conducted in the "defensive mode."

As for the use of the mass media in illuminating the election campaign, we have already, working jointly with the newspaper editorial office, have considered the plans in detail. A "Rostrum for Discussion" is being prepared. The editorial office has invited workers and kolkhoz member, party and soviet workers, the ideological aktiv, and deputies and voters to make statements.

We are also thinking about providing equal opportunities for expounding the candidates' election platforms. We are resolving questions with paper, with newspaper area.

[Kuvshinova] Our enterprises are producing five house organs, and there are editorial offices for local radio

broadcasting. We are including them in our work. We are arranging for the exchange of replaceable printing plates and tape recordings.

Nevertheless, not every claimant will be able to make a statement in the newspaper or over the radio. We shall produce leaflets and posters, so that the voters will have information about each claimant for a deputy mandate. We are preparing an agitation train for a trip. Lecturers, amateur performers, and propagandists during October and November will visit the remote inhabited places (we have approximately 200 of them), meet the public, make statements, and record their requests and wishes. One should not forget that the participants in the pre-election agitation will include the candidates themselves, their proxies, the agitation aktiv, support groups, labor collectives, and public organizations. It is impossible to transfer all of this to the CPSU gorkom and the soviet agencies! The large-scale enterprises have their own copying and reproduction equipment, and they will help the organizations that they sponsor. The candidates who have been nominated from the population must be helped by the okrug electoral commission. In addition, any initiative group can use its own efforts to manufacture appeals, leaflets, and posters. It is not precluded that monetary funds will be created from voluntary contributions for the conducting of the electoral campaign. This has not been prohibited by law.

[Correspondent] With the beginning of the election campaign, agitation stations, voter clubs, and information-and-propaganda and public political centers have been opening their doors. But it frequently happens that they have everything—furniture, a telephone, a television receiver, and a radio, newspapers and magazines, reference literature, and an agitator on duty. The only thing that is missing is the main character in the dramatis personae—the voter...

[Kuvshinova] In the past election we rejected the agitation stations: Why spend money on them if the agitator can carry out his assignment in the accommodations where the district electoral commission is situated? The voters know the road there. We open up public political centers where the people can go to relax and spend their free time—these are houses of culture, club houses. There the propaganda and agitation work intertwines naturally and organically with people's leisure activities.

[Serogodskaya] But even in this instance live political work with people is needed. Entertaining measures do not take the place of meetings with the candidates and their proxies, or of discussions among them. For example, we provide for the mandatory participation of administrators of agencies, chairmen of electoral commissions, jurists, teachers, and doctors in the meetings with party and soviet workers. Of course, the person who remains the connecting link between such an agitation center and the voters is the agitator. When inviting people to the meeting, he becomes acquainted with them, and during the meeting he can carry on a conversation and talk about the candidates, or can listen to claims made against the local soviet and economic agencies.

[Kuvshinova] There are remote inhabited places where there are no cultural centers. We send agitation brigades to these places. In addition, we make it a practice to send teams to visit households: the agitator who is assigned to ten households, the manager of the production sector (brigade leader, animal-farm manager, agronomist), and deputy visit the households once a month. The social and everyday-life questions are resolved on the spot, the new political situations are discussed, and explanatory work is carried out.

The election campaign is taking on momentum. As everyone knows, there are no ready-made formulas that are suitable for all situations in life. Constructive dialogue with the voters will require the initiative and creativity of the ideological cadres and the well-coordinated efforts of all the interested organizations. The agencies that once again will become the guiding and coordinating center are the party committees.

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**Estonian Draft Law on Immigration**

*90UN0269A Tallin MOLODEZH ESTONII in Russian  
2 Nov 89 p 3*

[“Self-Managing Estonia [IME] Draft Law of the Estonian SSR on Immigration”; translation of draft law published in the Estonian-language newspaper NOORTE HAAL, 31 Oct 1989]

[Text] Chairman of the working group: *Yu. Sillaste*.

Members of the working group: *Yu. Bergvald, A. Yunti, A. Kollist, V. Lyynik, T. Myangel, M. Pays, Ya. Tedder*.

Participating in composing the draft were: *I. Fyuk, E. Kundla, K. Luyga, A. Reymbush, V. Tammiksaar, L. Tepp*.

Draft expert: *K. Katus*.

In compiling the draft, consideration was given to the views of 46 public movements and associations of workers, and also of departments.

A group of experts from the Institute for the Economic Development of Estonia—on 19 October 1989.

The Estonian SSR Gosplan Collegium—on 21 October 1989.

Changes and additions have been coordinated with the authors.

Views and proposals should be directed to the following address: Department of Legislation IME, Estonian SSR Gosplan, 200103, Tallin, Ul. Komsomola 1.

**Commentary to the Estonian SSR Law on Immigration**

In the opinion of the chairman of the working group, government member Yu. Sillaste, this draft immigration legislation, which is being presented for discussion, has real chances of being implemented as the first legislative initiative proposed by citizens. At the same time, it should be noted that, over the course of prolonged and numerous refinements, though the initial idea has been preserved, certain aspects have been changed and much that is new and valuable has been introduced.

The most fundamental argument that arose in the course of work was about whether such a law is necessary at all. Doubts were expressed as to whether it is possible by administrative methods to achieve the desired result. Here, reference was made to world experience and the discussion centered around attempts by administrative measures to limit migration within the borders of one state. In my opinion, it is of principle importance to stress here Estonia's aspirations for sovereignty. Beside declarations, she recognizes a need to create institutions and institutes which guarantee practical sovereignty. At the same time, the migration service is one of these and, obviously, is important enough that, at least during the first two or three years of its activity, it should be

subordinate directly to the prime minister and the director of the migration service should have the rights of a minister.

Introducing the draft law on immigration for discussion, we need to understand that we are dealing with a very important enterprise, in the realization of which, clearly expressed public opinion will play a large role. Concerning the text of the draft law, I want to say the following:

1. The drafters have strived to consider the important role of local self-government. Procedures must be handled in such a way that an employer or individual person who is interested in attracting working forces will be obliged to reach an agreement with the local organ of self-government and, through it, with the all-Estonian migration service. The agreement of local self-government, in all cases, is a preliminary condition for immigration. On the other hand, one concern of the migration service will be to restrain the aspirations of certain cities, rayons, and volosts to attract as many immigrants as possible.

2. One of the key questions is establishment of a state-wide quota. The draft does not indicate how this quota will be broken down: How many people we will be able to accept in keeping with requirements for qualified workers, specialists and high-grade intellectuals, sportsmen, etc. This is important and serious work which, of course, must be completed before passage of the law. A special opinion in a footnote points to the necessity of establishing some kind of limit, one which cannot be crossed no matter what. At the same time, it should be noted that a quota of 1500 persons, especially taking account of the direction of migratory flows and the catastrophic situation, is a very high one for Estonia. It should be viewed as a limit that will not be raised.

3. On the other hand and closely tied to all this is departure from Estonia in connection with a change in place of residence. This law does not directly regulate remigration or emigration, but consideration must be given to ensuring that this draft law will be implemented in such a form as not to cause any kind of discomfiture for those who wish to find themselves a permanent place of residence outside Estonia.

4. The system of issuing residence and work permits, possibly, is set forth less than ideally but, as an idea, it is certainly reasonable. The fact is that, in truly sovereign states, there is a third component—authorizations for entry, or visas. A similar resolution of the question is suggested in the fifth paragraph, which talks about a still not existing system of border control. The necessity of such control, naturally, is dictated not only by the requirements of the emigration service. This is required by the necessity of developing the economy on the basis of economic accountability, of protecting the domestic market no matter whether the means of payment will be the ruble, as formerly, payment checks, the Estonian crown, the dollar, or all of them together; and also the

necessity of combatting uncontrolled speculation, the shadow economy, vagrancy, crime, and God knows what else.

5. Besides border controls, still one other new concept is introduced. Article 26 talks about taking stock of all persons really living in Estonia (taking stock, a census?), and, in a footnote, also about issuing them, as a supplement to this, appropriate certification.

This is fundamental in several aspects, including also in connection with the fact that persistent rumors are going around that the central government of the Soviet Union intends to abolish the system of passes as being nondemocratic and as an infringement on the Soviet people.

Further, it is clear that with the introduction of border controls, the mass of those people who already have an established connection of one kind or with Estonia should be known.

The question will certainly occur to those who read this footnote as to whether the philosophy of the committees of citizens of Estonia is not being copied here, whether we aren't dealing here with an audacious attempt to divide all people into first and second class citizens, as our so-called internationalists assert. In fact, all this is only an attempt to describe the situation that has developed and the desire, by codifying it, to attempt to achieve a satisfactory solution.

Whether we wish it our not, objectively, the situation is that two communities of people with different histories live in Estonia: citizens of the occupied Estonian Republic and their heirs and those whom fate or their parents have brought here for the most part since the Second World War. And it is important that we talk about this circumstance as it really is.

In any case, obviously, it should be repeated that, as people, all residents of Estonia, of course, are equal.

I would like to hope that this published draft law will serve as a cause for thought and will give birth to your proposals. It is possible that, through common efforts, we will be able to see this legislation implemented on 1 January.—*A. Kollist.*

The changeover of the Estonian SSR to full economic accountability presupposes control over migration processes, which presumes state regulation of migration into the Estonian SSR from other union republics, of departures from the republic, and also of intra-republic migration.

This law concerns entry into the Estonian SSR; it provides an opportunity to newcomers to choose worthy living and working conditions for themselves and allows permanent residents to feel that they are protected socially.

## 1. General Provisions

### 1. The tasks of the Estonian SSR Law on Immigration

(1) The Estonian SSR Law on Immigration regulates social relations arising in connection with the entry of individuals into the Estonian SSR and provides legal guarantees of the purposeful social and territorial development of the republic's population and of the rational labor employment of new arrivals.

(2) The cited relations are regulated by the Constitution of the Estonian SSR, by the present law, and by other normative acts of the Estonian SSR, taking account of agreements between states.

### 2. The Concept and Subjects of Immigration

(1) Immigration is the residence or work for a period of at least one month within the Estonian SSR of persons who before this resided permanently outside its borders, in connection with family, production or official circumstances, with the goal of professional training, improvement of qualifications, or obtaining an education.

(2) The subject of immigration relations is an individual person or family and, on the other side—local self-government, expressing the interests of the social and territorial community of people.

### 3. Persons to whom the law on immigration does not apply

(1) The present law does not apply to:

- a) citizens of the Estonian SSR and their descendants;
- b) deported and illegally repressed persons and their descendants;
- c) persons permanently resident in the Estonian SSR who have been called up to active service in the Soviet Army;
- d) persons freed from places of confinement who, at the moment of their sentencing, resided permanently within the Estonian SSR;

(2) Persons named in part 1 of this article have the right of unimpeded settlement in the Estonian SSR.

(3) Questions of providing permits for residence for military personnel, the personnel of embassies, consulates and representations, refugees and persons applying for political asylum in Estonia are regulated by intergovernmental agreements.

### 4. Regulation of internal migration

Immigration legislation does not regulate the processes of migration within the Estonian SSR; organs of local self-government are concerned with this.

### 5. Temporary entry and transit through the Estonian SSR

(1) The temporary entry of an individual into the Estonian SSR or transit through the Estonian SSR lasting up to one month, in connection with temporary duty assignment, tourism, rest, the import and sale of goods, and visits to residents of Estonia, is to be organized by the Estonian SSR border control system, which shall be

introduced by the Estonian SSR Council of Ministers not later than within 6 months from the moment that the present law enters into effect.

(2) Shuttle [chelnochniy] migration in border regions is regulated in consultation and in agreement with local self-government.

## 6. Migration Service of the Estonian SSR

(1) An Estonian SSR Migration Service shall be established for purposes of governmental regulation of relations arising in the course of migration processes.

(2) The basic statute concerning the Migration Service of the Estonian SSR shall be approved by the Estonian SSR Council of Ministers.

(3) The Estonian SSR Migration Service has the right, within the limits of its competence, to conclude agreements with enterprises, organizations and institutions of other countries and USSR union republics.

## 7. The Immigration Quota

(1) The Estonian SSR Law on Immigration regulates the settlement of individuals for purposes of residence in the Estonian SSR on the basis of quotas established for each calendar year. The quota represents the maximum norm for entrants and is formulated taking account of the proposals of local self-government. (add: "...but should not exceed 0.1 percent of the permanent population"—*A. Kollist, A. Yunti.*)

(2) The immigration quota and its structure in terms of types of migration and regions shall be approved by the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian SSR for the calendar year, based on a proposal by the Estonian SSR Council of Ministers and in agreement with the Estonian SSR state budget.

(3) The quota shall apply to all persons arriving to reside in the Estonian SSR irrespective of their age, social origin, family ties, ethnic, racial, and religious affiliation.

## 8. Obtaining a residence or work permit in the Estonian SSR

(1) A person desiring to obtain a permit to reside or work in the Estonian SSR must obtain the written permission of the Estonian SSR Migration Service, using the form that is established for this purpose.

(2) The basis for application to obtain a residence or work permit is a personal declaration, which is submitted to and examined by the Estonian SSR Migration Service in each specific case individually, following procedures established by the Estonian SSR Council of Ministers.

(3) A denial to issue an authorization must be motivated by objective reasons, by the conditioned interests of Estonian society as a whole.

(4) A condition for receipt of authorization is payment of state customs duties.

## The Residence Permit

### 9. Types of residence permits

(1) Permits for residence in the Estonian SSR are subdivided into temporary, fixed-term, and permanent ones.

(2) A permanent permit for residence may be issued to a person having within the Estonian SSR close relatives (spouse, parents, children), ties with Estonian culture, or particularly necessary labor skills that are socially important from the viewpoint of the Estonian SSR.

(3) A fixed-term residence permit may be issued to a person for the specific term of his work or activities within the Estonian SSR.

(4) A temporary residence permit may be given to a person for a definite period of time. A condition of receiving a temporary residence permit is the availability of subsistence funds, certified according to procedures stipulated by the Estonian SSR Migration Service, that shall exceed the living minimum for the indicated period of stay.

### 10. Term of validity of the residence permit

(1) A temporary residence permit may be issued to a person for a period of not more than 6 months.

(2) A fixed-term residence permit is issued to a person, as a rule, for a period of not more than 3 years.

(3) A person, living outside the Estonian SSR, who marries a person permanently residing within the Estonian SSR, is on first application issued a residence permit for a period of 6 months; subsequent residence permits shall have a fixed term of 5 years.

## 11. Residence of children and young people within the Estonian SSR

(1) Children up to 10 years of age receive a permit for residence in the Estonian SSR in common with their parents. When issuing residence permits to persons who arrive accompanied by children of 10-16 years of age, the wishes of the children are also taken into consideration. At ages 16-18, children have the right to apply for a residence permit on their own. If they do not have their own family or are living as dependents of their parents, the written agreement of their parents or guardians is required.

(2) The proposed procedures shall function in the event that other procedures have not been established in agreements between states or the union republics of the USSR.

## 12. Special Cases in the issuance of residence permits

(1) A person whose temporary residence permit has expired and who desires to remain living in Estonia upon

fulfillment of his professional obligations or completion of his studies may, together with his close relatives (spouse, children, parents) apply for a permanent residence permit on a general basis within quota limits if the Estonian SSR Migration Service recognizes him as having adapted.

(2) Close family members of military personnel (spouse, children, parents) are issued fixed-term residence permits on the basis of an application submitted in the proper form.

### **13. Restrictions attached to temporary and fixed-term residence permits**

The place of residence of a person applying for a temporary or fixed-term residence permit shall be determined by the Estonian SSR Migration Service in agreement with local self-government.

### **14. Residence permits of persons who have committed an administrative legal violation or a crime**

The question of the validity of a residence permit of a person who has committed an administrative legal violation or a crime shall be examined by the Estonian SSR Migration Service following procedures which it shall establish.

### **15. Expiration of a residence permit**

(1) Upon expiration of a temporary or fixed-term residence permit or its premature cancellation, and also in the case of residence in the Estonian SSR without a residence permit, the individual shall be issued a order to leave the Estonian SSR, which shall be carried out in accordance with procedures established by the Estonian SSR Council of Ministers.

(2) Temporary or fixed-term residence permits are subject to revocation:

- 1) upon the cessation of working relations;
  - 2) if a person conceals taxable income or provides false information in an earnings statement;
  - 3) if a person is called up to active service in the Soviet Army;
  - 4) if a person systematically fails to pay his apartment rent or if his activities appear contrary to part 1 of Article 98 of the Estonian SSR Housing Code;
  - 5) if a person has consciously placed himself in the situation of having insufficient subsistence funds;
  - 6) if a student withdraws or is excluded from the student rolls;
  - 7) in the case of dissolution of a marriage to a person permanently resident in the Estonian SSR.
- (3) Premature cancellation of a residence visa may also be initiated by the person holding the residence permit.

## **Work and Study in the Estonian SSR**

### **16. Work permits**

(1) Work permits are either for a fixed term or permanent.

(2) In the case of fixed-term employment in the Estonian SSR, the individual receives authorization from the Estonian SSR Migration Service, upon application from local self-government, for work in a specific organization.

(3) Fixed-term work permits may be:

- short-term, up to 6 months;
- temporary, up to 3 years.

(4) Recipients of fixed-term work permits must have a permanent permit outside the borders of the Estonian SSR, if other procedures have not been established in the corresponding states.

(5) Fixed-term work permits may not be extended.

(6) Premature cancellation of fixed-term work permits is accomplished according to procedures established by law.

(7) A separate work permit is not issued to persons who have a permit for permanent residence in the Estonian SSR.

### **Entry for study within the Estonian SSR.**

(1) A person entering the Estonian SSR for purposes of study must have a set course of study.

(2) Persons listed in the rolls of educational institutions (including course members and students) shall be issued a short-term residence permit above the established quota, the effective period of which shall be limited to the period of study.

## **Establishment of benefits**

### **18. Facilitating the adaptation of persons settling in the Estonian SSR**

(1) The Estonian SSR Migration Service is required to take measures to help persons who have received a residence permits to adapt to local conditions.

(2) For this purposes, the Estonian SSR Migration Service, in close cooperation with local self-government, societies for cultural autonomy, public organizations, and the individuals who have received residence permits, shall organize a system of courses and study programs in the Estonian language, culture, history, and state structure.

(3) Expenditures for assisting the adaptation of persons who are resident on the basis of a work permit shall be borne by the organization which has submitted the application to employ them.

**19. Fund for assistance to persons settling in the Estonian SSR**

A fund, comprised of funds from the state budget, societies for cultural autonomy, organizations and individual persons, shall be established under the Estonian SSR Migration Service for purposes of extending assistance to persons settling in the Estonian SSR. State allocations to the fund will be made by the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet. Procedures for the expenditure of fund assets shall be defined by the Estonian SSR Council of Ministers.

**20. Resettlement of persons from the Estonian SSR**

Questions connected with the resettlement of persons from the Estonian SSR and the provision of benefits to persons who are settling elsewhere are regulated on the basis of corresponding agreements between the organs of self-government of the states and of the union republics of the USSR, with the assistance of law enforcement organs, basing themselves on the wish and right of the individual to a free choice of place of residence.

**Legal relationships****21. Obligations of the Estonian SSR Migration Service**

(1) The Estonian SSR Migration Service is obligated to familiarize persons wishing to reside or work in the Estonian SSR with their rights and obligations that stem from this law.

(2) The submission of false information by a person desiring to receive a permit for residence or employment shall entail cancellation of the residence or work permit.

**22. Obligations of organizations and institutions**

To avoid violations of the rights of citizens and with the goal of providing timely assistance to persons who have received a permit for residence or employment, organizations which deal with persons who have received residence or work permits from the Estonian SSR Migration Service, have the following obligations:

—enterprises, institutions and organizations with which fixed-term work agreements have been concluded—to inform the Estonian SSR Migration Service concerning premature dissolution of the work agreement;

—educational institutions—to advise the Estonian SSR Migration Service concerning exclusion of students, cessation of studies, or transfer to another educational institution;

—the tax service—to immediately inform the Estonian SSR Migration Service when persons who have a residence permit, which is not connected with working activity, fall below established minimum subsistence funds level;

—law enforcement organs—to urgently inform the Estonian SSR Migration Service of all violations of the law by persons who have received a residence permit;

—civil registration service—to immediately inform the Estonian SSR Migration Service of a change in the family situation of a person who has received a residence permit.

**23. Additional legal protection of persons coming from outside the Estonian SSR**

(1) A contract for rental of housing in the Estonian SSR may be concluded only with persons who hold a residence permit.

(2) Only a person with a permanent residence permit has the right to conclude transactions involving the purchase and sale of real estate (with the exception of that designated for production purposes), including purchases on installments.

(3) Violation of the enumerated conditions will result in the concluded transactions being declared invalid.

(4) Damages suffered in the course of illegal transactions are not subject to reimbursement.

**24. Settlement of disputes**

(1) Disputes arising on the basis of this law shall be resolved under procedures established by the Estonian SSR Council of Ministers.

(2) Disputes in questions connected with the permanent residence permit may be resolved by the parties under court procedures.

**25. Responsibility for violation of the Law on Immigration.**

A person guilty of violating the Law on Immigration shall bear responsibility under procedures established by Estonian SSR legislation.

**26. Procedures for application of the Law on Immigration.**

(1) This law shall go into effect on 1 January 1990.

(2) Beginning on 1 January 1990, passports regulations will have to brought into compliance with the requirement that arriving individuals necessarily must to have a residence permit.

(3) A person who has received a residence permit is required to register at the population registry upon its receipt from the Migration Service.

(4) Until establishment of the population registry, the procedures for establishing the permanent population of the Estonian SSR shall be determined by the Estonian SSR Migration Service. (Citizens residing within the territory of the Estonian SSR on the day that the Law on Immigration goes into effect shall be provided with the following documents within the course of 6 months:

(1) citizens of the Estonian Republic and their descendants shall be issued an identification document (form

No. 1), which certifies their residence in the Estonian SSR, and a corresponding notation shall be made in their passports.

(2) persons who are permanently residing within the Estonian SSR at the moment the Law on Immigration goes into effect and who are not citizens of the Estonian Republic, or their descendants, shall, in accordance with their wishes, be issued certification (form No. 2) which confirms their residence in the Estonian SSR.—*A. Kolist, A. Yunti, V. Tammiksaar.*)

#### PROPOSALS FOR APPLICATION OF THE ESTONIAN SSR LAW ON IMMIGRATION

With the object of application of the Estonian SSR Law on Immigration the working group introduces the following proposals:

1. To amend the Estonian SSR Administrative Code with corresponding articles and to stipulate responsibility for violation of the Estonian SSR Law on Immigration.

2. To amend the Estonian SSR Criminal Code with a new article entitled "On responsibility for violation of the Estonian SSR Law on Immigration, which will establish the responsibility of official persons for violations of the Law on Immigration and introduce penalties in the form of a monetary fine of up to 5000 rubles or deprivation of freedom for a period of up to 3-5 years.

3) Problems connected with the sale of real estate, and also questions of labor relations should be subject to regulation by the introduction of changes and additions to the Estonian SSR Civil Code and the Estonian SSR Code of Law on Labor.—director of the working group, *Yu. Sillaste.*

#### ON POLITICS IN CONNECTION WITH THE LAW ON IMMIGRATION

In May of this year, at the initiative of the government, a working group was created to develop a legal act regulating migration. At the initiative of the director of the group, it was decided when developing the draft law to make use of available results of population and migration studies as well as of the help of scholars.

The participation of scholars in this work was complicated: (1) by overwhelming political radicalism in the understanding of migration and the ways to regulate it, and also (2) by the lack of an information base due to the small volume of research done on migration. Nevertheless, the results of the scientific studies that were available to the commission and, particularly, the constructive spirit that developed during its work, made it possible to create what, from a scholarly point of view, was an acceptable draft.

On their way to the Supreme Soviet, all drafts pass through the hands of the middle-level apparatus. Due to a wide diversity of aspirations, interference of the apparatus in the preparation of laws seems stronger than ever.

In essence, the draft law on immigration that went to the government and is being commented on over the radio represents a version that differs fundamentally from the one that was created by the commission. It is true that the names of the authors of the earlier draft have been preserved, which may suggest to some that scholarship is represented to its previous extent.

Proceeding from what has been said above, the undersigned cannot add themselves to the collective of authors of the draft law that has been proposed to the government. Also misleading is the assertion that "changes have been coordinated with the authors."

We recognize the inalienable right of Estonian politicians to make legislative decisions dictated by all kinds of aspirations. We consider the task of scholarship to be the obligation to advise of the possible consequences of these and alternative decisions. Despite differences in assessments of the further fate of this draft, we express our readiness for open discussion and evaluation of it from the position of demography. In case of necessity, in our opinion, along with the official draft, it is possible to present its original version, prepared by the working group.—*K. Katus, D. Mikkaylov, T. Myangel.*

#### Differing Versions of ESSR Draft Law on Immigration Published

90UN0360A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 5 Nov 89 p 1

[Interview with Yu. Sillaste, chairman of the Estonian SSR State Committee for Labor, by L. Sher: "The Law on Immigration: The Work Has Just Begun"; time, place not given]

[Text] On 4 November, in the Estonian SSR Gosplan [Committee for State Planning] auditorium, members of the Estonian SSR Council of Ministers, Estonian SSR government advisers and scientists gathered in order to carefully analyze the draft law on immigration, about which a multitude of questions had arisen upon its first reading in the republic's government. Since the publication of this draft in the newspapers NOORTE HAAL and MOLODEZH ESTONII immediately provoked such a stormy and at times pointed reaction on the part of the most diverse strata of society, we requested that Yu. Sillaste, chairman of the Estonian SSR State Committee for Labor, who is heading the committee developing the draft, comment on the fact of the publication itself, without going into an analysis of the draft law text.

[Sher] The draft law was having its first reading in the Estonian SSR Council of Ministers in the evening, on the eve of the publication of this text in the newspaper MOLODEZH ESTONII, and it was decided to have an intermediate discussion with the participation of government members and advisers before holding the second reading. To what extent may the published text be considered to reflect the opinion and position of the government?

[Sillaste] The given text is in no way an official government text of the draft law. This is a draft document prepared by the working group, according to the results of the meeting of the Estonian SSR Gosplan collegium, to which were appended particular opinions on various questions from individual members of the working group, with their names indicated; this is based upon the minority having the right to express and advocate its opinion. I must say that we have worked out more than one-tenth of the versions of the draft law before coming to a consensus on the majority of the issues. The published draft has been examined by experts, and by the Estonian SSR Gosplan collegium coordinating all the work on lawmaking associated with IME [Self-Managing Estonia]. The cap, "The IME Draft" bespeaks the fact that the draft was not brought out for public discussion by the government. The publication of such an interim version by Estonian SSR Gosplan pursues only one goal: to involve the public in developing the law at as early a phase as possible.

It should be considered that a few readings in the Council of Ministers is not yet the end of the work on the draft law. The legislators will go further into the matter; most likely, the draft will be officially brought forth for popular discussion, and then the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet deputies will have the decisive word. So in essence, the work is still just at the beginning.

[Sher] How can the discrepancies in the text published in NOORTE HAAL and the text published in MOLODEZH ESTONII be explained?

[Sillaste] It is hard for me to find an explanation for that. True, both texts are distinguished by their negligence. So, for some reason, the prefacing comments are included in the text of the law, presented in effect as a basis for the viewpoint of those draft developers who had a particular opinion on certain articles. Understandably, in no way may commentary become a constituent part of a legislative act. But while in NOORTE HAAL these two particular opinions were rendered in footnotes, in MOLODEZH ESTONII they were included in the text of articles, particularly in articles 7 and 26, and are perceived as statutes adopted by the working group.

And quite unintelligible is the disappearance from the text of two subpoints of article 26, and the corresponding change in the enumeration of all the subpoints. I feel it my duty to cite in their entirety these subpoints which vanished from the text presented to the government:

"(2) All individuals having on 31 December 1989 permanent residence in the Estonian SSR are considered to be individuals having a permanent residence permit.

(3) All individuals having on 31 December 1989 temporary residence in the Estonian SSR are considered to be individuals having a temporary residence permit within the time limits of the permit."

It seems to me that the disappearance of these two statutes changes the direction of the draft law significantly. It is hard for me to judge if there are shortcomings on the part of the editorial and typographic services behind these errors. But objectively, this was conducive to a growth of the tension, associated with the draft law, of the political situation in the republic for which, it seems to me, there are as yet no grounds. I repeat, it was published specifically so that all political forces, all the republic's residents could express their opinions, comments, and suggestions; so that, if they are adopted, the law take into consideration the interests of all groups and strata of society, all its citizens. Incidentally, in preparing the draft law, the working group considered the opinions and comments of 46 different social movements and associations of workers, as well as departments.

In conclusion, we shall explain that in the Russian text, the phrase in article 7 must be distinguished by the footnoted comment (that is, by special decision of individual members of the working group): "(Add: "...but must not exceed 0.1 percent of the permanent population"—A. Kollist, A. Yunti)"; and in article 26: "(Citizens residing in the territory of the Estonian SSR on the day the law on immigration takes effect are provided with the following documents over the course of 6 months:

1) citizens of the Estonian Republic and their heirs are issued personal identification (form No. 1) which proves their residence in the Estonian SSR, and the corresponding notation is made in their passports;

2) individuals permanently residing in the Estonian SSR at the moment when the law on immigration takes effect who are not citizens of the Estonian Republic, or their heirs, according to their wishes are issued a certificate (form No 2) confirming their residence in the Estonian SSR.—A. Kollist, A. Yunti, V. Tammiksaar)."

#### Estonian Draft Laws on Immigration, Taxes Discussed

*90UN0360B Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 15 Nov 89 p 1*

[ETA report by L. Sher: "The Lawmaking Continues"]

[Excerpt] The 13 November meeting of the republic government began dramatically for Yu. Sillaste, Goskormtrud [State Committee for Labor] chairman, who reported to the Council of Ministers on the changes and additions introduced to the draft law on immigration after its first reading in the government.

As we know, the preliminary publication of this draft law provoked a very pointed reaction, as it contained certain statutes which could, and not groundlessly, be perceived as being discriminatory. At the discussion between the two readings in the government, the working group reached a consensus on the removal of certain formulations, in particular, on the border patrol. The text of the

preamble contained in the first version prepared by the group was restored; it indicates the link of the given draft law to the General Declaration of the Rights of Man, adopted by the UN. Two subjects are presupposed at the center of the law's attention: local self-management, the role of which is being significantly raised, and man (the family). Much more emphasis is being made on the economic, rather than the administrative methods of regulating migration, in particular, on the responsibility of the enterprises inviting workers from beyond the republic's borders to provide those invited with normal living conditions, and to bear all the expenses associated with the adaptation of the worker and his family members. The draft recognizes the impermissibility of interfering with family migration—the reunification of families, although it also stipulates measures against entering the republic on the basis of fictitious marriages. In a word, many changes have been made, and in my view, they are for the better.

Nevertheless, opinions also resounded at the meeting to the effect that the draft is very rough, and cannot be recommended for adoption in such a state, since many issues associated with exiting the republic remain beyond the limits of regulation. And after all, the prospects for a "brain drain" and a drain of the qualified workforce are absolutely real. Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Gren directed particular attention to this in reporting that the ministry had already received petitions for leaving to work in the countries of the West; there is as yet no procedure for satisfying such petitions.

In summing up the discussion, head of government I. Toome emphasized that of course, the normal democratic state toward which we are striving should not restrict the rights of people even on the scale stipulated by the draft law being examined. Yet the situation now is such that this is vitally necessary. And the government is consciously forced to move toward this in order to defend the republic's population from a long-term deterioration of its welfare.

After an inventory of the comments and amendments expressed during the course of the discussion, it was decided to introduce the draft law to the ESSR Supreme Soviet for further work.

More than a few comments, amendments, and additions were expressed on the matter of the second draft law under discussion as well—the draft law on taxation. As a result, even the title of the draft was changed—the draft law on the organization of taxation. This is a framework draft law. It does not determine the imposition of taxes, or the procedure of taxation. As regards taxing the population, that will be established by individual laws for each type of tax, and regarding taxes from enterprises, by government decrees. The draft law defines 15 types of taxes, which must first of all encompass all types of economic activity of judicial individuals and citizens, and secondly, influence economic activity through taxes as a means of economic regulation in a trend necessary to the republic, and thirdly, provide all necessary budgetary

expenditures and extra-budgetary designated funds with revenue, and fourthly, maximize the provision of the principle of social justice for taxpayers, independent of the form of property, the sphere of activity, its organizational forms, etc. It can hardly be managed to introduce all the taxes at once. Planned for 1990 are an income tax on enterprises, social tax, land tax, transportation tax, investment tax, tax on the right to expand activity, entertainment tax, and state duty. The introduction of a partial excise tax is envisaged, as is a tax on natural resources and minerals, and a tax for polluting the environment. Other taxes, in particular, a tax on circulation, remain unchanged for the time being.

The government noted the necessity of developing in the near future drafts of normative acts regulating the imposition of taxes, the procedure for their collection, and the procedure for granting tax relief. The first reading in the government has been done, and now the work on this will continue. [passage omitted]

#### Draft Law on Estonian SSR Government

90UN0459A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 22 Nov 89 p 1

[“Draft Law of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic on the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic Government”]

#### [Text] I. General Provisions

**Article 1.** The Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic Government—the supreme body of state administration of the Estonian SSR

The Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic Government is the Estonian SSR's supreme body of state administration and is subordinate to the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet.

The Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic Government is empowered to decide all questions of state administration that belong, according to the Estonian SSR Constitution and this law, to its jurisdiction.

**Article 2.** The composition of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic Government. The procedures for forming the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic Government

The Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic Government includes the chairman of the Estonian SSR Government (the prime minister) and ministers.

The chairman of the Estonian SSR Government (prime minister) is appointed to his office and removed from office by the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet.

With the removal from office of the chairman of the Estonian SSR Government (prime minister), the Estonian SSR Government as a whole resigns.

The appointment to office and removal from office of a member of the Estonian SSR Government are done on

the basis of a representation of the chairman of the Estonian SSR Government (prime minister).

The Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet may appoint ministers to office regardless of the number of ministers, but no more than 21 ministers.

Deputy ministers, the general directors of Estonian SSR departments, and the directors of Estonian SSR inspection services are appointed to office and removed from office by the chairman of the Estonian SSR Government (prime minister).

In the event of the resignation of the Estonian SSR Government, it continues to exercise its authority on instruction of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet until the formation of a new Estonian SSR Government.

### **Article 3. Basic areas of activity of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic Government**

The Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic Government, within the limits of its powers:

shows concern for the well-being and security of the population;

creates conditions for the development of a republic that is strong in social and economic respects;

provides for the effective management of the economy, the acceleration of scientific and technological progress, and the improvement of the quality of work;

develops commodity-money relations and partnership to the utmost;

carries out economic cooperation with the union republics and foreign countries;

prepares draft Estonian SSR laws to be presented to the Presidium of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet;

— fosters the development of the independence of bodies of state administration of various levels;

— shows concern for the preservation of the indigenous population, as well as for the political and cultural development of Estonia's other nationalities;

— ensures preservation of the natural environment and the economical utilization of natural resources;

— shows concern for the execution of laws of the Estonian SSR, as well as for USSR laws and international agreements that have effect in the Estonian SSR.

### **Article 4. The basic principles of the activities of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic Government**

In its activities the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic Government:

— is governed by the republic Constitution and other laws;

— proceeds from the principles of broad democracy, glasnost in its activities, and the consideration of public opinion;

— provides for the collegial consideration of questions and the personal responsibility of government members for the implementation of decisions that are made.

### **Article 5. The responsibility and accountability of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic Government**

The Estonian SSR Government is accountable to the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet.

A newly formed Estonian SSR Government presents a program of its activities to the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet for consideration. Meetings of the Estonian SSR Government are, as a rule, closed. By decision of the chairman of the Estonian SSR Government (prime minister), they may be open.

The Estonian SSR Government ensures glasnost in its activities before the population.

The Estonian SSR Government or a member of the government to whom an inquiry is addressed by an Estonian SSR people's deputy is required to answer the inquiry in a session of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet.

The Estonian SSR Government considers the recommendations of commissions and committees of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet, as well as the proposals of Estonian SSR people's deputies, and informs them of the results of their consideration or of action that has been taken.

The manifestation of no-confidence in an Estonian SSR Government and the early recall of an Estonian SSR Government or a member of it are done by the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet.

### **II. The Jurisdiction of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic Government**

#### **Article 6. General questions regarding the jurisdiction of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic Government**

The Estonian SSR Government, within the limits of its authority stipulated by the Estonian SSR Constitution and this law:

1) carries out a program of activities aimed at the republic's economic and social development;

2) coordinates and directs the activities of Estonian SSR ministries, Estonian SSR departments, Estonian SSR inspection services, and other state agencies and organizations;

3) provides recommendations concerning the activities of Estonian SSR executive bodies of government;

4) exercises oversight over the implementation of its decisions.

**Article 7.** Basic powers of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic Government in the area of social development, public education, and culture

The Estonian SSR Government:

- 1) follows a uniform social policy and ensures the preservation of the Estonian language and culture;
- 2) implements and improves an integral policy in the area of population and the family;
- 3) directs migration policy;
- 4) provides for Estonian SSR citizens free general education and the opportunity to acquire a specialty;
- 5) creates the physical facilities and equipment and conditions necessary for the development of education, culture, health care, and social security;
- 6) draws up strategic guidelines for the development of housing and municipal services;
- 7) provides for the development of physical culture and sports;
- 8) creates special funds for the development of literature and art, and directs the preservation of historical and cultural monuments;
- 9) provides for the development of tourism and recreation.

**Article 8.** The basic powers of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic Government in the area of economic development

The Estonian SSR Government:

- 1) provides for the strategic development of the Estonian SSR economy;
- 2) draws up and presents to the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet draft laws on long-range programs of economic and social development and adopts measures for their implementation;
- 3) organizes the drafting and implementation of republic comprehensive programs;
- 4) develops and enacts measures for the preservation and scientifically substantiated, rational utilization of the land, underground resources, water resources, and flora and fauna, the preservation of air and water purity, and the ensured reproduction of natural resources and improvement of the human environment;
- 5) adopts measures for the integration of the Estonian SSR economy into the USSR economy and the world economy;
- 6) provides for a diversity of forms of ownership and organizational structures;
- 7) shows concern for the decentralization of economic management, the development of commodity-money

relations, and observance of the principles of self-supporting economic operation and self-management in all spheres of the republic's economic activity and at all levels;

- 8) follows an innovative policy taking the long-term structure of the economy into account;
- 9) adopts measures and allocates funds to provide assistance to regions and branches of the republic economy that find themselves in grave circumstances or require accelerated development;
- 10) determines the procedures for the utilization and disposition of republic special funds created for the purposes of economic development;
- 11) provides for the organization of a unified system of record keeping and statistics;
- 12) organizes the development and implementation of state standards.

**Article 9.** Basic powers of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic Government in the area of finance, credit, taxation and prices

The Estonian SSR Government:

- 1) submits draft laws on the Estonian SSR State Budget to the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet for consideration and adoption;
- 2) develops and carries out republic policy in the area of finances, credit and taxation;
- 3) carries out and improves republic policy in the area of prices and the price system.

**Article 10.** Basic powers of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic Government in the area of labor and wages

The Estonian SSR Government:

- 1) carries out policy in the area of labor, employment and wages and adopts measures for its improvement;
- 2) provides for the implementation and improvement of policy in the area of the training, retraining and advanced training of personnel.

**Article 11.** Basic powers of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic Government in the area of science and technology

The Estonian SSR Government:

- 1) carries out policy in the area of the development of science and technology;
- 2) provides for the development and implementation of comprehensive programs for the development of technology;
- 3) creates special funds for the development of science and technology;

4) organizes the protection of copyrights and inventors' rights.

**Article 12. Basic powers of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic Government in the area of ensuring legality**

The Estonian SSR Government:

- 1) provides for the preservation of the public order and the protection of citizens' rights and liberties;
- 2) prepares draft laws for the improvement of existing legislation;

3) organizes oversight over the observance of legislation by Estonian SSR ministries, Estonian SSR departments, Estonian SSR inspection services, and all enterprises and organizations located and operating within Estonian SSR territory.

**Article 13. Basic powers of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic Government in the area of ensuring the state's security and defense capability**

The Estonian SSR Government adopts measures within the limits defined by the Estonian SSR Constitution to ensure the republic's security and defense capability.

**Article 14. Basic powers of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic Government in the area of foreign political activity**

The Estonian SSR Government:

- 1) concludes treaties with other states and their organizations;
- 2) organizes relations between the Estonian SSR and foreign states and international organizations, as well as the acquisition and exchange of information that is of interest to the sides;
- 3) adopts decisions on the opening of republic missions in other countries and the opening of other countries' missions in the Estonian SSR.

**Article 15. Questions decided at meetings of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic Government**

Questions pertaining to the implementation of state policy, social and economic problems, and the course of the execution of Estonian SSR laws and implementation of decrees of the Estonian SSR Government are considered at meetings of the Estonian SSR Government.

**III. Relations Between the Estonian SSR Government and Other State Agencies**

**Article 16. Relations between the Estonian SSR Government and the USSR Council of Ministers and union-republic Councils of Ministers**

The Estonian SSR Government carries out cooperation with the USSR Council of Ministers and the union-republic Councils of Ministers.

In order to provide for daily ties between the Estonian SSR Government and the USSR Council of Ministers and union-republic Councils of Ministers, representatives of the Estonian SSR may operate in Moscow and the capitals of the union republics.

**Article 17. Relations between the Estonian SSR Government and local government executive bodies**

The Estonian SSR Government:

- 1) within the limits of its powers, directs and monitors the activities of local government executive bodies;
- 2) organizes, with the participation of local government executive bodies, the management of facilities and economic branches that are of state significance (electric-power grids, the telephone system, railroads, highways, and other communication and transportation systems);
- 3) directs social security, health care, public education, culture, environmental protection and regional policy.

**Article 18. The management of Estonian SSR ministries, Estonian SSR departments, and other agencies subordinate to the Estonian SSR Government**

The Estonian SSR Government directs the work of Estonian SSR ministries and Estonian SSR Government committees and commissions. It directs the activities of Estonian SSR departments and Estonian SSR inspection services.

The Estonian SSR Government submits proposals on the formation and abolition of Estonian SSR ministries to the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet.

The Estonian SSR Government approves regulations on the ministries, Estonian SSR Government committees, Estonian SSR departments, and Estonian SSR inspection services.

**Article 19. Oversight by the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic Government over the activities of agencies subordinate to it**

The Estonian SSR Government exercises oversight over the work of Estonian SSR ministries, Estonian SSR departments and other agencies subordinate to the Estonian SSR Government.

The chairman of the Estonian SSR Government (prime minister) may direct inquiries to each Estonian SSR minister, and executive of an Estonian SSR department or Estonian SSR inspection service.

Within the limits of its jurisdiction, the Estonian SSR Government has the right to rescind acts of Estonian SSR ministries, Estonian SSR departments, and other agencies subordinate to the Estonian SSR Government.

The Estonian SSR Government may impose disciplinary penalties on Estonian SSR ministers and their deputies,

as well as the executives of Estonian SSR departments and other agencies subordinate to the Estonian SSR Government.

**Article 20. Estonian SSR Ministries**

Estonian SSR ministries are central agencies of state administration.

Estonian SSR ministries are headed by ministers.

Estonian SSR ministries carry out policies of the Government, direct spheres of administration on the basis of Estonian SSR laws and decrees and orders of the Estonian SSR Government, and monitor their execution and implementation within the limits of their jurisdiction.

Estonian SSR ministries have the right, within the limits of their jurisdiction, to promulgate normative acts.

**Article 21. Estonian SSR departments and Estonian SSR inspection services**

Estonian SSR departments and Estonian SSR inspection services are formed by the Estonian SSR Government for the purposes of direction, coordination and oversight in matters of state administration, the organization of economic life, and other matters not belonging directly to the functions of ministries.

Estonian SSR departments are headed by general directors and Estonian SSR inspection services—by directors.

Estonian SSR departments and Estonian SSR inspection services may, within the limits of their jurisdiction, promulgate normative acts and monitor the execution of Estonian SSR laws and the implementation of Estonian SSR Government decrees.

**Article 22. Committees of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic Government**

The Estonian SSR Government establishes Estonian SSR Government committees for the purposes of economic development and the development and implementation of policies in the area of finance, credit, prices, social security, public education and culture.

The aforementioned committees are made up of Estonian SSR ministers and, when necessary, of scientists and specialists, based on the representation of the chairman of the Estonian SSR Government (prime minister).

The work of a committee is directed by the chairman of the Estonian SSR Government (prime minister) or a minister appointed by the Estonian SSR Government.

**Article 23. Commissions of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic Government**

The Estonian SSR Government establishes, as necessary, standing and temporary commissions for the purposes of studying various problems, considering disagreements,

and preparing draft laws and proposals. Their composition and the procedures for their operation and submission and consideration of proposals are determined by the Estonian SSR Government.

**IV. List of Estonian SSR Ministries, and the Organization of the Work of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic Government**

**Article 24. Estonian SSR Ministries**

Estonian SSR Ministries include:

- Ministry of Construction;
- Ministry of Education;
- Ministry of Justice;
- Ministry of Trade;
- Ministry of Environmental Protection;
- Ministry of Culture;
- Ministry of Union Relations;
- Ministry of the Economy;
- Ministry of Agriculture;
- Ministry of Finance;
- Ministry of Communications;
- Ministry of Internal Affairs;
- Ministry of Social Problems and Labor;
- Ministry of Health and Social Security;
- Ministry of Transportation;
- Ministry of Industry and Power Engineering;
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

**Article 25. Meetings of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic Government and the procedures for decision-making at the meetings**

The Estonian SSR Government is a collegial body.

Meetings of the Estonian SSR Government are conducted as necessary.

A meeting of the Estonian SSR Government is considered official if at least half of the Government members are present at it.

Decisions at meetings of the Estonian SSR Government are adopted by a majority of votes of the Government members. In the event that the number of votes cast is equal, the vote of the chairman of the Estonian SSR Government (prime minister) is decisive.

**Article 26. The chairman of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic Government (prime Minister)**

## REPUBLIC PARTY AND STATE AFFAIRS

The Estonian SSR Government is headed and its activities coordinated by the chairman of the Estonian SSR Government (prime minister). The chairman of the Estonian SSR Government (prime minister) chairs the Estonian SSR Government.

The chairman of the Estonian SSR Government (prime minister):

- forms the personnel of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic Government and submits relevant proposals to the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet;
- presents proposals on the reorganization of the Estonian SSR Government to the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet;
- in cases of urgency makes decisions on individual questions of state administration within the limits of the Estonian SSR Government's jurisdiction, informing the Government of such at its next regular meeting.

For the time of his absence, the chairman of the Estonian SSR Government (prime minister) entrusts the performance of his duties to one of the ministers.

### **Article 27. Decrees and orders of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic Government**

Decisions of the Estonian SSR Government that are normative in nature or are of general significance are promulgated in the form of decrees. Decrees of the Estonian SSR Government are published in VEDOMOSTI ESTONSKOY SSR and, when necessary, are publicized through the mass media.

Decisions on operational and other current matters are promulgated in the form of orders.

Decrees of the Estonian SSR Government are considered valid on the condition that they have been signed by the chairman of the Estonian SSR Government (prime minister), the appropriate minister, and the Estonian SSR Minister of State.

### **Article 28. The apparatus of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic Government**

The Estonian SSR Government has a State Chancellery headed by the Estonian SSR minister of state. The Estonian SSR minister of state operates under the supervision of the chairman of the Estonian SSR Government (prime minister).

The structure of the State Chancellery is approved by the chairman of the Estonian SSR Government (prime minister).

The Estonian SSR minister of state is appointed to office and removed from office by the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet upon the representation of the chairman of the Estonian SSR Government (prime minister).

The duties of the Estonian SSR State Chancellery and minister of state are determined by a statute ratified by the chairman of the Estonian SSR Government (prime minister).

The institution of Government counselors is established within the State Chancellery for the purpose of providing advice to the leaders of the Estonian SSR Government and ministers on complex matters of state administration and the economy.

Government counselors are appointed to office and removed from office by the chairman of the Estonian SSR Government (prime minister).

### **Georgian Supreme Soviet Commissions Report on Republic Sovereignty Issues**

*90US0313A Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian  
29 Nov 89 pp 2-3*

[GRUZINFORM report on proceedings at 11th Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet 12th Session: "Information of Working Groups and Commissions"]

[Text] Deputies received reports of the working groups formed by the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium on the work that had been done on the introduction of the legal status of citizenship of the Georgian SSR, the conditions of the effect of USSR laws on the territory of the Georgian SSR, study of immigration processes in the republic and an end to the shortcomings and mistakes which had been perpetrated in this respect, the exercise of the Georgian SSR's real sovereignty, on questions of the restoration of national army formations and republic draftees' performance of military service on the territory of the Georgian SSR and on questions of the political and legal evaluation of the violation of the 7 May 1920 treaty between Georgia and Soviet Russia and the findings of the commission formed by a decree of 17 April 1989 for investigating the circumstances of the events of 9 April 1989 in Tbilisi.

In connection with the fact that the leader of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet working group on formulation of proposals pertaining to the introduction of the legal status of Georgian SSR citizenship, Sergo Dzhordzhanidze, professor at Tbilisi University and corresponding member of the Georgian SSR Academy of Sciences, had taken ill, the report on the group's work was delivered by Deputy V.A. Sharashenidze, deputy chairman of the working group.

The group deems it expedient, he observed, to prepare the law "Georgian SSR Citizenship," and not "Status of the Georgian Citizen". It is not only a question of terminological disputes here. Status is a considerably broader concept and represents a unity of the citizens' basic rights and duties. The Georgian public, on the other hand, is concerned not about the status of the citizen but the law on Georgian SSR citizenship and the principles distinguishing it from the citizenship of other republics or countries.

A thoroughgoing discussion is under way here on a whole number of acute controversial aspects. Alternative propositions are being prepared. Preliminary proposals for a bill on residency and language qualifications, dual citizenship, acquisition and deprivation of citizenship and other questions with regard for the legislative experience of the union republics and foreign countries have been drawn up.

In the work on the draft law the working group took stock of the fact that there had been a fundamental change in the recent period in the mentality of the Georgian people and that new movements, societies, ideas, programs and concepts had appeared. The party organization and government of the republic have clearly manifested a national position.

The working group has now prepared a working version of the bill "Georgian SSR Citizenship". There is also an interesting draft of the same title, prepared at quite a professional level, which has been drawn up by the Rustaveli Society.

Working in accordance with the "festina lente" principle, it may be assumed that the commission will very soon have put the finishing touches to it, taken account therein of the proposals of the bill received from the Rustaveli Society and also other proposals and have submitted it to the Supreme Soviet Legislative Proposals Commission for it to be opportunely published in the press for general discussion.

We believe that a few joint meetings of our group for elaboration of the migration law and the Rustaveli Society group will be sufficient for once more finally clarifying our positions prior to nationwide discussion.

The enactment of the bill of citizenship should be preceded by changes to Article 31 of the current Georgian SSR Constitution.

We have prepared proposals for the Legislative Proposals Commission—a draft new version of Article 31 of the Georgian SSR Constitution. We believe that unless changes connected with citizenship of the republic are made to the constitution, elaboration of the law on citizenship would be pointless, the more so in that without these changes the enactment of the law itself would represent an alternative instrument inasmuch as the Georgian SSR Constitution currently in force and the 1978 Law on USSR Citizenship do not precisely determine the institution of citizenship of a union republic. But they reserve to it the right to grant citizenship of the republic only to foreign citizens.

We deem it expedient to submit the draft of the new, our, version of Article 31 of the Georgian SSR Constitution with a few remarks.

First of all, citizenship of the republic and the list of laws which regulate this question should be clearly determined inasmuch as part one is worded as follows:

"Georgian SSR citizenship, which is instituted only by republic legislation, is established in the Georgian SSR."

Part two of this article concerning the relations of citizenship of the Georgian SSR and the USSR requires particular attention. Following lengthy debate, with regard for the interests of the republic's citizens, we opted for the following wording: "Proceeding from the primacy of citizenship of the Georgian SSR, each citizen of the republic, in accordance with the USSR Constitution, is simultaneously a citizen of the USSR." It should be noted here that the attitude of the public toward this part is ambivalent.

No objections will be raised, we believe, to part three—"Georgian SSR citizens abroad enjoy the protection and patronage of the Georgian SSR and the USSR" inasmuch as the republic as yet has its representations only in a few countries. For this reason the interests of Georgian SSR citizens require the prospect of the protection of the USSR. This emphasizes once again the soundness of our wording of part three of this article.

Article 31 of the Georgian SSR Constitution currently in force has the following part: "Citizens of other union republics on the territory of the Georgian SSR enjoy equal rights with Georgian SSR citizens." If on the territory of our republic all USSR citizens enjoy equal rights with our citizens, enactment of a law on citizenship of the republic is altogether meaningless. We have therefore developed this part as follows: "aside from the preferential rights and corresponding duties which are determined for citizens of the Georgian SSR stipulated by this constitution and other Georgian SSR laws." We wish to give the assurance that this is not some particular privilege but the privilege of a citizen of the republic both in rights and primarily, we believe, in the sphere of duties.

Part five incontrovertibly words the proposition "Entry into the territory of the Georgian SSR and departure therefrom are regulated by laws of the Georgian SSR and the USSR." Movement not only on territory of the USSR but outside also is implied here.

The working group deemed it expedient to reflect in this article a provision which regulates migration processes in the republic inasmuch as this question is closely connected with Georgian SSR citizenship. Part six of this article has assumed the following wording: "Migration processes in Georgia are regulated by Georgian SSR legislation with regard for demographic, ecological and land-use possibilities and needs."

The Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, Deputy A.I. Kavasdze observed, instructed the group formed on 20 June of this year to elaborate a draft law which regulates anew the effect of USSR law on Georgian territory.

In preparing the draft law the members of the group had interesting meetings with the population and representatives of various strata of the society, and we familiarized ourselves with the constitutions of almost all the world's federative states and with how similar relations are regulated in other countries. Proposals and laws drawn up in the union republics, in the Baltic republics specifically, were studied.

Permit me to recall Article 77 of the current Georgian SSR Constitution: "USSR laws are mandatory on the territory of the Georgian SSR."

And now I shall acquaint you with the proposal concerning changes in the constitution drawn up by the group:

"Laws of the Georgian SSR and the USSR operate on the territory of the Georgian SSR.

"The Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet has the right to suspend fully or partially a USSR law on the territory of Georgia if this law does not correspond to the republic's interests and is obliged here to submit substantiated proposals to the USSR Supreme Soviet.

"In the event of the matter not being decided in accordance with the republic's demands, the law will have no validity on the territory of the republic."

We familiarized various public organizations, individuals and specialists, participants in the Council of Trade Unions plenum, the electorate of Borzhomskiy Rayon, Komsomol officials and representatives of various youth groups with the draft law.

I consider myself bound to provide explanations in respect of certain criticisms, the more so in that almost everywhere that the bill has been discussed one and the same question has arisen. Specifically, some people believe that the word "partially" in the wording of the bill is superfluous. I wish to explain that a law often consists of several parts. In this case the word "partially" makes it possible to accept the part of the law which we consider acceptable and to reject the part which is contrary to the republic's interests. A convincing argument, I believe.

Some specialists—spokesmen for public organizations—categorically demanded that the submitted draft take account of the proposition according to which a union law's registration in the republic Supreme Soviet would be obligatory prior to its entry into force. We rejected this for various reasons. Here are some of them. First, it would be improper from the legal and ethical viewpoints to institute supervision of the activity of a higher organ of power. Second, and most importantly, we would by such a decision be limiting ourselves inasmuch as registration means recognition that this legislative instrument or the other has been adopted. Its subsequent suspension or the exertion of influence thereon would only cause complications. The wording we propose is flexible and is engaged when there is a need for it.

As I have already said, we familiarized ourselves with the constitutions of almost all the world's federal states and with how similar questions are regulated in these countries. An analysis of the material convinces us once again that supreme in the federative state are the laws enacted by the highest body of the federation, and there are no other opinions on this score.

Although we were able, nonetheless, to find a precedent for even the governor of a state being accorded the right in an emergency to suspend by means of public ratification the effect on the territory of the state of a law enacted by the country's parliament.

The platform of the CPSU adopted by the CPSU Central Committee 20 September 1989 Plenum emphasizes: "The highest representative organs of power of the union republics may protest and suspend rulings of the union government on their territory if they violate the union republic's constitutional rights."

On the basis of the material quoted and study of the issues we conclude that under the conditions of perestroika and the democratization of administration in the Soviet Union the fundamentals and principles of Soviet federalism must be raised to an entirely new, progressive level.

We, for our part, are prepared to defend the theoretical and practical foundations of the proposed draft law.

I confess, however, that after the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium had unambiguously given the supreme soviets of the Baltic republics and Azerbaijan directions concerning the alignment of similar laws which they were enacting with the USSR Constitution, we no longer looked for support from the Georgian CP Central Committee and other bodies. Givi Gumbaridze, first secretary of our party's Central Committee and chairman of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, evidently took account of the wishes and mood of the community of the republic, assumed the greatest responsibility and supported us. Big thanks for the support and patriotism.

As far as the wording proposed by G. Gumbaridze is concerned, it is identical to the draft which we have submitted, and the difference is only one of style. We therefore, of course, support it and ask that the deputies display in respect thereof the same approach.

Lest the law be still-born, I consider it necessary for the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium to instruct the authors of the draft, with the participation of experienced lawyers, to prepare theoretically sound proposals concerning changes to Article 77 and other corresponding articles of the USSR Constitution.

It is well known that David the Builder was able to conquer in the struggle for Georgia's unification only in the 13th-14th year of his reign, following the Ruissko-Urbnisskiy Council, that is, after he had, together with

the solution of other questions, freed the secular authorities and the clergy from unworthy people and bribe-takers and brought worthy people to power.

Yes! I consider it impossible to conduct a discussion about legality and a law-based state in a land of corruption. We therefore need to concern ourselves primarily with a purge thereof and with ensuring that the law be the law and that its executor act with clean hands. I may say with confidence that even the most consummate law devised by the world's greatest humanists and democrats and geniuses themselves even will prove to be directed against the people and the honest individual if it falls into the hands of a bribe-taker.

Considering that elections are to be held in some 4 months or so, would it not be better following this session to shift our main attention to the elections in order that honest and worthy patriots be elected to the managerial, administrative and law enforcement authorities.

One further matter in conclusion. It is no secret that we are not ready for parliamentary work—neither the USSR people's deputies nor the members of the republic Supreme Soviet. They are not professionals, and it is not surprising that they cannot make a correct evaluation of many legal and political issues. It would be no bad thing, I believe, for the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium to create a special constitutional group which would include lawyers, philosophers and political scientists. This subdivision should have ties to the USSR Supreme Soviet Secretariat, whence it would preliminarily receive the necessary material and drafts, which would be examined in the subdivision, prepared in the republic and submitted to the deputies. This subdivision could show deputies from our republic in an entirely new light and render members of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet great assistance. The deputies would support the formation of such a subdivision, I believe.

In his report Deputy A. Charkviani, chairman of the commission for study of immigration processes in the republic and elimination of the shortcomings and mistakes perpetrated in this respect, spoke of the unobjective position adopted by certain of the mass information authorities in respect of the tragic events which had occurred in the republic.

"Let us say plainly," he observed, "that only kindness and magnanimity, and not threats and a policy of force, can stop what is being done in Georgia currently. This can be stopped only by a state based on the rule of law, which would contribute to Georgia's complete independence and complete freedom."

"We have in many respects lagged behind, been dilatory, found ourselves in a hopeless situation and given no thought to the need for an immigration policy and the corresponding legislation, which is made necessary by recognition of the fact that people of a non-Georgian orientation, who feel no love for our country, may live in Georgia."

"A passive attitude toward immigration is disastrous for Georgians in the direct meaning of this word.

"Big and powerful states afford the immigration issue a large place in their legislation, but not us!"

"A commission for 'study of immigration processes,' which is analyzing these processes and is at the same time called upon to eliminate all the mistakes and shortcomings which exist in this respect, has finally been created in the Supreme Soviet Presidium.

"Our commission takes account primarily of the fact that Georgia is a very land-hungry republic and that the amount of land per capita suitable for settlement is four times less here than in the country on average. As a result, given an increase in the size of the family, the new member is not in the countryside allocated a nearby plot, and young people are leaving the countryside en masse. In the past 15 years tens of thousands of persons have moved from the country to the town, and the correlation with the town is manifestly not in favor of the country.

"At the current level of development of the productive forces Georgia's territory is considerably overloaded. In this situation it is essential to maintain a balance of demographic, ecological and economic development. Otherwise there will be a deterioration in living conditions, and nature may sustain irreparable injuries.

"The land hunger and the limited nature of the sphere of employment are a principal reason why in the last 30 years Georgia has in comparison with the other union republics had a negative balance of population migration exchange. Approximately 200,000 more persons left the republic than came here in the period 1959-1979 alone. At the same time there has been a gradual increase in the proportion of persons of indigenous nationality among those leaving. According to preliminary figures, almost 43,000 more Georgians left Georgia for other republics than returned to their homeland.

"Georgian youth's acquisition of secondary education in other than its native language and also the assignment of substantial numbers of graduates of higher and secondary specialized educational institutions outside of the republic since they cannot find work in the republic itself are contributing to a large extent to the migration of the indigenous population to other republics. To this we should add the young people who have graduated from VUZ's in other republics, the majority of whom are not returning to their native country.

"Proceeding from this, we should have no immigration problem virtually, but the situation is not that simple and straightforward. First, it should not be forgotten that up to the end of the 1950's external-migration processes were of a reverse nature—the number of those moving to the republic was far greater than the number of those leaving, and we cannot be sure that this process will not resume. Second, there have in recent years, as you know, been mass requests for a return to Georgia of the former inhabitants of Meskheti who were forced to leave. Third,

the misappropriation of land by the nonindigenous population both in town and country has until recently continued, unfortunately, which under the land-hunger conditions is categorically contrary to the interests of our republic's national development.

"Another fact is of no less significance: as of the 1920's and in the years of Soviet power a relatively large number of insufficiently skilled immigrants of other nationalities moved to Georgia as a result of the extensive development of the economy, which slowed markedly the process of social and cultural development of the indigenous nation and caused a reduction in the proportion of the Georgian population in its homeland, and in some provinces the indigenous population found itself in a minority even. As a result of our negligence we lost over the years educated, highly qualified professionals, augmenting, however, the uneducated, unskilled work force. All this has today confronted us with many dispiriting economic and social processes. The non-Georgian population which has arrived in the republic since the 1960's differs sharply both from the indigenous population and from its compatriots who came in past years (who acquired an education here) in questions of culture, way of life and value orientations. All this has exacerbated interethnic relations.

"There has in recent years been a considerable increase in the outflow of Georgian youth beyond the republic since many of them cannot find work in their particular field locally. It should not be forgotten that this fact and the gradual supplanting of Georgian in the clerical work of enterprises and establishments of the republic have contributed to persons of indigenous nationality acquiring secondary education in a language which is not their own. It should not, after this, come as a surprise that those who graduate from school in a language which is not their own endeavor primarily to obtain higher education outside of the republic. It may be said without exaggeration that we are in this way losing a substantial part of our national organism.

"To overcome the said negative phenomena it is essential that the republic's economic and cultural building correspond both to our nature and human resources and their quantitative and qualitative indicators. It should be acknowledged that we have up to the present taken little stock of this—a most important requirement of national development. An integral part of the problem is the question of control of external and internal migration, and, specifically, the regulation of immigration should play its part here, which is envisaged by the draft immigration law drawn up and submitted for discussion by the Supreme Soviet Presidium commission.

"What can we do, we are a land-hungry republic, and the resources of nearby plots are exhausted here. We are once again looking for places for settlement in Georgia to satisfy the Georgians who are casualties of the natural disasters in Svaneti and Adzharia and who are living in boxcars, under the severest conditions. For this reason

we need meanwhile to remove from the agenda the questions of the so-called 'Meskhetian Turks'.

"Of course, we also need to settle the request concerning settlement in the homeland of the Georgian intelligentsia which has for many years lived outside of the republic. Those who have come to be in foreign countries face the danger of loss of their native language, adaptation with other peoples and disappearance as Georgians. For this reason they are asking us to take their pain closely to heart and to allow them to return home. This matter needs to be settled, therefore.

"It is essential to promote the introduction of leasing in agriculture, but the land hunger is confronting us with problems here also. Our commission has recommended that the USSR Council of Ministers and State Agro-Industrial Committee leave the land basically in the permanent possession of the public farms and transfer land for use in perpetuity, by way of an exception, to the citizens only of revived and new villages of the republic, the land-hungry, northern high-mountain areas and also areas with a complex demographic situation. Nor should we forget 'horticulture,' which should help rectify the economic position of the townspeople, which has reached the point of catastrophe.

"And, finally, all this becomes meaningless unless Article 69 of the republic constitution (basic law) is worded as follows:

"The Georgian SSR has the right to withdraw from the USSR.

"As of the revocation of this right by the Congress of USSR People's Deputies or the USSR Supreme Soviet or the adoption of a decision on its direct or indirect limitation the Georgian SSR is deemed to have withdrawn from the USSR. The question of whether the right of the Georgian SSR's unimpeded withdrawal from the USSR is or is not limited by a legislative instrument adopted by the Congress of USSR People's Deputies or the USSR Supreme Soviet will be decided by the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet."

Deputy N.I. Lagidze familiarized the session with information of the working group on the Georgian SSR's exercise of real sovereignty. It said:

"The problem of reflection of the sovereignty of the state in the republic's constitution is not a local one. It is global. Inasmuch as it concerns almost all spheres of state independence, both economic and political, domestic and foreign.

"Only after the conceptual basis of Georgia's real sovereignty has been elaborated can real and, primarily, constitutional paths of its implementation be mapped out.

"The working group was entrusted with highly laborious and crucial work—developing the concept of implementation of Georgia's real sovereignty under the current

conditions of federation and charting the main directions of its future development and prospects. And very labor-intensive work has been performed in this respect inasmuch as it concerns the bulk of actual articles of the constitution.

"The commission has embarked on the work. Specific tasks have been outlined. Each member of the commission is working on his own concept of the republic's sovereignty. Material created in connection with this issue throughout the republic is being assembled.

"The problem of the republic's real sovereignty requires serious elaboration. The development of a contemporary concept of sovereignty itself and its reincarnation in constitutional provisions and then practical realization are a complex matter. For this reason a temporary association of scholars, a so-called 'special problem-solving group,' which is assisting the working group in the scientific elaboration of the problem, has been formed in the Georgian SSR Academy of Sciences State and Law Study Center.

"Only in January 1990 will the commission have completed preparatory work and submitted its findings to the Presidium for confirmation and implementation."

Z.M. Ratiani, chairman of the Georgian Lawyers Union, observed in his report:

"The processes occurring at the current stage in our republic, as throughout the country, have, together with other urgent and painful issues, put on the agenda questions of the restoration of national army formations and our draftees' performance of their military service on republic territory.

"Thanks to perestroyka and glasnost, it is now the time when each intelligent proposal needs intelligent comprehension and analysis and the elaboration of the pertinent constructive considerations.

"The republic authorities acceded to public demand, and the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium formed a special commission for the elaboration of the said problem.

"The commission has studied all the extant archive and legislative material on this issue. For it to be clear on what this decree offered the Supreme Soviet session is based it is not only not without interest but also, I believe, necessary, evidently, to make a brief survey of certain aspects of the question.

"In the first period of Sovietization of Georgia an Independent National Army or 'Georgian Red Army' was formed in the republic. It was subordinated to the Georgian SSR People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs. This was an entirely just and logical action in keeping with the republic's sovereignty. However, in 1922, in accordance with the change in the situation, I refer primarily to the creation of the Transcaucasus Federation, these armed forces in the shape of the Georgian Rifle Division were put under the command of

the Caucasus Red Banner Army. In our opinion, there was no need for this, in that period even less. No one could persuade us that the existence of national armed forces within the framework of the Transcaucasus Federation impeded the requirements of state building.

"In 1924 the Second Georgian Rifle Division was created and a military school, which played an extremely important part in the training of national military personnel, was founded also. From an evaluative viewpoint, however, we believe that these formations, although part of the general system of armed forces, had the value of national self-awareness. For success in combat and political training the said divisions were repeatedly awarded military decorations.

"By a joint resolution of the All-Russia CP (Bolshevik) Central Committee and the USSR Council of People's Commissars of 7 March 1938 the national formations and military schools were converted into various union army formations, and the commander personnel were, to be blunt, dispersed. Time showed that this exerted a negative influence to a considerable extent on the international development of the armed forces. During the Great Patriotic War there once again arose the need for such formations. In this connection national army formations were put together by the USSR State Defense Committee 13 November 1941 decree 'Creation of National Formations in the Soviet Armed Forces'. The national formations, which made a significant contribution to the victory in the Great Patriotic War, remained in existence in fact through the end of the 1950's. It should be emphasized that they were liquidated in the period of unchecked subjectivism and voluntarism. At the same time all this occurred non-legislatively. This was also connected with the tragedy of our people of 1956. Many people still remember those bitter days, I believe, although who could be held to account or who would have stood up for this at that time!

"The 1978 USSR Constitution failed to take account of this right, which had been recognized by the preceding constitution, which, we believe, flouted the national interests of the republics as an integral part of their sovereign status.

"The excesses perpetrated down the years in military personnel policy caused, and this is now common knowledge, qualified national personnel in the USSR Armed Forces to be reduced to the minimum. Owing to this, the leadership posts of a whole number of Georgia's district military commissariats are now staffed by non-Georgian officers.

"Practice shows that the bulk of Georgia's draftees is allocated to worker and construction battalions for the reason that the draftees do not know Russian properly and to the extent that they cannot master modern military art do not attain to the corresponding level of combat and political training.

"Small numbers of draftees are sent to military schools following graduation from which there are no prospects

of growth for the specialists. For the draftees generally there is no consideration of climatic conditions, and they are sent wholly to remote areas.

"It is ascertained from letters from draftees into the army that unhealthy and, in a number of cases, insulting treatment is displayed in respect of them both on the part of the enlisted ranks and the officers, which checks have confirmed repeatedly.

"It is not that seldom, unfortunately, that this has a tragic outcome.

"And, finally, in our opinion, there is one further significant proposition which should form the basis of today's demand. It is generally acknowledged that the existence of a national army formation has in spiritual, political and social life the same vital force and indisputable moral significance as all other national components. It shapes and regulates many aspects of national being. An army formation is a condition of a state's existence and sovereignty.

"Proceeding from this, the commission believes that in this respect the demand of the republic's community for the creation of a national army formation and our draftees' performance of military service on its territory is entirely justified and legitimate and merits the utmost attention. For this reason it must necessarily be realized. It is fully in keeping with the platform and concept of the Georgian CP Central Committee concerning the republic's national development. But by which paths? It has to be considered that we live and exist under the conditions of a federative association. For this reason the creation of a national army formation is possible only within the system of the USSR Armed Forces. Everyone must understand this well and that other demands or proposals at this stage are futile.

"The commission expresses the hope that the deputies will support the proposals which have been submitted."

The respected deputies know full well the situation which brought about the formation of this commission, said A.D. Aleksidze, chairman of the commission for political and legal evaluation of the violation of the 7 May 1920 treaty between Soviet Russia and the Democratic Republic of Georgia. This has been the heightened public interest in recent years in events which, at the start of the 1920's, abruptly changed the direction of Georgia's development and the wish expressed by various public and artistic organizations for a reassessment of the officially accepted and asserted evaluations of these events.

It was clear to the commission from the very outset that to accomplish the task it had been set it would be necessary to take account of a very broad range of issues, many of which had not hitherto been completely studied or had been illustrated in one-sided and biased manner

and that there was here a whole set of questions connected with the history of the existence of the Georgian Democratic Republic, so brief, but so packed with political and cultural events.

Georgia's fate was decided in the complex political reality of a world which had emerged from the fire of world war and which had been set in motion by the October Revolution at the intersection of the economic, military and diplomatic interests of Russia, the European countries and Turkey. It was essential, therefore, for a recreation of the picture of those times to take account of vast, multilingual documentation—Soviet and foreign sources, archive material, emigre literature and such.

The findings submitted by the commission to the Georgian Supreme Soviet were formulated on the basis of an analysis of this vast amount of material, an exchange of opinions between historians and lawyers and many hours of intensive and substantive meetings. The commission understands that the problem may be studied in even greater depth and more extensively and that even the material unearthed by the commission in Soviet and foreign archives even has not yet been studied completely. Study of all these documents should, naturally, continue, and this material, the commission believes, should, following its appropriate processing, be published in the form of a separate digest. At the same time, however, the commission believes that even on the basis of the material that has already been unearthed and studied an evaluation of the events of 1921 is perfectly possible in principle.

The deputy went on to familiarize the session with the basic content of the commission's findings. The first pages of the findings, he said, survey and evaluate the centuries-old traditions of Georgian statehood and the main stages and processes of the historical development of a country situated on the boundary of Europe and Asia, in hostile encirclement. There was subsequently an analysis of the complex historical processes occurring in the Transcaucasus with the participation of Russia, Turkey, Germany and Britain. The sociopolitical situation which brought about the proclamation of Georgia's independence was examined.

"Restoration of Georgian statehood lost 117 years previously and the creation of the Democratic Republic of Georgia," the text reads, "crowned a natural historical process and was a progressive event of great significance in the nation's history."

A considerable part of the text is assigned a study of the complex and contradictory relations of the Democratic Republic of Georgia and Soviet Russia—before and after the treaty was concluded. The 7 May 1920 treaty is characterized as a most important political act, which expressed the Leninist principles of the equality of the peoples of the former Russian Empire. By this treaty Soviet Russia recognized Georgia's freedom and independence and undertook not to interfere in its internal

affairs. The treaty enshrined the legal status of Georgia's independence on an international scale and raised the confidence of the world community in its independence, which was followed by recognition thereof in the course of 1920-1921 by a number of states.

On the other hand, the commission's findings examine and analyze another line of Soviet Russia's attitude toward Georgia—a number of actions and documents confirming the purposive, consistent development of the idea, outlined back in 1917, of the Sovietization of Georgia. The 1921 incident in the Lore neutral zone, which was recognized as an inspired action and pretext for the commitment of troops to Georgia, is analyzed in detail.

The 7 May 1920 treaty concluded between the Democratic Republic of Georgia and the RSFSR was a consequence of an entirely specific historical situation and the parties' particular political and strategic position. For this reason consideration of the historical and political concepts and rules of law of that time was deemed a necessary principle in evaluation of the violation of the treaty.

Official statements, memoranda and minutes of reports of the Georgian government in exile clearly express their evaluation of the events of February 1921. The government of Soviet Russia is accused of having flagrantly violated the international legal status of an independent and sovereign republic, having ignored the basic provisions of the agreement it had signed and having initiated military operations against Georgia without a declaration of war and without any serious cause.

The hopes of the government in exile—for obtaining the support of the major European states and the international organization within the sphere of their influence in the struggle to restore the ousted democratic system in Georgia—proved in vain. Britain and France were afraid of a complication of relations with Soviet Russia.

The intrinsic contradictoriness which characterized Soviet domestic and foreign policy in the post-October period was manifested in the attitude of the government of Soviet Russia toward Georgia.

In the period 1917-1921 the leaders of the Russian CP (Bolshevik) Central Committee openly proclaimed the precedence of class solidarity and revolutionary justice over all other principles, viewing nations' right to self-determination from this viewpoint. Having assumed the historical mission of liberation of the former Russian Empire from the oppression of the landowners and capitalists, even by way of armed interference, the offspring of the October Revolution—Soviet Russia—in this case attached little significance to the extent to which this action corresponded to the principles of "bourgeois international law".

In the Russian CP (Bolshevik) Politburo one of the main reasons for the start of the war with Georgia was considered the fulfillment of "revolutionary duty," which was to have been expressed in assistance to the insurgent workers.

To the insistent demand of the government of the Georgian Democratic Republic that it explain the reason for the Red Army's invasion of Georgia the Soviet Government responded with a note accusing the former of "punitive measures in respect of the inhabitants in the Lore neutral zone, which led to an uprising of the local population" (G. Chicherin's note of 18 February 1921).

The Red Army's invasion of Georgia from several sides and the taking of Tbilisi with similar justification seemed unconvincing. Therefore this action—the commencement of war—was subsequently justified differently: the need to perform its international duty.

The true thrust of the February action of 1921, however, is revealed in the statements of I. Stalin, L. Trotsky, G. Ordzhonikidze, F. Makharadze and B. Lominadze, which was recognized by the commission as a main, source principle of the political and legal evaluation of the 7 May 1920 Treaty, A. Aleksidze said.

True, legally the Georgian Democratic Republic preserved the status of independent state which had been recognized by the government of Soviet Russia by the treaty of 21 May 1921 and enshrined in the Georgian SSR Constitution of 1922. However, this legal form did not reflect political reality. The presence of the Red Army in Georgia limited the possibility of the Georgian people's political expression. In the opinion's commission, the situation which took shape in Georgia as of February-March 1921 essentially corresponded to the definition of annexation set forth in Lenin's "Decree on Peace".

It should be noted that some Georgian communists (the "national deviationists") expressed dissatisfaction at the loss of real independence. They fought against the limitation of the legally enshrined independence of Georgia, the creation of the Transcaucasus Federation and incorporation by means thereof in the USSR. In the situation which had come about the aspirations of the "national deviationists" remained unrealized.

With regard for what has been said above the violation of the treaty concluded by the government of Soviet Russia with the government of the Democratic Republic of Georgia of 7 May 1920—the commitment of troops to Georgia and the seizure of the whole territory—represents from the legal standpoint military interference (intervention) and occupation for the purpose a change in the existing political system. This action, with its ensuing consequences, should from the political standpoint be seen as virtual annexation.

Such are the findings adopted by the members of our commission with general accord. It was signed by all

members of the commission except for two persons who are at this time overseas, A. Alekisdze observed in conclusion of his speech.

The findings of the commission for investigation of the circumstances connected with the events of 9 April 1989 were presented to the session by USSR People's Deputy E.N. Shengelaya, a member of this commission.

The tragedy which occurred in the Georgian capital on 9 April of this year, he observed, shook the Georgian people and caused nationwide grief and anger. Aimed against the people, this barbaric action, which was distinguished by features of the organized, mass extermination of totally innocent people, urgently demanded an investigation of all its circumstances, determination of the guilty parties and, the most important thing, ascertainment of the true causes.

The commission performed extraordinarily intensive and at the same time highly responsible work. In the 6 months of its activity it held 20 meetings, studied the testimony of hundreds of witnesses, casualties and employees of the internal affairs authorities who were at the scene of the occurrence and also of medical personnel, heard explanations from the leaders of party, soviet, Komsomol, trade union and law enforcement authorities of the republic and other officials, made use of the testimony of the leaders of party and state authorities, the Transcaucasus Military District and other military establishments in the commission formed by the Congress of USSR People's Deputies and analyzed the documentary material of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, Georgian CP Central Committee and the republic Council of Ministers and other bodies and the findings of forensic medicine, the medical and chemical-toxicological subcommissions and the International Committee of the Red Cross and also of scientists and specialists of the Soviet Union and foreign countries. The commission familiarized itself with numerous video recordings which captured the events of 9 April, photographic material and other material evidence. For the purpose of a full evaluation of the events the commission studied public opinion in connection with the circumstances of the 9 April tragedy and the comments of the republic, union and foreign press.

The facts established on the basis of an analysis of the accumulated material and their legal and political evaluation in the form of findings of the subcommissions were systematically published in republic newspapers and covered on television and radio. It should be said generally that the principles of glasnost were observed to the utmost in the commission's work. People were afforded an opportunity not only to follow the activity of the commission and its conclusions, which, in our view, was of particular positive moral and psychological significance in the life of the people for easing the serious situation which had taken shape in this period but also enabled them to make their contribution to determination of the actual circumstances of the tragedy and the factors which had brought it about.

The commission for investigating the circumstances of the 9 April tragedy completed its work on 18 September and presented its findings, signed by all members of the commission, to the Georgian Supreme Soviet Presidium. The findings were published in republic newspapers, and copies thereof were distributed to the deputies.

It should be noted that the propositions of the findings of the commission formed by the Congress of USSR People's Deputies and the republic commission coincide with one another, in the main, both from the viewpoint of determination of the actual circumstances of the tragedy and their legal and political evaluation, E.N. Shengelaya emphasized.

Under the conditions of the processes of perestroyka and democratization occurring in our society, he went on to say, there has been a sharp stimulation of the public movement, which has put on the agenda the acute national-cultural and socioeconomic problems which accumulated in the era of totalitarianism and stagnation, and the political assertiveness of the people's masses at large, which has been developing increasingly in forms of direct democracy (street protests, political demonstrations, mass meetings) and has been geared to a strengthening of the republic's sovereignty and the real achievement of Georgia's political and economic independence. The former leadership of the republic declared this movement an attempt to destabilize the overall situation by extremist groups. In the changed social and political atmosphere the party organization and the organs of leadership and administration were unable to formulate the correct political course and regulate the processes which were occurring in society by political methods, which led to a total polarization of the position of the leadership and the people.

For a way out of the political crisis the republic leadership turned to the tried-and-tested method customary for a totalitarian state—violence. It requested from the center permission for the use of force and the appropriate assistance. It should be noted that whereas at the time of the November 1988 crisis the center did not comply with a similar request, and the tense situation was relaxed by political methods (we recall M.S. Gorbachev's appeal to the Georgian people), on this occasion it was decided at meetings led by Ligachev and Chebrikov in the CPSU Central Committee on 7 and 8 April to render the republic leadership assistance with units of the Soviet Army and internal forces. In accordance with a decision of the republic leadership, the action to put a stop to a thousands-strong peaceful meeting was headed, as you know, by Gen I. Rodionov, former commander of the Transcaucasus Military District, who conducted it as a military operation. Thus was a new tragic page inscribed, for the umpteenth time, in the history of the Georgian people.

The commission deems it established that flagrant breaches of legality were perpetrated both in the republic and at the center in the adoption of the decision to halt

the mass meeting, execution of the decision, the imposition of a curfew and its implementation.

Considering all the circumstances of the tragedy, the commission made the following conclusive finding: "The crime committed on 9 April in Tbilisi was one of the most serious in the history of the Soviet country. It was of the nature of a punitive operation and was an action planned in advance for the organized extermination of totally innocent people perpetrated with particular brutality and the use of chemical substances. It contains the hallmarks of an international crime and, specifically, a crime against humanity."

The session issued the appropriate decrees on the report and the findings.

The 11th Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet 12th Session decided to create a standing commission for land use and land-tenure regulations. Deputy Bakur Gulua was elected chairman of this commission.

It was also decided at the session to form a standing immigration commission. The need for this has been brought about by the present demographic status of the republic's indigenous population. Many aspects of the migration processes whose thorough study is to be taken up by the Immigration Commission headed by its chairman, Deputy Temur Chkheidze, were illustrated during the discussion.

Instances of the prevalence among active servicemen of nonregulation treatment is causing the public serious concern. There have been instances of servicemen deserting from army units as the result of conflicts. There have been other instances of breaches of military discipline also. The session adopted the decision to create a standing commission for work among draftees into the Soviet Army from the Georgian SSR headed by Deputy Rismag Gordeziani.

Man's incorrect attitude toward nature has brought about the fact that a disturbing ecological situation has been created currently throughout the planet almost. The situation is difficult in Georgia also. The session deemed it necessary to change the Commission for Environmental Protection and the Rational Use of Natural Resources into the Ecological Commission. Deputy Irakli Gverdsiteli was elected commission chairman.

There is as yet in the republic no law which determines the procedure for the holding of a referendum (nation-wide ballot). The Supreme Soviet Presidium proposed to the session the creation of a commission for formulation of a law on the procedure for the holding of a referendum and the election of Deputy Niko Chavchavadze as chairman thereof. The session studied this proposal of the Presidium and approved it.

The session also confirmed the commission for formulation of a draft Georgian SSR language law. Deputy Dzhansug Charkviani was elected its chairman.

Entire bodies and individual officials who are not paying due attention to the citizens' complaints, which is forcing them to spend a long period of time appealing to republic and union authorities, are being revealed increasingly clearly under the current conditions of perestroika and democratization. The session deemed it necessary for a settlement of these questions to create a commission for study of the submissions of citizens who have been lodging complaints for many years. The commission was headed by Deputy Nodar Natadze.

The session also deemed it necessary to form a commission for the study of the issues raised in connection with the status of the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast. The commission was headed by Deputy Eldar Shengelaya.

#### **Kazakh CP Draft Platform on Elections**

90US0282A Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA  
in Russian 26 Oct 89 p 1

[*"Draft of Kazakh CP Central Committee Political Platform on Elections of Kazakh SSR People's Deputies and Local Soviets of People's Deputies"*]

[Text] In publishing the draft of the political platform on the elections of Kazakh SSR people's deputies and local soviets of people's deputies, the Kazakh CP Central Committee deems it necessary to draw the attention of the party committees, primary party organizations, Communists, and all the workers in the republic to it. At such time, consideration will be taken of all the comments, recommendations, and corrections that are aimed at deepening the pre-election program and giving it a more constructive nature. With a consideration of the various opinions, the political platform will be adopted at the next plenum of the Kazakh CP Central Committee.

In conformity with the decision by a special session of Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet, an election to local soviets will be held on 24 December 1989, and an election of Kazakh SSR people's deputies will be held on 25 March 1990.

This very important political campaign is being conducted during a period when a fundamentally new situation is developing in the party and in society. The campaign is typified by the development of the process of democratization and glasnost and by the increase in the public awareness and initiative of the masses against the background of the acute problems in the republic's socioeconomic development which have been revealed by perestroika.

**The republic's party organization links the further movement ahead with radical reforms in political and economic life.** Kazakh SSR has taken a turn in the economy toward people's needs, and toward its social reorientation.

The share of the funds allocated for the social sphere has increased during the five-year period from 26 to 30 percent. The republic is consistently carrying out such

socially important programs as the Food Program, the Housing Program, and the program for the production of consumer goods. During 1986-1988 the volume of gross agricultural output increased by almost 17 percent. The average-annual grain production, as compared with the 11th Five-Year Plan, increased by 22 percent; meat, 19; milk, 12; and eggs, 16. The population's per-capita real income increased by 9.2 percent.

There has been an increase in the per-capita consumption of basic food products. During the first four years of the five-year plan, drawing from all sources of financing, the republic will activate more than 33 million square meters of housing, or 1.4 times more than during the corresponding period in the past five-year plan. The production of consumer goods increased by a factor of 1.4 and, judged according to the 1989 results, will constitute 11.1 billion rubles. Capital investments in the educational sphere reached 1.4 billion rubles; culture, 207.2 million rubles; and public health, 416 million rubles. High growth rates have been noted in the rendering of paid services to the public.

The Kazakh CP completely supports the CPSU line that is aimed at a revolutionary perestroika that is designed to renew Soviet society, and it is doing everything necessary to carry it out in practice. At the same time, the Kazakh CP also sees clearly the unresolved problems and the serious omissions in social policy. The deformations in interethnic relations have not been eliminated, the ecological situation has become more acute, and there has been an increase in the number of violations of the law.

The republic's Communists, without attempting to remove from themselves the political responsibility for the miscalculations that have been made, are deeply convinced that they can be eliminated only by deepening the processes of perestroika, by consolidating all segments of society on the CPSU platform and its ideology of renewal.

Life convincingly confirms the fact that there does not exist today any alternative to perestroika. It is precisely for that reason that it would be ruinous for the fate of the country and the republic to depart from the path whose beginning was laid by the April 1985 Central Committee Plenum and by the CPSU 27th Congress.

**In approaching the elections, the Kazakh CP is firmly resolved to continue the job of perestroika and deems it necessary to state its position with regard to the basic questions of the republic's socioeconomic and sociopolitical development.**

Standing in the center of attention of the reforms that are currently being carried out is man. The day-by-day work of the party organizations is aimed primarily at improving the nation's welfare, at intensifying the extent to which it is socially protected, and at multiplying the intellectual potential.

The achievement of these goals is possible only on the basis of the accelerated development of the economy. These are the high-priority areas in the work of the party organizations.

The measures that have been undertaken recently have failed to lead to a fundamental change in improving the economy. The development of the economy is still being held back by the rigid centralization of administration both on a nationwide and a republic scale, and this results in the slowing down of the rates for the growth of production potential, in tangible branch and territorial disproportions, in the lack of development of the social infrastructure, and in the alienation of labor and producer goods.

A way out of the situation that has been created can be seen in the republic's changeover to principles of economic sovereignty, self-government, and self-financing, principles of the reconsideration of the administrative structures in conformity with the draft of the "Concept of the Self-Government and Self-Financing of Kazakh SSR." The expansion of the republic's independence in the use of labor and natural resources, and of the production potential and the funds being earned, can guarantee real shifts in accelerating the rates of socioeconomic development and improving the public's life. The Kazakh Communist Party deems it necessary to confirm the republic's right to own its natural wealth and will defend this principle before union agencies.

At such time Kazakhstan, true to the principles of Soviet federalism, cannot fail to combine concern with the development of the regional economy with the nationwide interests.

We must all be aware of the fact that economic sovereignty, in and of itself, will not change the situation for the better. The introduction of new management methods requires the tremendous straining of efforts, a new way of economic thinking by the cadres, the complete use of spiritual and moral potential, and the fundamental improvement of labor and production discipline.

The final goal of the restructuring of the management of the economy and the social sphere in Kazakh SSR is the creation of conditions for the complete satisfying of the public's material and spiritual needs. The plans for 1990 and the 13th Five-Year Plan as a whole have a clearly expressed social directedness.

The implementation of the housing program will continue. During the five-year period, in conformity with the Housing-91 Program, the housing conditions will be improved for approximately 800,000 families. Subsequently the rates of housing construction will increase in such a way as to resolve the task that has been given—by the year 2000 provide every family with an apartment or separate home. The republic's Communist Party maintains the line aimed at intensive cooperative and individual construction, at the first-priority development of branches of the construction industry, at the immediate implementation of the decisions that have been made

with regard to the sale of housing to the public, and at the creation of a home-building base.

Our republic will support measures to normalize monetary circulation and to combat inflation.

In carrying out a strong social policy, the area that remains the chief one is the resolving of the **food problem**. The enterprises in the agroindustrial complex have been given the task of achieving in 1990 the goals sets by the 13th Plenum of the Kazakh CP Central Committee, and to increase the per-capita consumption as follows: meat, to 72 kilograms; milk, to 300 kilograms; potatoes, to 93 kilograms; vegetable and melon crops, to 130 kilograms. The republic's party organization sees the resolution of these tasks in the universal development of rental relations, animal-raising (peasant) farms, the transfer of the land to long-term use, and other progressive management methods.

There will be an increase in the saturation of the market with **consumer goods**. By 1995 their production will increase by a factor of 1.4 and will come to 18.1 billion rubles. There will be strict monitoring of the observance of the Law on the Cooperative System. The existing cooperatives will be oriented toward increasing the production of commodities and services. The Kazakh Communist Part deems it to be inadmissible to create cooperatives that get rich by means of speculation and those whose actions aggravate the socioeconomic situation and destabilize the financial system.

In developing the economy and increasing the production of commodities, the republic's party organization attaches great significance to expanding the mutually advantageous links between Kazakhstan and the other countries of the world, to creating joint enterprises, and to the broad exchange of the achievements of scientific-technical progress.

Concern for the public's health permeates the republic's target programs aimed at improving the **providing of medical services to the public**, primarily in rural areas. By the end of the current five-year plan our republic will build hospitals with a total of 17,900 bed, and clinics and inpatient facilities for handling 49,500 visits per shift. In the 13th Five-Year Plan it is planned to open up 12 new oblast consultation and diagnostics centers. The total appropriations for developing the public-health sphere will be increased by no less than a factor of 2 to 3.

The **republic program for the comprehensive development of 30 socially and economically backward rayons and inhabited points** will be consistently implemented. That program stipulates the accelerated improvement of their social infrastructure and the raising of the public's standard of living.

The party attaches exceptional importance to the **protection of the environment and the improvement of the ecological situation**. Accordingly, the Kazakh Communist Party deems it necessary to develop a republic-level ecological program and to take decisive steps to expand

the rights of the republic's agencies to be in control of natural resources, to create a single service providing independent monitoring of the efficient use of natural resources. It is necessary to broaden information about the state of the ecology in the republic, especially in the major industrial centers, and also in the regions adjacent to the Semipalatinsk Nuclear Testing Grounds and to the drainage areas of the Aral Sea and Lake Balkhash. The **republic's Communist Party is strongly in favor of suspending the nuclear tests** at the testing grounds in the Semipalatinsk area, and the adoption of special decisions by the union government to raise the standard of living and provide special benefits for the population in those regions.

**The party's policy in the field of culture and education** is aimed at increasing the workers' intellectual potential, creating the optimal conditions for developing people's spiritual life, restoring good folk traditions, and increasing the family's educational role. A republic-level comprehensive program for moral and esthetic instruction and the indoctrination of the upcoming generation has been worked out. That program presupposes the humanization of public education. The network of general educational institutions that specialize in the study of the national cultures is expanding; centers of esthetic education are being created in rural rayons; and it is planned to open a republic-level children's musical theater, national woodwind-instruments school, and a handicrafts school. All this will promote the further confirmation of socialist morality.

A matter that has always been and continues to be of special concern for the Kazakh Communist Party is the resolution of the problems of **interethnic relations**. The program of actions in this area has been presented in the CPSU platform "The Party's National Policy Under Modern-Day Conditions."

**The Communist Party of Kazakhstan deems it necessary to carry out persistently the line aimed at defending Soviet socialist federalism, the unification of all the healthy forces of society against separatist, extremism, manifestations of chauvinism and nationalism, and any attempts to cause a split in the fraternal family of our country's nations.**

It is planned to guarantee in practice the free development of all nations and national groups living in the republic, and their cultures and languages, and to continue the work to enrich and reinforce the deep spiritual ties among all the nations and nationalities.

**The Law on Languages has been enacted in the republic**, and the Concept for Linguistic Policy and Linguistic Construction has been developed. In conformity with them, in addition to the Kazakh language, which has been legislatively established as the state language, and the Russian language, as the language of interethnic communication, conditions are being created for the free functioning of all other languages used in the republic. **The party organizations will take all steps to promote the**

**implementation of the principle of national-Russian and Russian-national bilingualism, and the creation of conditions for the study and mastery of languages, while preventing any discrimination of people on the basis of language.**

A very important condition for observing actual equal rights is the maximum representation of all the national groups in the republic's sociopolitical structure.

The party shares the workers' concerns about the increase in violations of the law. **The reinforcement of legality and law and order** is a very important sector in the activities of the party organizations. For this purpose the republic is developing a comprehensive program for combatting crime, worker detachments to support the militia have begun operating, and specific steps have been taken to reinforce the cadres in the internal-affairs agencies, to intensify the legal protection provided to their workers, and to assure the technical equipping of the subdivisions of the internal-affairs agencies. The eradication of phenomena that are alien to socialism is the duty not only of the law-enforcement agencies, but also of the broad public, all the party committees, the local soviets of people's deputies, and the Komsomol and trade-union agencies.

**In all its undertakings the party relies on the living creativity of the masses and all segments and groups of the population.**

The job of perestroyka will not move ahead without the firm and decisive position taken by the **working class and the peasantry**. The republic's Communist Party deems it necessary to achieve a considerable intensification of their real participation in the elected agencies and, consequently, in the defense of their own interests, in the processes of developing, adopting, and implementing the socioeconomic decisions that correspond to the principles of a law-governed state. It is necessary to increase the role of the labor collectives in administering the scientific-technical development of enterprises and the social sphere, and in establishing the standards for the amount of working time and recreation. The level of payment of labor must be made directly dependent upon the final contribution made by each worker, the complexity and quality of his labor, and the enterprise's profitability.

It will be necessary to expand the opportunities of the labor collectives as a result of the development of rental and cooperative relations. It will be necessary to **guarantee the decisive changeover to varied forms of socialist ownership and types of management**, and to preclude the diktat of administrative-fiat management methods.

**Under these conditions, the workers are able to exert a more active influence on reinforcing the labor and social discipline and to take decisive steps to oppose bureaucratic obstacles.** While recognizing as an extreme measure the workers' right to strive, the party feels that the resolution of conflicts by these methods alone will not promote success in political renewal. There exist a rather

large number of other means for regulating any points of disagreement that arise and for releasing the social tension.

**Young people** are being involved to a broader and broader extent in the practical matters of perestroyka. While justifiably counting upon the energy of the young men and women, their creative strivings, and their support of everything that is new and advanced, the republic's Communist Party sees that a large number of problems have accumulated among the youth. On the basis of a study of these problems it is necessary to take more aggressive steps to create the political, legal, socio-economic, material, and other conditions that are necessary for the fully valid education of the upcoming generation. The republic's Communist Party supports the strong state policy with respect to youth, that is aimed at the maximum satisfying of their demands for the granting of housing, greater opportunities for spending their free time, the learning of a profession, and the complete manifestation of their labor and creative capabilities, especially in rural localities.

A considerable amount of attention will be devoted to **women's living and working conditions**. The republic's party agencies are obliged to continue in the future to do everything to assure that woman can completely combine happy motherhood with active participation in labor and state affairs, and can contribute to carrying out the measures that have been taken to create the optimal conditions and labor schedules for the workers, to increase the amount of maternity leave for female workers, and to increase the legally established amounts of the benefits paid as child support to single mothers and to families with a large number of children or with a low level of income.

The party agencies consider to be their duty the concern for **party, war, and labor veterans, disabled individuals, the elderly, and orphaned children**. The decisions that will become acts of genuine charity and attention to them are the decisions aimed at improving pension support and at expanding the construction of homes for the elderly, the disabled, and infants. Steps are being taken to increase the production of commodities to be sold at socially low prices, including those for senior citizens.

The party evaluates highly the efforts of the **creative and scientific intellectuals** to consolidate all the efforts of society, to reinforce the friendship of nations, and to confirm the ideals of humanitarianism and culture. The republic is consistently creating conditions for the development of science, art, and culture.

Kazakhstan's party organizations have begun the preparation for the next CPSU congress—the 28th. This event will be preceded by the 17th Kazakh CP Congress and the report campaign in the party organizations, which events will sum up the results of the completed stage of perestroyka and will set down its future prospects. The Kazakh Communist Party supports the CPSU line

aimed at the development of democracy and glasnost, and approves the election to the directive party and Soviet agencies, on an alternative basis, of Communists who enjoy authority and the workers' trust.

In the complicated and rapidly changing situation, Communists must be objective in analyzing the situation that has developed, must evaluate in a well-principled manner the shortcomings and miscalculations that have been allowed to occur, and must specify measures to overcome them. The party committees must rid themselves of the administrative-fiat management methods, must continue to reorganize the structure of the party committees, and must renew the party apparatus by involving workers and specialists who have an unusual way of thinking and are free of stereotypes, which have come directly from labor collectives.

Every party organization must improve its work style and methods on the basis of the thorough analysis of the vital processes. **It is only on the path of intraparty democracy, when every primary party organization becomes the political nucleus of the labor collective, that the further growth of the party's authority as a whole and the increase of its vanguard role in society are possible.**

A factor that is taking on special importance today is the mastery of methods of political management, which presuppose the appeal to man, his awareness, and the inner motivations of his behavior. These methods mean the ability to implement the party's policy by way of the Communists and the use of means of conviction, while resting upon democratic principles, with a consideration of public opinion, the interests of various social groups, and the national peculiarities of the public.

On the eve of the election, questions that are taking on special immediacy are those that are linked with guaranteeing the party's vanguard role in the political system of Soviet society, and the freeing of the party from functions that are not inherent to it. The Central Committee and the party's obkoms, gorkoms, and raykoms, completely sharing the position that was developed by the 19th All-Union Party Conference, see their chief task at the modern-day stage in carrying out the real transferral of state authority to the soviets of people's deputies. It is only if this condition is observed that one can guarantee the creation of a truly democratic mechanism for authority, with which the broad masses of the people will be included in the resolution of nationwide, republic-level, and regional questions.

The political functions of the party agencies must be implemented through the participation of the Communists in the soviets, through the struggle to elect to them the party representatives who are most authoritative and most worthy. At such time the party organizations will increase the demands made upon the Communists participating in the work of the democratic agencies to implement the party line aimed at the renewal of

socialism, and will strive for a situation in which they demonstrate a personal example of high responsibility for the assigned job.

Under conditions of the deepening of socialist democracy, the increase in the economic independence of enterprises, and the expansion of the rights granted to labor collectives, a new practice is being formed for the **interrelationships between the party and trade-union organizations**. While developing the experience that has already been accumulated, the party committees support the work that is aimed at expanding the rights of the trade-union committees in the area of labor and the carrying out of their protective functions, and aimed at the carrying out of a social policy and that kind of cooperation that assure the complete preclusion of administrative-fiat methods being applied to them.

The Kazakh Communist Party, continuing to believe that the **Komsomol is its reliable assistant and reserve**, views it as a completely voluntary, spontaneous, and independent organization that has been formed from the political active forces among the youth. The interrelationships between the party and the Komsomol in the republic will be based on Leninist principles and the traditions of the party management of that union, on the basis of the commonality of the ideological-political platform, mutual respect, and trust.

The development of the perestroyka processes and the intensification of public initiative in the republic are substantially influenced by **spontaneous organizations and movements**. Many of them participate actively in the work of improving the ecological situation and act as partners of soviet and Komsomol organizations in accelerating the renewal of social life and in the fight against bureaucratic methods. The republic's Communist Party attempts to attach political maturity and a constructive nature to the aroused initiative of the masses and it will support in every way the constructive undertakings of the spontaneous social formations and movements. At the same time it considers to be inadmissible the manifestations of extremism and of speculating on the current difficulties of perestroyka on the part of individual formations and movements of this kind. The antisocialist and anticonstitutional actions will be given the proper rebuff from positions of party conviction and firm adherence to principles.

Under conditions of the developing economic independence of the regions, enterprises, and organizations and the expansion of their rights and powers, it is necessary to put up a solid road block against manifestations of local favoritism, collective and group selfishness, poor business practices, and squandering. This will be promoted by the intelligent combination of the democratization of society and responsibility, with strict accounting and monitoring that are carried out by and monitored by the people's control agencies. The party committees will render all kinds of assistance to them and will support them in the fight against undesirable

elements and for the reinforcement of contract, production, and executive discipline.

The Kazakh Communist Party will maintain a course aimed at carrying out a dynamic cadre policy, at granting greater independence to republic and local agencies in selecting and assigning workers in the new perestroyka formation, at rejecting the use of crudely administrative methods in assigning cadres in the agencies of state authority and administration, and at the further democratization of the election process in the party.

**The Kazakh Communist Party considers it to be its duty to state that, in the election of people's deputies to the local soviets and to the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet, the party organizations will occupy an active position.** They will promote the carrying out of this very important sociopolitical campaign on the basis of the broad study of public opinion and the determination of the clear-cut political line, while resting on the genuine leaders of all social groups. **Special support will be rendered to the best representatives of the working class and the peasantry—active participating in perestroyka who are operating boldly, decisively, competently, and on a broad scale.** The deputy corps must absorb the aggressive forces of the people's intelligentsia, truly brilliant individuals who know the nation's concerns and aspirations, who are capable of exerting an influence on people's minds and hearts and of assuming the responsibility for resolving state tasks. The soviets must include worthy representatives of public organizations, trade unions, the republic's Komsomol, women's councils, cooperative organizations, war and labor veterans, creative unions, and other formations. On the part of the party organizations they will be given all kinds of support in developing the social activity of the masses in involving newer and newer adherents of perestroyka in the processes of renewal.

The election campaign coincides in time with the preparation for the celebration of the 120th anniversary of the birth of V. I. Lenin and the 45th anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet nation in the Great Patriotic War. It is necessary to use these holidays for the broad propagandizing of the ideals of socialism and the priorities of the country's revolutionary renewal.

The Kazakh Communist Party calls upon the Communists and all the workers in the republic to participate actively in the election to the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet and the local soviets of people's deputies, and to the consolidation of society as a whole, on the basis of its political platform that is aimed at resolving the critical tasks of perestroyka.

The election of people's deputies must become a school of democratization and the triumph of the sovereignty of the nation.

The perestroyka program is the program of the party and of the entire nation.

### Kazakh Appeal to US, USSR Defense Ministers to End Nuclear Testing

18320015A Alma-Ata QAZAQ ADEBIYETI in Kazakh  
13 Oct 89 p 15

[Open Letter to US Defense Minister R. Cheney and USSR Defense Minister D. Yazov: "We Have Our Reasons to Make This Demand"]

[Text] To: US Minister of Defense R. Cheney, USSR Minister of Defense D. Yazov

#### Open Letter

On the occasion of the 4 October, 1989, nuclear test carried out in connection with the regular testing of nuclear weapons in the Semipalatinsk polygon, the "Nevada-Semipalatinsk" Movement appeals to you in the name of the people of Kazakhstan. In spite of the fact that our Movement, and the anti-nuclear movements of other countries, have expended every effort to solve the question of the nuclear entanglement in a peaceful, thoughtful and humanitarian way, the USA and the USSR continue to test nuclear weapons against the will of the people.

We suggest that you consider the question of a joint moratorium. We think that this moratorium would be an act benefiting all mankind. We are hopeful that you will listen to what we say, and that you easily overcome many years of mutual distrust.

The peoples of the USA and the USSR have long ago learned to trust one another. You should learn from their example.

In the name of the million activists of the "Nevada-Semipalatinsk" anti-nuclear testing movement, the president of the Movement, USSR People's Deputy Olzhas Suleymanov.

For over 40 years, beginning in 1949, the nuclear polygon, which has seized like a leech and shaken the very existence of our broad land, of our happy people, has threatened all the people with great danger. Our home is located some 450 versts from the Semipalatinsk Polygon. But who can say that the radiation, which in the twinkle of an eye embraces hundreds of versts through the air, and the dust raised by the explosions, does not reach us? And what happens when it does reach us? Due to the peculiarities of the geographical lay of the earth's crust in our region, the atmospheric pressure is always to the west, towards Kurshim, and comes to Semipalatinsk Oblast from the northwest. As a result, scientific research has shown that the radioactive layer in the soil of the regions located around the nuclear polygon is up to 15 centimeters in depth. Thus the number of victims from morbid tumorous swellings increases year by year in our rayon. In even such a small village as Terektilibulaq, 2-3 persons die from such a disease every year. There are quite a number of persons who suffer from nose-bleeding or from anemia (decrease in the amount of blood) due to swelling of the blood vessels. But, even taking all of this

into account, no one is helping us with real medical assistance. In short, it seems as if our fate has not been considered by the "masters" of the nuclear polygon.

We are human beings! We have every right to demand that nuclear testing cease in our native land, from whose breast we are nourished, and from whose springs we drink. We think that every intelligent person, concerned about the health and life of future generations will understand our request and will honestly support it.

Stop the testing!

In the name of the inhabitants of Terektilulaq Rayon: T. Zhaqparov, R. Zhumaghozhina, P. Qizatova, N. Gorbunova, A. Shumakher, R. Akhmetov (signed by 1672 persons in all).

Eastern Kazakhstan Oblast

**Gorbachev Warning to Estonian Reformers Cited**

*18150119 Tallinn NOORTE HAAL in Estonian  
3 Nov 89 p 1*

[Report by correspondent Toomas H. Liiv: "Gorbachev Called Väljas And Met Yesterday With Estonian Deputies in Moscow"]

[Text] Word reached us around noon yesterday that Mikhail Gorbachev had met with the USSR Supreme Soviet deputies elected from Estonia.

At 16:20, Estonian time, we reached parliamentary deputy Ulo Vooglaid.

[Correspondent] Are the rumors founded?

[Vooglaid] Yes. The meeting started at 12:10 and lasted roughly a half hour. We were at the president's working office that is adjacent to the Supreme Soviet session hall. Our deputies attending the meeting were Igor Gräzin, Mikhail Bronstein, Siim Kallas, Vello Vare, Klara Hallik, Ivan Lözo, Tadeus Pupkevich and myself.

On Wednesday, a group of deputies had been discussing economic reform in the presence of Gorbachev. Attending this "session" from Estonia was Mikhail Bronstein. Quite a few men had been making rather reactionary speeches, demanding an end to all of perestroika and that the house be put in order. Among them were the chairman of the Leningrad Council of Work Collectives and the director of a big scientific production collective in Sverdlovsk.

It was suggested at this meeting that the progress in Estonia should be discussed more thoroughly. And so, at around 11 o'clock today we had a visit from the Council of Nations Chairman Nishanov who announced that Gorbachov wishes to meet with us at 12:10. We had a little over an hour left, the men were scattered all over town: Bronstein in the Planning Committee, Kallas at the Central Council of Trade Unions ...

Our talk with Gorbachev included the matter of arriving at a historical and judicial evaluation of the events that occurred in Estonia between 1939 and 1940. Gorbachev said he was not sure that such an evaluation would be understood the same way by people across the whole Union. It may precipitate processes that he could not control.

Gorbachev said he was afraid that this step would deprive Estonia of the support and understanding it now enjoys.

We tried to explain to him that it was not so much a matter of seceding from the Union, as it was of arriving at a just evaluation historically. This is essential if we want to restore people's faith in our leaders.

[Correspondent] What is the attitude of the Supreme Soviet toward the Baltic states right now?

[Vooglaid] Quite understanding, in my opinion. I don't see any forces that would malign or question the activities of our deputies. We are being consulted, our materials are being picked up on the run.

Hostile attitudes of the kind we experienced during last summer's congress are not in evidence now.

[Correspondent] We have also been told that Mikhail Gorbachev had made a call to Väino Väljas asking that the Estonian Supreme Soviet's session continuing on November 10 not pass the resolution regarding 1940 that would void the Estonian State Council's resolution about joining the Soviet Union. From what we know, the draft of this resolution was recently turned over to Väino Väljas by president Rüütel.

[Vooglaid] This morning, when we found out about the upcoming meeting with Gorbachev, we immediately called Arnold Rüütel, who dictated to us the text of the drafted resolution. Bronstein also read it to Gorbachev. It still seemed to be too extreme for Gorbachev.

Yes, he said, he had called Väljas. "We talked," were his words. Apparently the talk had been about the same things we were discussing here.

The content went something like this: gradually, you'll get everything; right now, if you try to make leaps that are too long, I can't back you up. That was apparently the whole message.

Ivar Raid told him that backing off the resolution could cost the leadership the confidence of the Estonian people and, come election time, it may be all over and done with, even for the representatives of the People's Front.

[Correspondent] When is IME [Self-Managing Estonia] coming up for discussion at the Supreme Soviet?

[Vooglaid] It is not on the agenda for the near future, but we should be getting around to it before the end of the current session.

[Correspondent] Is there anything else of interest happening in Moscow?

[Vooglaid] This afternoon, Chief Prosecutor Sukharev was told he should go into retirement if he cannot keep track of law enforcement. This happened while the work of the Gdlyan commission was discussed. Reportedly, Sukharev had made a statement about Gdlyan at the CPSU Central Committee Plenum that was later declared invalid.

**Commission Opinions Split on Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact**

*18150120 Tallinn RAHVA HAAL in Estonian  
5 Nov 89 p 1*

[Article by K. Pollisinski: "In Moscow, Confusion Still Prevails on the MRP"]

[Text] Members of the MRP [Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact] Commission of the USSR Congress of Deputies met in Moscow on Saturday, November 4. Edgar Savisaar, deputy chairman of the commission, summed up the meeting as follows:

This was the first meeting of the MRP commission since mid-July when we met at Jakovlev's. What made the situation difficult was that many of the progressive members had gone abroad. There has not been a debate that serious for some time. To our surprise we discovered that the document completed on July 19 had been replaced with a new draft of the resolution.

We never managed to ascertain the author of this new draft, nobody claimed authorship, a direct answer was avoided.

Criticizing this new nine-page document, Yuriy Afanasyev said that its first part is a justification of the Stalin regime, the second part talks about diverging opinions within the committee, and divides the committee into good and bad members. Bad members are those who find it necessary to claim that the Soviet leadership took an imperialistic course in the late thirties. The third part consists of half-justifications and half-accusations, but these too have a clearly expressed ideological orientation.

The previous draft, supposedly weaker than this one, was thought to cause a wave of chauvinism in Russia and not be to the liking of the congress of deputies.

The debate lasted for a long time, and it became obvious that we were not going to convince each other. The minority stuck to its position, and so did the progressive majority. It was finally decided that a short draft of the resolution will be submitted to the congress of deputies that would acknowledge the existence of the secret protocols, demand their annulment from the time of their signing, and condemn the Stalinist foreign policy. Appended to the draft of the resolution would be the presentation made by the chairman of the commission that would also describe the divergent opinions within the commission. Actually, there was no assurance that this draft would indeed be the last, and that there would be no more surprises the next time we meet.

Unfortunately, there was still no convincing explanation from the chairman of the commission as to why the July resolution had not been made public. He had not understood that the resolution had already been approved. What other kind of approval does one need after 21 of the 26 members of the commission had already signed it.

Raised separately was the issue of professor Yuriy Afanasyev who has been slandered and persecuted for his views by the Union press. He is the second member of the commission to have a campaign launched to discredit him. We proposed to issue a statement in defense of Afanasyev on behalf of the commission. For the time being, this has remained a proposal only.

Generally speaking, many of the commission members have gotten over the awe that first surrounded their dealings with highly placed functionaries in the offices of Kremlin. This is also why the arguments are getting more heated, and thoughts are expressed with more clarity.

#### Baltic States Make Commitment to Freedom on Pact Anniversary

18150102 Tallinn NOORTE HAAL in Estonian  
26 Aug 89 p 1

[Proclamation of the Baltic Council of the three peoples' fronts read on 23 August at meetings held after the Baltic chain in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania: "The Baltic Way"]

[Text] August 23, 1939 has inflicted wounds on dozens of nations and states. Some of them are bleeding to this day.

The Hitler-Stalin pact unleashed an attack on the state of Poland that was destroyed and divided between the parties to this pact. The Hitler-Stalin pact relegated the three Baltic states to the Soviet sphere of influence. Three member states of the League of Nations were occupied by the Red Army, three independent states ceased to exist. The Soviet Union has done everything on its part to erase the republics of Estonia, Latvia and Estonia from the memory and maps of Europe, from your libraries and textbooks, from your hearts and your sense of justice, from your concern and from your mind. Many have indeed let their conscience be lulled into conceding to the provisions of the Hitler-Stalin pact over the last few decades of this millennium...

This is why we, the three Baltic nations, turn today, on the fiftieth anniversary of this pact, to the general public of Europe and the whole world with a firm conviction that most of them have enough moral will power, sense of justice and readiness left to agree with our evaluation: the criminal pact between Hitler and Stalin should be annulled! At the core of all these Hitler-Stalin pacts and secret protocols was the imperialistic mapping out of the spheres of influence between the two superpowers. With this criminal act, the Soviet Union unilaterally broke all international agreements made with the Baltic states, violated the Baltic states' historical right to self-determination, served the Baltic states with cruel ultimata, occupied them with overwhelming military forces, and carried out their forced annexation under conditions of military occupation and political terror. The Hitler-Stalin pacts, and their secret protocols still in force today were, and still are directed against other states, furthermore, they were and are directed toward destroying the sovereignty and independence of these states.

Today, on the fiftieth anniversary of this pact, we want to remind all the nations of the world that, from the standpoint of international law, such pacts are criminal and void from the time of their signing. This knowledge, something that the apologists for imperialism and red fascists have preferred to forget, has supported and

sustained us for decades, despite the state-endorsed terror and systematic genocide. We have maintained our faith in democracy and human rights even when the imperialistically-minded colonial powers had set as their goal the physical destruction of the Baltic people through mass murders, deportations of hundreds of thousands to Siberia, and a purposeful denationalization of our cities, villages, factories, and of our culture.

The Hitler-Stalin pact is still shaping the Europe of today, the Europe of which we were once a part. Yet we are convinced that the society of Europe and democratic forces in the East will join their voices in the demand to void the pact along with its secret protocols, and namely from the time of its signing, *ex tunc*. Only then will Europe be free of the last colonies of the Hitler-Stalin era, and the Baltic people will have an opportunity to plan their destiny based on free self-determination.

Closing one's eyes to the Baltic problem would not make it go away. To us it is a matter of our inalienable human rights, to you it is a matter of a double standard and also of security but, in one way or another, we will have to solve it together according to the norms and principles of international law. One prerequisite for a common European home is the right to free self-determination for all of the peoples of Europe. The Baltic nations have been seeking a way to peaceful restoration of their statehood in a manner that would conform to the interests of not only Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, but also to those of the Soviet Union, and one that would guarantee security in northern Europe. We are of the position that stability on the Baltic Sea should be based on a system of agreements that was in force before the pact of 1939, and one that is rooted in the peace treaties signed by our countries in 1920. We have been looking for a solution, and we have called it the BALTIC WAY!

**THE BALTIC WAY** is a parliamentary way to the peaceful restoration of our statehood.

**THE BALTIC WAY** does not endanger anyone!

**THE BALTIC WAY** guarantees social amenities, citizens' rights, and economic advancement to all inhabitants of the Baltic countries, regardless of their nationality.

**THE BALTIC WAY** is the way of democracy!

**THE BALTIC WAY** is the only way to freedom, fraternity and equality for us on the shores of our common Baltic sea.

All villages, cities and states have arisen out of the ashes of World War II, except the three Baltic republics, the one-time member states of the League of Nations. Haven't you noticed our absence? Today, close to half a century later, we are calling out to all of our friends, be they North or South, East or West: the Baltic states are standing once again on the threshold of Europe. Today, Europe is welcoming us like its long-lost sons. On our part, we have never considered ourselves as being lost.

So, let's join hands and step forward along our common way: THE BALTIC WAY is the way of Europe, THE BALTIC WAY is the way of getting rid of the last vestiges of colonialism in Europe, THE BALTIC WAY is the way of our common home!

Brothers and sisters in the East and the West, we are ready to forget your double standards if you find in your hearts the courage to demand the application of the principles of international justice not only in Africa and Asia, but also in Europe. Let's join our voices and demand that the Hitler-Stalin pacts, along with their secret protocols, be declared void from the moment of their signing, and let's declare the annexation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to be in violation of law and justice!

We are ready, we are coming.

#### Estonian Intermovement Head Criticizes Republic Leadership, IME

90UN0172A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 30 Sep 89 p 2

[Interview with People's Deputy Ye. Kogan by V. Ivanov: "Thirteen Questions to Yevgeniy Kogan"]

[Text] After USSR People's Deputy Yevgeniy Kogan's speeches at the First Congress of Soviets and a series of interviews which he granted to journalists of various publications, radio and television companies (including foreign ones), the editors received quite a few letters from readers expressing their attitudes toward what they heard Kogan say and asked that some things be clarified.

Furthermore, commentaries appeared in much of the mass media regarding statements of USSR People's Deputy Ye. Kogan from Tallinnskiy-Kalininskiy National Territorial Election District No. 450. Based on letters and telephone calls to the editors, and also on articles in the press, we compiled several specific questions which we posed to Yevgeniy Kogan on the eve of the second session of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

[Ivanov] The CPSU Central Committee Plenum just completed a session at which issues of national policy were discussed. What are your impressions?

[Kogan] I still have not managed to adequately study the Plenum materials which were published (Author's comment: The conversation with Ye. Kogan took place on the morning of September 21). But from what we already know... On many issues it is what we already discussed a year ago. For example, a union language (Author's comment: He has in mind a single state language for the whole country which was discussed at the Plenum). I had already warned certain activists of the People's Front of Estonia [NFE] that their activities would lead precisely to this. And, as I recall, they then made disparaging comments about me for this statement! We have never had a single union state language but they (NFE) have achieved it through their actions and matters are moving

precisely in that direction. Second: We have always actively opposed a confederation. Now, in my opinion, the i has been dotted... Although you probably recall that every time the leaders of the republic returned from Moscow they stated: "Moscow supports us. Mikhail Sergeyevich personally approves" etc. But now it turns out that this was not the case.

Furthermore, the question about the Party is the same thing. We opposed its federated structure as a collection of independent parties of the union republics. And here the Plenum confirmed that we are on the correct path.

In any case, I will say that to a certain degree the Plenum which took place approves our ideas. The main thing (already diverging from a specific discussion of the Plenum) is that we succeeded in defending our positions with regard to the thesis on the priority of an indigenous nation. Even our opponents at the negotiations (Author's comment: With representatives of strike committees, OSTK [United Council of Labor Movements], and Intermovement [ID]) were finally compelled to admit their fallibility. And this signifies a lot. All laws that we obtain in the future will be based precisely on that idea. Obviously definite changes will be introduced right now.

[Ivanov] Now specifically about your activities and about you personally. How do you combine the responsibilities of a people's deputy and the directly job-related responsibilities? Do you have some sort of staff of advisors, assistants, and experts?

[Kogan] Of course, a very large stream of people has to work very intensively. There is a very neglected infrastructure, housing, utilities, and trade, here in Koplya where I was elected. There are a mass of problems which need to be resolved and people come to me as a people's deputy. I run, I fight... With the water supply and utilities trust and with other authorities. Thus there are, as they say, many opportunities to quarrel with someone or other.

There are many industrial enterprises in our rayon that pay taxes to the city budget and I am currently interested: Just how much is the gorispolkom allocating to us for development of our rayon and let us compare these figures with other rayons where there are fewer or no industrial enterprises at all... I think that I will direct this request to the Tallinn Gorispolkom in the very near future and I hope they will answer me.

Anyway: Yesterday—the apartment issue, today at noon a man will arrive to discuss the apartment issue. From all sides—the apartment issue. And each day we are forced to extend our working hours until 9-10 p.m. so that this will not be detrimental to office duties. Just yesterday I gave myself a breather: I felt that I was becoming worn out.

As for a staff of assistants, according to the interim provision on USSR People's Deputies (there is such a document), I would be obliged to provide an office and allocate the sum of 300 rubles per month—in any

manner I desired: Either hire one person at 300 rubles or three at 100 rubles each; well, up to now, I have neither one or the other. I requested assistance from the leadership of Estrybprom but three weeks have already passed and I have not heard anything. Although local soviets must generally be engaged in this matter. And I asked one of my volunteer assistants to request this from the Kalinin Raysoviet. But no one is rushing to resolve this issue at the present time. I understand that there is a general shortage of office space in the city, but here—you have already seen—there is a pass system on the grounds of the fishing port and I have to talk to the entry personnel each time that a person wishes to come to my office on deputy business and they are already looking askance at this. Or sometimes I manage (again by agreement) to get a temporary office at the Mayak DK [House of Culture], at BSRZ [Baltic Ship Repair Yard], or at TSRZ [Tallinn Ship Repair Yard]. Of course, I must also sometimes see people at home, but it is now practically impossible to catch me at home.

[Ivanov] Yevgeniy, Please do not be offended by the next question, however, there are quite a few rumors, including the most improbable, circulating around you, as around many people who are "in the public eye." And we all know that the best method to stop rumors is to give a direct and unambiguous answer. For example, certain people ask us (in letters and on the telephone): Is it true that Kogan is leaving for a cooperative? That he bought himself a house allegedly with funds acquired outside of Estonia to help local strikers?

[Kogan] Yes, this gossip has reached me: A 70,000 ruble house and a garage with a Mercedes in it... They even listed the address—on Kadaka Tee, and recently, as far as I know, the owner of this house had some difficulty—how did she "dare" sell the house to Kogan?!

But I assure you: I have neither a house nor a Mercedes. This is at the same level as the questions during the pre-election campaign: Is it true that I participated in a robbery of a monastery? But I could not ascertain from my questioners at that time just where exactly this monastery was located nor can I see my 70,000 ruble house right now...

I do not even have a dacha like very many people have today. I do not have a car right now. That is, I have one, but after an accident it is in such a state that I can hardly put it "on the road" now. Incidentally, hundreds of people have, using their own time and at their own initiative, (and I would like to use this opportunity and I ask that it be noted that I am very thankful to them for this) collected several thousand rubles in their desire to assist me. But that sum is several times lower than what I paid for the mythical house that rumors attribute to me. We are talking about several, quite a bit less than ten, thousands that I sent to the Intermovement Fund. Insofar as it does not have an official account at present and it is not registered, and perhaps is also not a juridical person.

[Ivanov] At the meeting of the group of USSR People's Deputies from Estonia when documents were adopted regarding the CPSU Central Committee Statement on the situation in the Soviet Baltic Republics, I have learned that the question also arose about condemning the activities of Deputies Kogan and Yarovyy. How do you regard the fact that Tiyt Made opposed this decision?

[Kogan] Well, first of all, not he alone. If we are quite precise, then the majority of the deputies opposed it. The majority was so obviously opposed that the proponents of the proposal did not even insist on a vote. Made also spoke against it. He, like the others, understood that this mechanism is illegal, incidentally, and that it could be turned against anyone else in the future and that sooner or later they all would have to pass through it. I have in mind the mechanism which permits them to dispose of disagreeable deputies.

Made, you recall, justified his refusal to sign the document censuring Kogan and Yarovyy by the fact that his constituents would not understand such an undemocratic trick by their deputy.

For example, I have a sufficiently good relationship with Khasso Nurm and he was also against it, although Khasso Nurm and Tiyt Made have quite different positions. Tynspoeg was also against it, yes and many, many others....

And anyway, I will tell you, I do not know if you will publish it or not, that the discussion of the documents provoked a fierce argument at the time. I have in mind both Gorbachev's telegram and his Appeal to the Peoples of the Soviet Union and to the USSR People's Deputies. It reached the point of an exchange of personal insults. If you had seen the original version and compared it with what was "released" to the press... It had become significantly smoother and more flexible. Because what Viktor Palm and Maryu Lauristin laid out on the table outraged the majority of the deputies. In any case, one could clearly see a division into three groups: Those who stopped at nothing and tried to entice the others along with them; those who were against the proposed version; and, those who adopted a wait and see attitude. It certainly is no secret to you that certain deputies removed their signatures from the document after they had already been printed in the press.

[Ivanov] In a word: What do you think about Tiyt Made's public statements (including those in foreign publications)?

[Kogan] Is it not paradoxical that Tiyt Made conducts himself more honestly than many others. He actually said it in a telephone interview from Stockholm in the newspaper EDAZI when he stated that he is not offended by those deputies who speak to the press and condemn his positions—they, in his words, think the same as he does but it turns out that they are great diplomats and have considered the political situation better...

Tiyt Made's courage does not fail him under any circumstances. Although my convictions strongly differ from his convictions... However, you can have a discussion with him and he is ready to have one. There are also those deputies (from Estonia) who do not want to have a discussion. I will not name them... But there are certain people, for example, who, for all of their, so to speak, education, will not even say hello.

[Ivanov] Yevgeniy, what did you have in mind when you said in your television interview which was recently repeated on Estonian Television about "those who live beyond the River Narova," and that "the Russian peasant [muzhik] takes a long time to harness [his horse] in order to rapidly ride later"?

[Kogan] They took this one sentence out of context and later played it inside out (we know how television in our country does this so elegantly)... And I only wanted to say that the natural habitat of the Russian people is not limited by the River Narova. And it may turn out that very many people who are there are our confederates. And that is how it already is—the rise of social consciousness in Russia is already occurring. Of course, I am not a politician—I am a mechanical engineer. And I see my responsibility as a people's deputy to never lower myself to the level of insults, I have not done so, and I will not do so.

Anyway, let us put an end to the idle gossip with regard to those sentences from the television interview: I had in mind that those who are conducting policy in Estonia are conducting it in an adventurous manner by causing the Estonian people to clash with the Russian people. And I do not see any particular difference here between the leadership of the Republic and the leaders of the People's Front. Take, for example, the Estonian CP draft program of action, especially its Tartu version, and compare them... I do not want to say that one was copied from the other but in any case they were written by people who adhere to identical opinions, identical views and convictions, and as a result, it is precisely the People's Front policy that is being implemented. And, in my opinion, it incites the Estonian people to adventurism. And adventurism can have quite deplorable consequences for any people. While inducing two peoples to clash with each other, they attempt to convince Estonians: "There are more of us," that is Estonians—here, in Estonia. But really this is a fool's method and nothing will come of it other than that it will incite the Estonian people into such an abyss from which I do not know how it will remove itself... As for the thesis of the indigenous nation, I dare to refute such a thesis.

[Ivanov] And does it not appear to you that you are contradicting yourself and precisely in this way: Several sentences earlier, you said that, in your opinion, definite progress has been achieved at the negotiations between the representatives of the strike committees, ID, and OSTK and the republic leadership and that your demands have been taken into account. And now you

assert that the Republic leadership's policies are as adventurist and hopeless as before. Just where is the logic here?

[Kogan] You know that people reproach me for being a dilettante and for being engaged in politics. But how are the professional politicians who lead the Republic better in this sense if they agreed to these negotiations only when the republic was placed on the verge of a serious crisis by the strike committees? Is such a situation necessary in order for a government to admit its shortcomings? Thus I am not contradicting anything at all.

[Ivanov] Yevgeniy, one more question from the category of tricky ones. You have the right to answer or not to answer, however rumor has it that you made a telephone call to Slyunkov both on the eve of strikes and after they had begun. What do you have in mind and are there real grounds for this rumor?

[Kogan] This is something new for me. Believe me, I did not call Slyunkov and I could not have even if I had wanted to. I simply do not know either his home or his office telephone number. Everyone certainly knows that such telephone numbers are "secret." I as a people's deputy have the telephone number of the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat and I can call there but I do not know how to call members of the Politburo or the government.... And by the way, I was in Moscow on the eve of the first strike and to call there from here is simply physically impossible. I spoke at the session of the Supreme Soviet and actually said that the situation in the Republic was miserable but there was no such telephone call to Slyunkov.

Maybe they are talking about this. When the decision to suppress strikes was made at the Republic Presidium of the Supreme Soviet level, the so called anti-strike law, then we, naturally, called Moscow to the USSR Prosecutor's office and warned that everyone (that is, ID and strike committee activists) would, at 4 a.m., be going to those enterprises which begin work at that time and if even one of us was arrested based on this new law, the situation here would take an unpleasant turn. And we were near the bus parking lot at exactly 4 a.m. but no arrests at all occurred... For some time now, we have had to search for the USSR prosecutor's office telephone numbers and use them when things get "hot."

Incidentally, if the conversation has already turned to that: The Estonian SSR Presidium of the Supreme Soviet's decision making mechanism itself was interesting. No one gathered all of the Presidium members together. They called certain members of the Presidium and they did not even consider it necessary to call certain other members... For example, they said that they "could not find" Boris Moronov at that moment.

[Ivanov] Tell me, do differences exist today between you and those people with whom you began establishing Intermovement?

[Kogan] No, there are no differences. Honestly speaking, it is simply that not everyone has the strength to withstand the tension of this work. Some have taken less active positions. Some had problems at work. For example, Kosta Kiknadze was forced to quit [his job] because he is an Intermovement activist. Today he is considered to be a member of one cooperative but as far as I know he does not earn very much there for some reason. There are arguments between us. There always were and we cannot get by without them. We also argued a lot when we began [the movement].

[Ivanov] This is why I am asking about this: When SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA published an interview with Viktor Balachevtsev, the ID Coordinating Council called us and stated that Balachevtsev was not authorized to speak for the entire Intermovement and could not express its opinion.

[Kogan] Of course, he is not authorized to speak for the entire Intermovement, but he is totally justified in saying whatever he likes from his personal perspective.

[Ivanov] Yevgeniy, what is your attitude toward the OSTK and your relationship with the OSTK?

[Kogan] Well, how can I say this to you... Relations with OSTK have generally always been complicated. But nevertheless, we have a lot that unites us. We work together. But there are also quite a few arguments. If we undertake some type of joint action, then Intermovement bears a portion of the responsibility if it is better prepared for it and OSTK bears a portion of it. For example, a staff is provided while conducting joint meetings of the enterprise which is part of OSTK. And really they are two independent and different organizations, each has its own charter and its program provisions. It is true and I will once again emphasize: We, the ID, are not registered as a juridical person and we cannot acquire that same staff. That is, they argue with us, they curse us, but they are afraid to recognize us. God only knows whom they have recognized and registered, even those movements and organizations that cannot possibly gather two dozen members. But they are afraid of Intermovement. At one Central Committee meeting, someone even spilled the beans: "What, do you think we are fools enough to recognize you? Maybe we should also give you the press?" Although we also have VESTNIK INTERDVIZHENIYA, it is no longer printed on Estonian territory. Where do we publish it now? That is really our affair. Although they granted us official permission to print it, the Oktoober Printing Plant refused to print it: They tore up our contract without any explanation whatsoever and arbitration would not help us. Allegedly on the grounds that we are inciting inter-ethnic animosity. Even though our circulation totaled 4,500. But now that we are compelled to look for a printing plant outside the Republic, the circulation will be greater. Around 20,000 at the beginning. And obviously it will generally be about 50,000. But they will not be able to print it in the Estonian language since they do not have the type: That is, they are depriving us of the possibility

to socialize with the Estonian population—they are obviously afraid that the people will learn too much about us. I cannot explain such things any other way.

[Ivanov] Tell me, how do you regard the concept of the IME [Self-Managing Estonia]?

[Kogan] I have a negative attitude toward IME and other such organizations. I react positively to the idea of regional or republic cost accounting. In my opinion, there is too much polarization in the IME concept. But inasmuch as its developers assert that it is an integrated unit and that removal of any part is intolerable, our attitude toward the IME is also negative. We are against the political portion of the concept. And we are for cost accounting with both hands—it will put everyone in their places.

[Ivanov] From the area of purely human terms: Do you not ever at times doubt the appropriateness of your words, actions, or positions?

[Kogan] Well, doubt is generally a peculiarity of a man. And in that sense I am not an exception. But I have not noticed any major errors on my part. You know, those of an irreversible nature. And anyway, perhaps I can possibly list several points upon which I review my positions. For example, do you recall how many irreconcilable arguments there were around the national symbol and the flag? Some are categorically "for" and others are just as categorically "against." And I would now propose a compromise version: We have an Estonian SSR National Flag which has blue and white stripes on it. Let us add one more color—black. If we are considering resorting to a compromise... And it is true that we ourselves will not resort to one.

The second point regards Estonia leaving the Soviet Union. We in due course, and I too, stated that we are categorically against this. And right now I say: Let us do this in another way. The Estonian people can leave the Soviet Union along with the territory (partially!) of course if they want to. And let them leave us to live the way we want to. If they do not want to live together, we will live nearby.

I saw the Turkish guest transient workers sitting in the rain near the Moskva Hotel... We should not end up in that position! And we will not end up there.

Therefore, let us conduct a referendum among the Estonian population and among the Russian speaking population. In referring to my opponents, I can say that, according to their data, they cannot gather the required majority in their auditorium, it will not happen....

*FROM THE AUTHOR: While speaking about the version of "not together, but nearby," Kogan had in mind implementation of the principle of administrative territorial autonomy with the division of territory where primarily Estonian people reside and which in this manner, in*

*his opinion, it could remain within the USSR while the other part of the Republic could separate from the Union.*

*When our conversation was practically over, the dictaphone was turned off and it was time to say good-by, a hard to explain expression glimmered in Yevgeniy Kogan's eyes and he suddenly asked: "Tell me, you have been in various auditoriums and you associate with various people. Do you think that the Russians and other minority nationalities living here support us, that is, the Intermovement? And if so, how widespread is this support and how broad is the circle of our supporters?"*

*I answered what I thought. It seems to me that Intermovement has more supporters among the Russian speaking population of Estonia than say, for example, the People's Front has. I cannot express them in absolute numbers or in a percentage ratio but, on the other hand, the impression of late is as follows: People are generally rather tired of the endless political squabbles with no end in sight and the main thing—that they do not see any progress in them. And there are no real results. People want to work and not discuss. Maybe I am not correct?*

*I do not know if I convinced Kogan of something or not. Incidentally, I did not even set that goal. I only answered the question he posed.*

### Most Kazakhs Pleased with New Language Law 18320019A

[Editorial Report] Alma-Ata SOTSIALISTIK QAZAQSTAN in Kazakh on 20 September carries on page 3 a 5000-word symposium of short articles, interviews and letters on the new Kazakh SSR language law entitled "Fate of a Language, Fate of a People." An editorial note records the tremendous reader interest in the subject, with more than 1000 letters received by the editors of SOTSIALISTIK QAZAQSTAN, of which a sample, along with other material is presented in the symposium. Three major themes emerge from views presented: 1) that establishment of Kazakh as an official language of the republic is the proper course and long overdue, 2) that no one is greatly offended by the continued use of Russian as the language for inter-ethnic communications (as long as Kazakh is given proper respect), and 3) that a tremendous educational effort will be needed at all levels, not only to teach Kazakh to non-Kazakhs, but to the Kazakhs themselves, many of whom are extremely weak in their own language. In this regard, respondents express considerable dissatisfaction with the way that Kazakh has been treated in the past, one letter saying openly that if Kazakh had been used over the years, alongside Russian as originally intended, the republic would not now be in the linguistic state of confusion it is now in. There is the underlying suggestion in this, a suggestion expressed elsewhere as well, that law is one thing, carrying out of the provisions of law another. Those expressing their views, however, clearly intend for the law to be carried out in fact as well as in theory.

**Interview on Kazakh Language Law Notes  
Ignorance of Mother Tongue**

18320019B

[Editorial Report] Alma-Ata SOTSIALISTIK QAZAQSTAN in Kazakh on 12 October carries on pages 3-4 a 3000-word interview with Sultan Sartayev, department chair of the Kazakh State University Legal Faculty, corresponding member of the Kazakh SSR Academy of Sciences, deputy chairman of the USSR Jurists Union, president of the Kazakh SSR Jurists Union, and former chairman of Commission on the Official Language Question of the Ideological Division of the Central Committee of the Kazakhstan Communist Party, on what the new republic language law means in fact and what the next steps must be, now that Kazakh has been made the official language of the republic. In the interview, recorded by Ye. Smayylov and titled "The Law Has Been Approved, What Must We Do Now?", Sartayev, in response to a question about how the views of the language commission once chaired by himself changed during the three or four years of its existence, makes clear that the issue as far as he is concerned, and apparently as far as the other members of his commission were concerned as well, is not so much the question of official use of Kazakh as a state language, something in theory at least already the case, but the sad linguistic and, as a result, cultural state of the Kazakhs themselves. To Sartayev, the republic's greatest linguistic problem is the fact that many Kazakhs, particularly the young, do not know their mother tongue at all well and as a result are losing their Kazakh culture (and even self-identity as Kazakhs). This, in his view, is the problem which must be responded to by the public, and by the authorities, above all through an enormous educational effort operating at all levels.

Sartayev, like many Kazakhs (he gives examples), is not really opposed to the continued use of Russian (which will continue to be used officially under the new law, "equally," although second in status to Kazakh) and even calls for improved teaching of Russian in Kazakh schools. The reason, he makes clear, that his commission chose to give preference to Kazakh as the official language of the republic was not any prejudice against Russian, or Russian culture, but the recognition that equal status in theory for Russian and Kazakh in the past has simply not worked, and that to make Kazakh anything less than the actual official language of the republic would be to "deprive that language of possibilities for future development" and continue the present situation whereby Kazakh is a language on the decline, little favored by the Kazakh elite who mostly choose to send their children to Russian schools (this is changing, interviewer Smayylov suggests).

To reassure readers that the new language law will achieve what it intends, Sartayev goes into detail about current planning to reform the educational and media systems to function as primarily Kazakh-language systems (although, he makes clear repeatedly, no other

nationality will be deprived to the right to use its own language freely). In this regard he notes large scale educational planning efforts for 1990 and the 10-year deadline for the changeover within the institutional efforts of republic life. In this regard he makes clear that he has no illusions whatever about the complexity and difficulty of the tasks involved.

Throughout the interview Sartayev repeatedly emphasizes the fact that Kazakh as an official language will not mean the eclipse of Russia. However, like other commentators on this topic, he is vague on specifics and seems somewhat embarrassed by the continued problem of what to do about Russian. To smooth over the difficulty he pays a great deal of lip-service to bilingualism and internationalist spirit, without saying very much in the process.

**Academician Qaydarov on Alma-Ata 'Mother Tongue' Society Meeting**

18320014A

[Editorial Report] Alma-Ata LENINSHIL ZHAS in Kazakh on 18 October 1989 carries on page 3 a 1,200-word interview with A.T. Qaydarov, director of the Kazakh SSR Academy of Sciences Linguistics Institute, academician, chairman of the "Mother Tongue" Society Organizational Committee, recorded by Otegen Oralbayev. The interview, entitled "Mother Tongue—Your Honor," focuses on the significance and planned events of the 20-21 October Alma-Ata organizational meeting of the Kazakh "Mother Tongue" Society. In his answers, Qaydarov makes clear that the society has come into existence above all as response to the great public interest in the Kazakh language on account of the new republic language law (and the needs which gave rise to it). Because of this, he also shows, the society will pursue goals in education and other areas supported by the public in connection with language issues. Altogether some 800 persons from 17 oblasts, the city of Alma-Ata and even areas outside the republic will participate in the organizational meeting, which will formally establish the society, set its organization and ratify a program of action. Speakers will include noted academics and others, indicative, Qaydarov shows, of broad official support, above all in academic circles, for the work of the society.

**Language Law Connection to Tajik Migration  
Downplayed**

**Migration Factors Stressed**

90US0283A Dushanbe KOMMUNIST  
TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 17 Nov 89 p 2

[Article by Kh.Umarov, doctor of economic sciences, and N.Matkulov, candidate of philosophical sciences: "Migration Processes: Motives and Assessments"]

[Text] Recently, trends and directions in current migration have been the subject of a lively discussion in the

republic. Rumors of a sizeable rise in the rate of departures by European nationalities from the Tajik SSR have appeared. The same rumors link the growth of emigration of Russian-speaking population to the passage of the Law on Language by the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet, giving the status of state language to Tajik.

First of all, we must stress how important it is to assess objectively the causes and motives of this phenomenon. Unfortunately, sociologists in the republic do not pay enough attention to population migration. The lack of a clear picture of true factors and personal motives in territorial migration gives rise to rumors, disorientates people and artificially inflames passions in relations among nationalities and ethnic groups in Tajikistan.

Without presuming to state the final truth, let us try to shed light on the true causes of this phenomenon. We should stress, in particular, that the balance of migration flows in the republic turned negative, i.e., outflows began to surpass inflows, back in the mid-1970s. According to the data of the Tajik SSR State Committee for Statistics, it totaled 2,600 people in 1975, 13,400 people in 1979 and 8,600 and 11,200 people in 1987 and 1988, respectively. This number includes representatives of the indigenous ethnic groups as well as Germans, Russians, Crimean Tatars and other nationalities and ethnic groups.

In other words, population outflows began to outstrip inflows long before the Tajik SSR Law on Language was passed and as such have no connection to that law. However, we would not be sincere if we closed our eyes to a certain increase in outflows while the Law on Language was being discussed and adopted. This was due to false rumors among Russian-speaking residents that their rights would be restricted.

We think that there is a number of causes which have a different force, impacting the process to a greater or lesser extent. They can be divided by their origin into internal and external ones.

The former include mainly the declining rates of industrialization and urbanization. Until some time in the mid-1970s, industries were being rapidly developed which, being labor-intensive, required a highly skilled workforce. These included machine building, electromechanics, textiles and knitwear, some plants of the building materials industry, etc. At the time, the intensive construction of the core parts of the South Tajikistan industrial complex was underway. Industrialization proceeded at a rapid clip, but with obvious distortions. Thus, there essentially was no well-functioning system to train the local workforce for the newly built industries. Instead, emissaries were sent to other parts of the country to recruit skilled workers for the new enterprises in the republic. In that period, the positive balance of migration was large, reaching 61,000 people during the seventh five-year plan.

At the same time, labor surplus on the countryside began to rise dramatically. Measures to provide jobs for this

group of population in the public sector were inadequate. On the contrary, impediments were created to the broadening of the industrial infrastructure on the countryside. It was thought that it should be limited to agriculture. For a variety of reason, rural population was unable to migrate to cities en masse. Consequently, in areas of new construction in Tajikistan, the numbers of new immigrants continued to grow.

In later years, noticeable changes occurred in the structure of industrial development. A decision was made to build large, capital-intensive projects. The construction and operation of the aluminum plant and the Vakhsha hydroelectric plant were still carried out largely with the help of outside workers, but in smaller numbers. It should be also kept in mind that major construction sites, even the Rogunskaya hydroelectric plant, draw mainly on the large pool of skilled indigenous and nonindigenous local workers that have appeared here.

The changing structure and direction of industrialization was linked to another, equally important cause of reduced inflows of population, i.e., the low level of urbanization of the region. Newcomers of European nationalities prefer to settle in urban areas. Yet, Tajikistan tends to have a low level of urbanization and a low population density in its cities. The share of urban population is only 33 percent, the lowest in the country. Moreover, since the mid-1970s, the process of deurbanization has been underway, i.e., the share of urban population is declining. This process exists nowhere else in the country and is rare elsewhere in the world.

Deurbanization is reflected in lower industrial and social capacities of cities, leading to lower opportunities for finding jobs, housing and social services. Potential immigrants, before they move, typically weigh living conditions in various cities and regions of the country. The availability of housing is one example. In Tajikistan, its availability has declined in recent years. In 1988, the republic built 50 apartments per 10,000 residents, compared to 90 in the RSFSR, 99 in Belorussia and 80 in the country as a whole. This suggests that compared to the RSFSR and most other republics the waiting period for housing is much longer here. This is, incidentally, an important factor determining migration behavior of individuals.

The same can be said about the quality of life in cities and the availability of social, cultural and consumer services. Only 16 percent of children have permanent day care facilities in Tajikistan, compared to 71 percent for the RSFSR and the Belorussian SSR and 61 percent in the Ukrainian SSR. Coverage by outpatient medical clinics, or the number of visits per shift per 10,000 residents, is only 52.6 percent of the level existing in the RSFSR and 59.6 percent of the national average. Historical data shows that in all indicators, the gap between the quality of life in Tajik cities and those in most other regions of the country tends to widen. This leads to an accelerated outflow of population of other nationalities from the republic and to smaller inflows.

An equally important factor in the republic's negative migration balance is increased demographic pressure on national output and social services. This pressure is the result of a combination of two factors: rapid rates of natural population growth and distortions in regional structural policy. Neither structural changes in the economy, nor the pace of development in the agricultural sector (especially its industrial subsector) took into account rapid rates of natural population growth. As a result, important measures of personal consumption have declined in recent years. The overall level, too, at 63.3 percent of the national average, remains low.

In particular, as a result of demographic pressure, per capita meat consumption in the republic is half the level nationwide. The average urban resident in Tajikistan has 2.3 times less housing space than his counterpart in the RSFSR. The republic is overpopulated. Naturally, when information is widely available, this situation has a negative impact on nonindigenous population. In this respect, the following data should be mentioned: in 1987, the main reason for leaving cited by rural residents of European nationalities was living conditions, mentioned by 50.8 percent of respondents.

Another external cause is departure to take up permanent residence abroad. Lately, emigration by Germans to the FRG and the GDR has risen dramatically. It should be especially stressed that, as far as we know, when they go abroad, Germans have never said that they were leaving Tajikistan due to strained relations with representatives of indigenous population. For the same reason, migration by persons of Jewish nationality out of the country has also increased.

It can be stated with certainty that the republic has no interest in seeing its highly skilled workers leave, especially since a large portion of those who do leave are good workers. The republic feels this way not because there may be problems with the normal functioning of industrial, research and design entities, but mainly because our goal is to create conditions for harmonious development of all nationalities and ethnic groups. We are convinced that only collaborative and highly productive labor by all nationalities in our republic will ensure economic, social and spiritual progress of nationalities and ethnic groups living in Tajikistan.

Thus, migration of residents has many causes, reflecting the desire of individuals to realize their needs and personal interests more fully. As to the deterioration of relations between representatives of different nationalities in the republic as the reason for leaving, this issue, in our opinion, does not have as great a significance as some people think, even though this issue has not been studied in sufficient depth. Thus, in a recent poll, over one half of Tajiks said they preferred working in multiethnic collectives and living in multiethnic settlements. For some 50 percent of respondents, the ethnic makeup of their collectives did not matter. From this stems our conclusion that migration processes can not be explained only by interethnic relations.

Hasty conclusions neither tested by science and nor based on facts can trigger a chain reaction of rumors and inventions which would not help maintain the normal climate in interethnic relations. To conclude, we want to stress one more time that Tajikistan has become the native land to representatives of many nationalities and ethnic groups, and it will remain their native land in perpetuity.

### Positive Language Role Seen

90US0283B Dushanbe KOMMUNIST  
TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 17 Nov 89 p 2

[Article by S.Yerov, student of the Sverdlovsk Higher Party School: "Higher Party School Student Ponders Language, Other Issues"]

[Text] After our summer vacation, a student at the party school from Sverdlovsk Oblast was a little surprised when I told him that the Tajik language had received the status of state language, and said:

"Usually, it is a very painful process accompanied by a wave of dissatisfaction and conflicts. In your case, it happened smoothly and rather quietly."

I told him then that there were many reasons for this, but the most important one was the democratic aspects of the Law on Language itself. Apparently, it was also important that when the issue had been debated, both sides showed enough wisdom and patience. (I meant both those for whom Tajik is the native language and other residents.) This made me hope that the articles of the law would be implemented without major difficulties.

Even though this hope is still with me, having read the recent appeal by a group of Tajik intellectuals to residents in republic newspapers and a number of other pieces, I saw that things were not as simple as it seemed. This is why I decided to share my thoughts with you. I understand that I may be subjective in some respects, especially since I am somewhat apart from the daily life of the republic, but while expressing my own views I am ready to listen to other opinions as well.

The issue of giving the status of state language to Tajik involved almost everyone in the republic. I was pleasantly surprised to see a man from my village, an ordinary tractor driver named Abdulhamid Madzhidov, gather signatures and go to Dushanbe with some petition, and later collect contributions from villagers to the Tajik Language Fund. Abdulhamid began to read newspapers regularly, not just subscribe to them.

I saw for the first time that people were not indifferent to political issues, which, in my opinion, the issue of languages has become. This issue roused the interest of the people probably because it touched a sensitive string in the popular soul. The reason seems to be that for Tajiks, as for many other nations, the language is the

strongest and practically the only bond helping them survive as a nation despite all historical upheavals.

But this is not, of course, the only reason why people's interest in the issue of languages has grown. Hidden ethnic tensions and street nationalism, which in some instances explode into interethnic strife and conflicts, are a form in which the crisis which grips other aspects of our life besides the economy manifests itself. This is why we must look at these phenomena with more sense and patience, without reproaches and fear, in full control of our emotions and without trying to solve all problems in one blow, by pressure and compulsion. Revolutionary passion is out of place here.

The desire of various nationalities in our country to be more independent, to restore justice in ethnic issues and to preserve their language and culture is natural. In his work "The Role of Violence in History", F. Engels used contemporary German history to show how natural the reaction of national sentiment is, and how it also has a materialist underside. To ensure world peace, he wrote, we must first eliminate all possible national tensions. Every nation has to be fully independent and be master in its own house.

There is no need to list the causes of intensified ethnic tensions in the USSR. Everybody is talking about them now. When I think of it, I often recall Yesenin's lines:

Few are the roads have I traveled,  
Many the errors I have made.

It is time to correct the errors, even though to correct them and even to admit them is often hard. It would be sad, however, if instead we began to look for extremes, creating the image of the enemy.

One sometimes hears that this or that nationality has progressed during the period of Soviet power at the expense of other ethnic groups. But come to think of it, the policy during Stalin's time and during Brezhnev's wasted era hurt all nationalities of the country. We all suffered in one way or another.

There is no need to argue that the knowledge of another person's language promotes mutual understanding and helps people grow closer together, not to mention that it is a great treasure. But there is no need to deny the fact that there used to be disdain for the Tajik language. I know people who have lived in Tajikistan for 10, 20 or more years without learning to say two words in Tajik. This cannot be explained away by the odious saying "one could break one's tongue on it," or by the fact that there is a shortage of dictionaries and that Tajik is taught badly at non-Tajik schools. It used to be different before. Ask those who came to Tajikistan in the 1920s-1940s.

Of course, many residents of the republic who do not know Tajik are not used to learning another language. It may feel strange, but they must do it, suppressing in themselves the sense of national superiority—if only to show their respect. In general, one should probably know

the people with whom one lives. The surest path to this is to learn the language. Pythagoras said: "If you want to know about the mores of a people, try to learn their language first." This is so because the language is not a mere tool of communication. This is an old, simplistic approach. If it were only a tool, it could easily be replaced by another tool. But, to use the words of Russia's poet Nikolay Dorizo:

I do not want Pushkin's tongue,  
The language of Nekrasov, Turgenev and Tolstoy,  
No matter how powerful or great,  
To displace another language.

If the national culture were compared to a house, the language would be the "shahsutun", or the mainstay, which holds up the entire house. This is why the attitude to any language should be that of respect and even reverence.

To borrow the best from any nation, one must probably know about its best sons and daughters. Would people of other nationalities not be interested to read the heirs to the great and fine poetry in Tajik (Farsi), such as Mumin Kanoat, Loik Sherzali, Gulrukhsor and Bozor Sabir, in the original? This is a good place to quote Marx: "Every nation can and must learn from others."

Indeed, the use of the Tajik language was restricted and a state system was established where, to use the words of G.Ch.Guseynov and D.V.Dragunskiy (VOPROSY FILOSOFII, No 6, 1989), the Russian people had to play "the sad role of the great assimilator of foreigners." But today we must present the bill not to those who were born and raised under that system and for whom Tajikistan has practically become a motherland, but to the part of the so-called "local bureaucracy" who became officially adapted to local nihilism and lost their civic courage, forgetting their roots and duties. And some of us played along with them and, at a time when our kids knew very little Russian, lied, proclaiming that Russian was our second language. We forgot that in our country, when we want to say "native language", we say "zaboni modari", meaning mother tongue. There is only one mother, and there is only one mother tongue.

Addressing my countrymen, especially young Tajiks, I want to say the following: everyone of us who wants our culture to flourish and be respected must first be a representative of that culture. The fact that Tajik has become the state language is a great step for the growing national consciousness and the implementation of the articles of the Law on Language is a necessary and positive undertaking.

But even a good undertaking can turn into its opposite if it transgresses the limits of reason. National consciousness, if it turns into national intolerance, anger or, worse, hatred, will not be good for any nationality. On the contrary, it may cause an irreversible spiritual damage to the people, destroy its spiritual balance and bring up an entire generation to be intolerant to outsiders.

Today, we can not allow careerists, demagogues or religious fanatics to become defenders of national interest. The people itself, through its progressive intelligentsia and, of course, party leaders and ideologists, must become the defender of that interest.

The representatives of the intelligentsia who call for such forgotten holidays as Sada and Mekhregon, as well as Navruz, to be brought back and infused with a new meaning are right, of course. Those are holidays with deep, common human roots and they undoubtedly promote mutual understanding and respect among nationalities in the republic. While borrowing elements from other cultures, however progressive, we must preserve the originality of our own culture and our language. The original is always more interesting than a hastily put together copy.

Recently, at a function at our party school, I sang a Tajik song "Mastam-Mastame", accompanied by folk instruments. (I hope that the muse of music and singing will forgive my presumption.) Almost all Tajiks came out to dance and everybody who saw it liked it very much.

"You were great," a friend from Perm told me a day later. "You gave us a great demonstration that you come from a nation with rich cultural traditions."

However, the idea had been received with skepticism by some of my countrymen. One of them asked me: "Why do you want to do it? No one will understand you anyway, and your primitive song will elicit nothing but a skeptical smile in the audience." I must confess that I myself had been hesitant before performing. I do not understand why we have this hesitancy and timidity, the inferiority complex which causes us to keep to ourselves.

The growth of national consciousness must be combined with the growth of self-knowledge, i.e., with a sober and rather critical, as opposed to blindingly enthusiastic, attitude to the nation's past and present. But I am afraid that some in our Tajik intelligentsia, and not intelligentsia alone, are unable to be self-critical toward our people. I know this from my own experience. But come to think of it, a self-critical view on the condition of one's own people stemming from concern and alarm for its future is a positive, progressive factor. This approach is not incompatible with respect for the past.

Along with the need to preserve national integrity and special features, the need to assert human values over group, class and national ones is evident today. Let us recall one of our wisest ancestors, Rumi, whose works unfortunately remain inaccessible to wide audiences: He rose above base human passions and above all religions, singing instead the loftiness of man and the unity of mankind.

Concluding my thoughts, I want to express my hope that the issue of broadening the use of the Tajik language and its preservation and enrichment, and of providing equal rights to other languages, is not left to its own devices. The Law on Language, like any law, is not a self-realizing

system; it requires daily work to put the rights and responsibilities it has promulgated into practice.

#### Turkmen SSR: Draft Program for Turkmen, Russian, Other Languages

90US0218A Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA in Russian 31 Oct 89 pp 1, 3

[“Draft Submitted by the Turkmen SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and the Turkmen SSR Supreme Soviet Commission on Interethnic Relations: State Program for Developing and Expanding the Sphere of Application of the Turkmen Language and Improving the Study of Russian and Other Languages”]

[Text] Under the conditions of perestroika, democratization of society and creation of a legal state, continued development of interethnic relations largely depends on the correct solution of the problems which have come to a head in the linguistic life of the nations and nationalities, and which were most acutely pointed out by the 19th All Union Party Congress and the 1st Congress of USSR People's Deputies. Conceptual approaches to linguistic policy were presented in the speech of CPSU Central Committee Secretary General and USSR Supreme Soviet Chairman, Comrade M.S. Gorbachev, given at the September (1989) CPSU Central Committee Plenum.

The Turkmen SSR as a sovereign and equal socialist republic within the make-up of the USSR, is called upon to ensure the comprehensive development of the language and culture of the Turkmen people, as well as the free development and equal right by all citizens to use their native languages. "He is not a Marxist, he is not even a democrat," stressed V.I. Lenin, "who does not recognize and does not stand up for the equal rights of nations and languages and does not combat all national oppression or injustice".

Lenin's teachings about the free development and equal rights of language and the voluntary choice of the language of instruction comprise a component part of the CPSU platform "On the national policy of the party under current conditions", adopted by the September Party Central Committee Plenum.

There are representatives of many nationalities and peoples living and working in our republic who speak different languages. In the years of Soviet rule in Turkmenistan there has been a cultural revolution, and linguistic construction has played an important role in its implementation. The Turkmen language has become a well-developed literary language, and its social functions have been significantly expanded.

The continued development and expansion of the sphere of application of the Turkmen language, as well as other national languages, is taking place not on the basis of isolation, but rather under conditions of intensive interaction and mutual enrichment. An important place in this process belongs to the Russian language. "It has

historically been such," notes the CPSU platform, "that the language of interethnic communication in our country has become Russian. Therefore, it is expedient in every respect to create favorable conditions for the development of national-Russian and Russian-national communication. The interests of all the Soviet peoples would be served by a legislative securing of the Russian language as the all-state language, to be used on the territory of the entire country and functioning on an equal basis with the state languages of the republic".

However, in recent years, many questions have accumulated within the republic which have been raised by the administrative-command system of management and the notions about lack of problems in national-linguistic relations. There has been a notable tendency to narrow the sphere of application of the Turkmen language in state, social and cultural life, which is having a negative effect on the development of the national culture. The process of continued development of the internal structure of the Turkmen language is proceeding slowly.

Part of the people of native nationality, primarily from among the urban population, have a poor knowledge of their native language. The study of the Turkmen language in the educational institutions does not meet current requirements, particularly in the general education schools. The level of study of the Turkmen language by representatives of other nationalities is extremely low.

There have been serious omissions also in the study and instruction of the Russian language. Many graduates of schools where Russian is not the language of instruction, particularly in the rural areas, do not receive the skills for unhindered communication in Russian, which creates difficulties for them in production and social life, in military service, and in attaining the achievements of domestic and world culture.

Little attention is given to the study and instruction of the Uzbek and Kazakh languages in schools with the corresponding contingent of students. The questions of studying the language in schools where young people of ethnic groups are studying have not yet been resolved. There are significant shortcomings in the training of scientific and pedagogical cadres, and the theoretical, instructional-material and methodological base of language instruction does not meet current requirements.

The means of mass information and the republic's artists' unions are weak in propagandizing the questions of development of the Turkmen language and national-Russian, Russian-national and interethnic verbal communication.

Under the conditions which have been created, the need has arisen for the development and realization of a State Program, whose purpose is to achieve harmonization of linguistic relations, the continued development of the Turkmen language, the expansion of the sphere of its application, the improved study of the Russian, Uzbek, Kazakh and other languages of the peoples living on the

territory of the republics, and creation for each citizen of the possibilities of using his own native language.

The present program, which requires considerable material and financial resources, provides for the step-by-step realization of measures on creating the scientific-theoretical, instructional-methodological, artistic-aesthetic, cadre, and material-technical base for the development and functioning of the Turkmen, Russian, and other languages. It is the basis for the development of the Turkmen SSR Law on Languages, and the provision which it grants to the Turkmen language as having the status of the state language on the territory of the republic.

### I. Organizational-Propaganda Work

1. To strengthen organizational-political work on harmonization of interethnic relations in the republic in connection with the expanded social functions of the Turkmen language and continued development of the study of Russian, Uzbek, Kazakh and other languages. *Turkmen SSR Council of Ministers, ministries and departments, and oblast, city, and rayon ispolkoms.*
2. To ensure regular illumination in the republic means of mass information of the questions of development of national-Russian and Russian-national bilingualism and multilingualism, to introduce a column for publication of materials on the history of the Turkmen language, its status under current conditions, and protection of the purity of the Turkmen literary language. *Editorial staffs of newspapers and journals, Turkmen SSR Gosteleradio [State Committee on Television and Radio Broadcasting].*
3. To take specific measures on the organization of synchronous translation of republic and oblast (and if possible also city and rayon) socio-political and mass cultural measures. *Turkmen SSR Council of Ministers, oblast, city, and rayon ispolkoms.*
4. To create in the schools, institutions, labor collectives, and public organizations courses for the voluntary study of the Turkmen, Russian, and other languages of USSR peoples used on the republic's territory. *Ministries and departments, Turkmen SSR "Znaniye" Society.*
5. To organize regular television and radio broadcasts:
  - in languages of the national groups living compactly on the territory of the republic;
  - as an aid to those independently studying the Turkmen or Russian languages. *Turkmen SSR Gosteleradio.*
6. To prepare and publish:
  - blanks, forms, documents, receipts, subscription forms, coupons, tickets, signs, labels, price lists, billboards, posters, envelopes, telegraph blanks, postcards, record books, advertising and souvenir booklets, invitation cards of all types, etc., printed in

- Turkmen and Russian; *Turkmen SSR Goskomizdat* [State Committee for Publications], departments and ministries.
- telephone directories containing excerpts from the rules of use of communications, advertisement materials and other textual portions in both Turkmen and Russian; *Turkmen SSR Goskomizdat*, *Turkmen SSR Ministry of Communications*.
- handbooks on the spelling of proper names (last names, first names, patronymics) which are widespread on the territory of the republic, with retention of national forms and with consideration for the regularities of the languages. *Turkmen SSR Academy of Sciences*, *Turkmen SSR Goskomizdat*.
7. To standardize toponyms of population centers, streets, squares, railroad stations, kolkhozes, sovkhozes and other territorial objects, as well as the names of institutions, enterprises, organizations, and monuments in their national form in Turkmen with translation to Russian, and in places of compact settlement of national groups, also in their languages. *Turkmen SSR Council of Ministers*, *oblast*, *city*, and *rayon ispolkoms*, and *Turkmen SSR Academy of Sciences*.
8. To ensure:
- service to the public rendered in Turkmen and in Russian in the Soviets of People's Deputies and their executive committees, in law enforcement and judicial organs, communal and medical institutions, at consumer services, trade, transport, and communications enterprises, and in places of compact settlement of national groups—to provide service also in their languages; *Turkmen SSR Council of Ministers*, *ministries and departments*.
- the preparation of texts of official publications, stamps and blanks of institutions, enterprises and organizations in Turkmen and in Russian; *Turkmen SSR Council of Ministers*, *Turkmen SSR Goskomizdat*.
- the transfer of verbal information (announcements, advertisements and others), as well as writing of signs, price lists, and announcements in Turkmen and in Russian, and in places of compact settlement of national groups also in their languages; *oblast*, *city*, and *rayon ispolkoms*.
- the publication of all legislative materials, departmental instructions-directives and other documents in Turkmen and in Russian; *Turkmen SSR Council of Ministers*, *ministries and departments*.
- that products of all types manufactured in the republic shall be accompanied by instructions written in Turkmen and in Russian;
- maximal provision of the republic's libraries with literature on questions of the Turkmen, Russian and other languages; *Turkmen SSR Ministry of Culture*.
9. To regularly hold republic, oblast, city and rayon celebrations of languages. *Turkmen SSR Ministry of Culture*.
10. To organize the publication of:
- the trade union newspaper ZAKHMET VE DUR-MUSH ("Labor and Life") in Turkmen and in Russian, providing in it also columns in Uzbek, Kazakh, and other languages; *TSPS* [*Turkmen Republic Council of Trade Unions*], *Turkmen SSR Goskomizdat*.
- the socio-political journal VATAN ("Homeland") for Turkmen living abroad. *Turkmen Society of Friendship and Cultural Ties with Foreign Countries*, *Turkmen SSR Goskomizdat*.
11. To create national-cultural centers in places of compact settlement of Turkmen in Uzbekistan, Stavropol Kray, the Amur Oblast of the RSFSR, and other territories; to provide socio-political and artistic literature, textbooks, and instructional-visual aids to general education schools with Turkmen as the language of instruction. To organize in these regions the sale of books, newspapers, and journals in the Turkmen language. *Turkmen SSR Council of Ministers*, *Turkmen SSR Ministry of Culture*, *Turkmen SSR Ministry of Public Education*, *Turkmen SSR Ministry of Communications*, and *Turkmen SSR Goskomizdat*.

## II. Developing the Study and Instruction of Languages

1. To complete the development of a conception of general secondary education in the Turkmen SSR, clearly defining in it the all-state (base) and national (regional) components. *Turkmen SSR Ministry of Public Education*.
2. In accordance with this conception:
- to develop a unified plan for step-by-step instruction in the Turkmen language in grades 1-11 in the general education school (spelling and speech, phonetics, basics of grammar of the Turkmen language, basic questions of stylistics and lexicology of the Turkmen language); *Turkmen SSR Ministry of Public Education*.
- to review on the basis of the principle of parity the instructional plans of all types of educational institutions for the purpose of standardizing the number of hours proscribed for study of the Turkmen and Russian languages; *Turkmen SSR Ministry of Public Education*.
- as the conditions are created for this, to ensure step-by-step staffing of classes and instructional groups for the study of the Turkmen language and literature in the amount of up to 25 persons in schools, PTU [vocational-technical schools], secondary special and higher educational institutions. *Turkmen SSR Ministry of Public Education*.

3. To bring into line with the actual demands the number of:

—children's preschool institutions, general education schools with Turkmen, Russian and other languages of instruction and upbringing; general education schools with parallel languages of instruction and upbringing; *Turkmen SSR Ministry of Public Education, oblast, city, and rayon ispolkoms.*

—general education schools with Turkmen as the language of instruction in cities and city-type settlements. *Turkmen SSR Ministry of Public Education, oblast, city, and rayon ispolkoms.*

4. To organize at the request of the students of vocational-technical schools, secondary special and higher educational institutions a parallel instruction conducted in Turkmen and in Russian, regardless of the departmental subordination [of these institutions]. *Turkmen SSR Ministry of Public Education.*

5. To expand the network of classes and instructional groups in general education schools and vocational-technical schools on the in-depth study of the Turkmen, Russian, Uzbek, and Kazakh languages and national literatures. *Turkmen SSR Ministry of Public Education, city and rayon ispolkoms.*

6. To create favorable conditions in all institutions, at enterprises and organizations for the voluntary study of the Turkmen language by citizens who do not have a mastery of Turkmen. To ensure the proper conditions for workers to study other languages of USSR peoples if they wish. *Ministries and departments.*

7. To provide effective aid to schools with Turkmen as the language of instruction and to groups of the population studying the Turkmen language beyond the boundaries of the republic (provision of instructional-methodological literature, provision of highly trained cadres). *Turkmen SSR Goskomizdat, Turkmen SSR Ministry of Public Education.*

8. To create:

—a problems laboratory for intensive methods and technical means of studying the Turkmen and Russian languages at the Ashkhabad Pedagogical Russian Language and Literature Institute; *Turkmen SSR Ministry of Public Education.*

—folklore-dialectology departments at Turkmen State University imeni A. M. Gorky and at the republic's pedagogical VUZes; *Turkmen SSR Ministry of Finance.*

—a department on the methodology of Turkmen and Russian language instruction, instruction in Turkmen and Russian literature (with sectors on the Turkmen and Russian language in preschool institutions; Turkmen language and literature in the Turkmen school; Russian language and literature in the Turkmen school; Turkmen language and literature in

the Russian School) at the Turkmen SSR Ministry of Public Education's Scientific-Research Institute of Pedagogy; *Turkmen SSR Ministry of Finance, Turkmen SSR Academy of Sciences.*

—departments in Turkmen language and literature at all of the republic's VUZes.

9. To expand the problematics and to strengthen with highly trained cadres the Department of Bilingualism and Multilingualism at the Turkmen SSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Language and Literature imeni Makhtumkuli. *Turkmen SSR Academy of Sciences.*

10. To ensure in the process of instruction the introduction of leading ideas and methodology of instruction, the broad application of the experience gained by the fraternal republics, and the active propaganda of practical experience of creative pedagogs. *Turkmen SSR Ministry of Public Education.*

11. To establish on an experimental basis written or oral exams (interviews) in the Turkmen language and literature for graduates of higher educational institutions in the humanities. *Turkmen SSR Ministry of Public Education.*

The results of the experiments should be discussed at the collegium of the Turkmen SSR Ministry of Public Education.

12. To regularly conduct:

—rayon, city, and oblast olympic competitions for school children on the Turkmen, Russian, Uzbek and Kazakh languages; *Turkmen SSR Ministry of Public Education.*

—republic olympic competitions on the Turkmen and Russian languages;

—review-competitions of students of vocational-technical schools, secondary special educational institutions, and students of VUZes for the best knowledge of the Turkmen and Russian languages and Turkmen and Russian literature. *Turkmen SSR Ministry of Public Education.*

### III. Improving the theoretical and methodological base for language development

1. To ensure priority directions for the development of theoretical and applied problems of bilingualism and multilingualism, Turkmen philology, instruction of the Turkmen and Russian languages, and generalization of the work experience of schools with parallel languages of instruction. *Turkmen SSR Academy of Sciences, Turkmen SSR Ministry of Public Education.*

2. To prepare and conduct:

—the III Linguistic Congress of the Turkmen SSR or a republic scientific-practical conference on the current problems of development of the Turkmen language; *Turkmen SSR Academy of Sciences.*

—a scientific-practical conference on problems of formulating positive motivation for studying the Turkmen and Russian languages by pupils and students of the republic's educational institutions. *Turkmen SSR Ministry of Public Education.*

3. To assign the commission on orthography and the commission on terminology of the Turkmen literary language the task of preparing proposals for developing literary norms and the terminology of the Turkmen language. *Turkmen SSR Academy of Sciences.*

4. To prepare and publish:

—monograph studies on the Turkmen language, history, culture and literature of the Turkmen people, stylistics of the Turkmen language, culture of Turkmen speech, methodology of teaching the Turkmen language and literature. *Turkmen SSR Academy of Sciences, Turkmen SSR Ministry of Public Education, Turkmen SSR Goskomizdat, Turkmen SSR Union of Writers, Turkmen SSR Ministry of Culture.*

—an encyclopedia entitled "The Turkmen Language".

—an encyclopedic dictionary in Turkmen on various fields of economics, science and culture.

—various types of dictionaries of the Turkmen language (defining, orthographic, etymological, dictionary of synonyms, antonyms, and metaphorical expressions), Turkmen-Russian and Russian-Turkmen dictionaries of general philological and instructional application, translated dictionaries and phrase books (Turkmen-Russian, Russian-Turkmen, Turkmen-Uzbek, Uzbek-Turkmen, Turkmen-Kazakh, Kazakh-Turkmen, Turkmen-English, English-Turkmen, Turkmen-German, German-Turkmen, Turkmen-Persian, Persian-Turkmen, Turkmen-Arabic, Arabic-Turkmen and others), and a series of terminological dictionaries on various fields of knowledge;

—the works of Azadi and other classics of Turkmen literature (selected compositions or cycles); *Turkmen SSR Academy of Sciences, Turkmen SSR Ministry of Public Education, Turkmen SSR Goskomizdat, Turkmen SSR Union of Writers, Turkmen SSR Ministry of Culture.*

—the complete academic publication of the legacy of Makhtumkul with expanded scientific commentary on it; *Turkmen SSR Academy of Sciences, Turkmen SSR Ministry of Public Education, Turkmen SSR Goskomizdat.*

—ancient Turkmen written monuments;

—a multi-volume series of Turkmen classical heroic tales, stories, proverbs, sayings, riddles, and folk epic works ("Gorkut ata", "Gorogly" and others); *Turkmen SSR Union of Writers.*

—the multi-volume series "Dostluk chemeni" ("Bouquet of Friendship"), which includes works by authors from the fraternal republics; *Turkmen SSR Union of Writers.*

—translations of the classics of world literature in Turkmen;

—the multi-volume series "Kokler" ("Roots"), which includes the works of Russian, Soviet and foreign scientists and specialists in eastern studies telling about the history, culture, everyday life, and traditions of the Turkmen people; *Turkmen SSR Union of Writers.*

—the compositions of leading scientists and writers of Soviet Turkmenistan; *Turkmen SSR Union of Writers;*

—the 5-volume series entitled "Monuments of the History and Culture of Turkmenistan"; *Turkmen SSR Union of Writers.*

—popular-scientific literature on the Turkmen language for the broad readership; *Turkmen SSR Union of Writers.*

—the works of the classics of Marxism-Leninism (selected works, multi-volume sets) in the Turkmen language. *Institute of Party History under the TCP Central Committee, a branch of the IML [Institute of Marxism-Leninism] under the CPSU Central Committee.*

5. To ensure the preparation for translation and Turkmen language publication of the 6th edition of V.I. Lenin's Collected Works. *Institute of Party History under the TCP Central Committee, a branch of the IML under the CPSU Central Committee.*

6. In accordance with the conception of a general secondary education in the Turkmen SSR, to review and create new instructional plans, programs and tests:

—on the development of Turkmen speech for various age groups of children in preschool institutions with a Russian-language contingent, the development of Russian speech with the Turkmen-speaking contingent. *Turkmen SSR Ministry of Public Education.*

—on the Turkmen and Russian languages, Turkmen and Russian literature for schools with Turkmen as the language of instruction; *Turkmen SSR Ministry of Public Education.*

—on the Turkmen language and literature for schools with Russian and other languages as the languages of instruction; *Turkmen SSR Ministry of Public Education.*

—on a practical course in Turkmen and Russian for vocational-technical schools, secondary special educational institutions, philological and non-philological specialties at VUZes. *Turkmen SSR Ministry of Public Education.*

## NATIONALITY ISSUES

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7. To renew authorship staffs for the preparation of the above-mentioned programs and textbooks, attracting to them experienced teachers, methodologists, scientists, and writers, and to widely practice the competitive selection of textbooks. To improve their artistic and polygraphic presentation. *Turkmen SSR Ministry of Public Education, Turkmen SSR Goskomizdat*.

8. To create authors' collectives to prepare the following for publication:

- textbooks in Arabic, instructional-methodological literature for the study of the Beludzh, Kurd, and other languages, and to review the publication of fictional literature in these languages; *Turkmen SSR Ministry of Public Education, Turkmen SSR Academy of Sciences*.

- an integrated course on "Turkmen studies", which contains information on the history and culture of the Turkmen people and the geography, flora and fauna of the region; *Turkmen SSR Ministry of Public Education, Turkmen SSR Academy of Sciences*.

- an integrated course on "Aesthetics", which contains information on the various forms of Turkmen, Soviet, and world art and culture. *Turkmen SSR Ministry of Public Education, Turkmen SSR Ministry of Culture*.

9. To prepare and publish:

- collections (anthologies) for extracurricular reading and visual aids (paleographic albums; photo reproductions of the works of Turkmen art; posters and tables on Turkmen grammar; portraits of Turkmen writers, leaders in science and culture); *Turkmen SSR Ministry of Public Education, Turkmen SSR Goskomizdat, Turkmen SSR Ministry of Culture, Turkmen SSR Academy of Sciences*.

- textbooks and self-study guides for those who wish to learn the Turkmen, Russian, Arabic, and other languages independently;

- textbooks on the Turkmen language and popular Turkmen literature for Turkmen living abroad; *Turkmen SSR Ministry of Public Education, Turkmen SSR Goskomizdat, Turkmen SSR Ministry of Culture, Turkmen SSR Academy of Sciences*.

- reference books, maps and travel guides to Turkmenistan written in Turkmen and in Russian; *Turkmen SSR Ministry of Public Education, Turkmen SSR Goskomizdat, Turkmen SSR Ministry of Culture, Turkmen SSR Academy of Sciences*.

- a school atlas of the Turkmen SSR written in Turkmen and in Russian;

- an atlas of the Turkmen SSR in Turkmen and in Russian;

- for scientific and instructional purposes, maps in the Turkmen language (historical, physical, political,

demographic, ecological, etc.). *Turkmen SSR Ministry of Public Education, Turkmen SSR Goskomizdat, Turkmen SSR Ministry of Culture, Turkmen SSR Academy of Sciences*.

10. To ensure:

- the Turkmen language publication of original and translated textbooks, instructional-methodological literature on all disciplines which is part of the instructional plans of schools, vocational-technical schools, secondary special and higher educational institutions; *Turkmen SSR Ministry of Public Education, Turkmen SSR Ministry of Culture, Turkmen SSR Goskomizdat, Turkmen SSR Gosteleradio*.

- the increased publication of books with parallel text in Turkmen and in Russian; the full satisfaction of the need by the republic's schools and population for scientific-methodological and fictional literature in Uzbek, Kazakh, and other languages of USSR peoples; *Turkmen SSR Ministry of Public Education, Turkmen SSR Ministry of Culture, Turkmen SSR Goskomizdat, Turkmen SSR Gosteleradio*.

- the creation and regular publication of collections of role-playing games, audiolingual courses and phonograph recordings, instructional films and film strips, and other instructional materials in Turkmen and in Russian; *Turkmen SSR Ministry of Public Education, Turkmen SSR Ministry of Culture, Turkmen SSR Goskomizdat, Turkmen SSR Gosteleradio*.

- the creation and distribution of instructional and popular scientific films about the leading experience of teaching the Turkmen, Russian, Uzbek, and Kazakh languages; *Turkmen SSR Ministry of Public Education, Turkmen SSR Ministry of Culture, Turkmen SSR Goskomizdat, Turkmen SSR Gosteleradio*.

- the systematic recording and mass volume publication of Turkmen folk songs. *Turkmen SSR Ministry of Public Education, Turkmen SSR Ministry of Culture, Turkmen SSR Goskomizdat, Turkmen SSR Gosteleradio*.

11. To organize the publication of:

- the scientific-methodological journal TURKMENSKIY YAZYK I LITERATURA V SHKOLO ("Turkmen Language and Literature in the School") (6 printed sheets with 6 issues published per year), and to increase the volume of the scientific-methodological journal RUSSKIY YAZYK I LITERATURA V TURKMENSKOY SHKOLO ("Russian Language and Literature in the Turkmen School") to 6 printed sheets; *Turkmen SSR Ministry of Public Education, Turkmen SSR Goskomizdat*.

- the popular scientific journal YLYM VE DURMUSH ("Science and Life") in Turkmen with 6 issues published per year; *Turkmen SSR Academy of Sciences*,

*Turkmen SSR "Znaniye" Society, Turkmen SSR Ministry of Public Education, Turkmen SSR Goskomizdat.*  
—one column of the press organ MUGALLYMLAR GAZETI in Russian, published once a week.

#### IV. Preparation and advanced training of teachers, scientific and pedagogical cadres

1. To introduce proposals on the training of cadres of teachers in the Turkmen and Russian languages in the republic's VUZes up to the year 2000. *Turkmen SSR Ministry of Public Education.*
2. To reorganize Ashkhabad Pedagogical Institute of Russian Language and Literature into the Turkmen State Institute of Language and Literature, with introduction of the following specialties: Turkmen language and literature in the Turkmen school, Turkmen language and literature in schools with Russian, Uzbek, Kazakh languages of instruction; Persian; Arabic, Beludzh. *Turkmen SSR Ministry of Public Education.*
3. To expand cooperative teacher training for schools and individual classes with Uzbek, Kazakh and other languages of instruction on the basis of pedagogical educational institutions of the fraternal republics. *Turkmen SSR Ministry of Public Education.*

#### 4. To organize:

- the training of translators of fictional literature, as well as translator cadres directly from Turkmen into Russian, from Russian into Turkmen, as well as into the languages of the peoples of fraternal republics; *Turkmen SSR Ministry of Public Education, Turkmen SSR Academy of Sciences.*
  - the inter-republic exchange of students studying in the specialties of "Russian language and literature", "Russian language and literature in the national school"; *Turkmen SSR Ministry of Public Education.*
  - advanced training of teachers for schools with Uzbek and Kazakh languages of instruction based at the Turkmen State Pedagogical Institute imeni V.I. Lenin and the pedagogical VUZes of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan; *Turkmen SSR Ministry of Public Education.*
  - the Training of scientific-pedagogical cadres on Turkmen and Russian philology, instructional methodology of the Turkmen language in schools with Russian, Uzbek, and Kazakh as the languages of instruction, and Russian language in the national school based at the Turkmen SSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Language and Literature imeni Makhtumkuli and Turkmen State University imeni A.M. Gorky; *Turkmen SSR Ministry of Public Education, Turkmen SSR Academy of Sciences.*
  - consultations with associates of scientific-research institutes in the pedagogical sciences of the Central Institute for Advanced Training of Pedagogical Cadres on Current Questions of Language Instruction
- at the head institutions of the USSR Academy of Pedagogical Sciences and the USSR Gosobrazovaniya [State Committee on Education]; *Turkmen SSR Ministry of Public Education.*
- courses for advanced training of Turkmen language teachers in the general education schools with Russian, Uzbek and Kazakh as the languages of instruction, PTU, secondary special and higher educational institutions on the basis of the Republic Central Institute for Advanced Training of Pedagogical Cadres; *Turkmen SSR Ministry of Public Education.*
  - permanently acting scientific-methodological seminars on the introduction of effective methods of teaching the Turkmen, Russian, Uzbek, and Kazakh languages at oblast institutes for teacher training; *Turkmen SSR Ministry of Public Education.*
  - probationary work of scientific associates at head scientific-research centers; *Turkmen SSR Ministry of Education.*
  - probationary work of instructors at VUZes, SSUZes, and PTU of the republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan; conclusion of an agreement on creative cooperation between educational institutions; *Turkmen SSR Ministry of Public Education.*
  - holding intra-VUZ scientific professor-instructor and student conferences on problems of improving instruction in Turkmen and Russian languages; *Turkmen SSR Ministry of Public Education.*
  - holding on-site instructional-methodological consultations for teachers of Turkmen, Russian and Kazakh languages in schools, PTU, and secondary special educational institutions; *Turkmen SSR Ministry of Public Education.*
  - exchange of work experience by instructors of Turkmen, Russian, and other languages of the national groups, currents, and departments in educational institutions and preschool institutions; creating inter-republic methodological associations. *Turkmen SSR Ministry of Public Education.*
5. To ensure free choice of the language of scientific works, the right to present one's dissertation and to defend it in Turkmen and Russian with consideration for the capacities of the scientific institutions and scientific soviets. *Turkmen SSR Academy of Sciences, Turkmen SSR Ministry of Public Education.*
  6. To include in the republic's plan of training scientific cadres an exchange of probationer-researchers, graduate students, and doctoral students; To organize regional specialized councils for defense of candidates' and doctoral dissertations in the specialties of: Methodology of teaching the national language in a school with Russian as the language of instruction, and Russian in the national school. *Turkmen SSR Academy of Sciences, Turkmen SSR Ministry of Public Education.*

**V. Material-technical and financial provision of the program**

1. To study and generalize in a month's time the proposals of the ministries and departments, enterprises and organizations on determining the need for typewriters and telegraph communications equipment in the Turkmen language, as well as copying equipment and other material resources. *Turkmen SSR Council of Ministers.*

2. To present to the Turkmen SSR Council of Ministers within a month's time proposals on:

—expanding and reconstructing the material-technical base of printing enterprises with consideration for fulfillment of the given program; *Turkmen SSR Gostekhizdat.*

—seeking out additional financial means for instruction in the Turkmen and other languages, making various blank forms, stamps, and signs, and training scientific, pedagogical and translator cadres; *Turkmen SSR Ministry of Finance, Turkmen SSR Ministry of Public Education.*

—increasing the volume of construction of all types of educational institutions;

—expanding the material-technical base of the Turkmen SSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Language and Literature imeni Makhtumkuli and Institute of History imeni Sh. Batyrov; *Turkmen SSR Academy of Sciences.*

—expanding the material-technical base of the "Turkmenfilm" film studio and the Turkmen SSR Gosteleradio for Turkmen language broadcasts and preparation of Turkmen subtitles for films, concerts, etc. broadcast in Russian and other languages; *Turkmen SSR Ministry of Culture, Turkmen SSR Gosteleradio.*

—increasing the capacities and number of radio and television stations for purposes of ensuring reliable reception of broadcasts by all the populated areas of the republic. *Turkmen SSR Gosteleradio.*

**From the Turkmen SSR Supreme Soviet Commission on Preparing the Draft of the Turkmen SSR Law on Languages**

The Commission announces that workers may forward their proposals and suggestions on the draft to the commission headquarters (744 000 Ashkhabad, ul. Gogolya, 15, Institute of Language and Literature imeni Makhtumkuli, Turkmen SSR Academy of Sciences, Tel. 5-56-39).

**Supreme Court Chairman on Law and Courts**

*90UN0347A Moscow CHELOVEK I ZAKON in Russian  
No 11, Nov 89 (signed to press 25 Sep 89) pp 3-9*

[Interview with Ye.A. Smolentsev, chairman of the USSR Supreme Court, conducted by journal's special correspondent: "An Independent and Impartial Court"; date and place of interview not given]

**[Text] On 4 August 1989 the USSR Supreme Soviet adopted the Law on the Status of Judges in the USSR. This is the first time that such a legal act has been adopted in our country. In this connection our special correspondent asked Ye.A. SMOLENTEV, chairman of the USSR Supreme Court, to comment on the status of the new law.**

[Correspondent] First of all, Yevgeniy Alekseyevich, I would like to clarify the following question. The USSR Constitution codifies important principles of justice, including the independence of judges and people's assessors and their immunity and subordination only to the law. These same principles are reflected in the Basic Principles of Legislation on the Judiciary, the Law on the USSR Supreme Court, and other legislative acts. Why was there a need to adopt a separate Law on the Status of Judges? What can it provide that is new?

[Smolentsev] Yes, that is true: separate provisions concerning the status of judges were codified in many legislative acts. But the point is that they were separate provisions. There was not a single act that covered all the most important aspects of the work of judges in detail and guaranteed their legal protection. These constitutional principles, not backed up by any reliable guarantees, in most cases proved simply inoperative, existing solely on paper. During the years of "stagnation" the role of the courts was diminished, and the judicial agencies found themselves, figuratively speaking, in the position of "stepchildren." However, your magazine has spoken out many times on this painful topic: the decline in the prestige and authority of people's judges and assessors, the judges' dependence on local authorities, the woeful state of many court buildings, "law by telephone," and so forth. So I will not return to that topic in our conversation. The main thing is that such an attitude toward the judicial agencies become completely intolerable.

From the outset of restructuring it immediately became evident that without real discipline, order and legality, there would be no revolutionary transformations in our country. We must build a socialist law-governed state in which the court is one of the central elements. But the idea will remain only an idea if precisely that element fails to receive dependable reinforcement, and if the entire judiciary is not improved. Judicial power should be one of the most important aspects of state power, along with legislative and executive power.

And that means, first, that the court should be independent and fully autonomous vis-a-vis the other bodies of the state, and second, that the state should provide real conditions for an independent judiciary. The courts make decisions in the state's name, and in order for justice to be administered on the basis of the law and in accordance with the convictions of judges, it is very important that they and the people's assessors be protected against outside influence and coercion.

However, no matter how everyone understands the importance of the courts in our state, it is impossible to enhance the role of the courts with appeals and declarations alone. Radical measures, first and foremost measures of a legal nature, are needed here. And one such measure is the adoption of the Law on the Status of Judges in the USSR. Many practitioners in the law-enforcement agencies and a broad spectrum of legal scholars took part in preparing it. Corresponding legislation of foreign states was studied. The draft law was thoroughly discussed by people's deputies at meetings of two USSR Supreme Soviet committees: the Committee on Legislation, Legality and Law and Order, and the Committee on Human Rights. Only after that was it submitted to the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet and, following discussion, adopted by a roll-call vote of the members of the Council of the Union and Council of Nationalities.

The law's chief significance consists in creating conditions for the courts to improve their work in the administration of justice, ensuring guarantees of judicial independence and immunity, and also defining the requirements for candidates for judge in order that only professionally trained and morally irreproachable people may be nominated for this work.

[Correspondent] The problem of judges' independence, Yevgeniy Alekseyevich, is one of the most important and, at the same time, complex, and its solution will put an end to the infamous "law by telephone" and rule out the possibility that unjust verdicts will be handed down for that reason. How is this problem reflected in the law?

[Smolentsev] It runs conspicuously throughout the whole law. Article 3 of the law contains a list of the basic guarantees of the independence of judges and people's assessors. In this connection, it emphasizes that their independence is ensured by procedures established by law for their election and removal, by their immunity, by strict legal procedures for the administration of justice, by the secrecy of the judges' consultations in handing down decisions and the prohibition against demanding that these consultations be made public, by liability for disrespect for the court or interference in the resolution of specific cases, and by the creation of necessary conditions for the courts' activities. In the discussion in committees it was proposed to add to this list the directive that judicial independence should be also guaranteed by providing financial and social benefits for judges in accordance with their lofty status. And that was also adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Note that the provision on procedures for electing and removing judges is given first place among the guarantees. Now first- and second-level judges will be elected by the next highest soviets of people's deputies, and judges of the Supreme Courts will be elected by the corresponding Supreme Soviets. Instead of five years, they will be elected for 10-year terms. The selection of candidates for judge will be made by the justice agencies in accordance with the requirements of this law on the basis of recommendations and consideration of the opinion of the labor collectives in which the nominated candidates work, as well as the conclusions of the appropriate qualifications collegium of judges.

[Correspondent] So do we get something like a "triple filter"? The opinion and recommendations of the labor collective, justice agencies and qualifications collegium.

[Smolentsev] Even a "quadruple" filter. After all, the deciding word in the election will belong to the higher soviets of people's deputies and the Supreme Soviets. I think that procedure will allow maximum avoidance of the selection of judges who are "convenient" to local authorities.

Qualifications of judges will be established for the first time, starting with oblast-level courts and going up to the USSR Supreme Court. These collegiums' basic task is to ensure the nomination of the most worthy candidates for judicial work and, of course, to strengthen the guarantees of judges' independence. These collegiums will evaluate the preparedness of each candidate who is nominated for judge for the first time, conduct an examination of candidates with regard to their qualifications, and only after that, provide a conclusion concerning the possibility of nominating a candidate for people's judge or for membership on a higher court. In addition, the collegiums will conduct a qualifications certification of judges, provide conclusions regarding recall, and when necessary also take up the question of their disciplinary liability for violation of the law in the hearing of court cases, for committing any other deed in office, and for committing any discrediting act. Here it must be particularly noted that the law, in defining the range of judges' and people's assessors' duties, prescribes that they all, in the performance of their duties in court and also in their relations outside of court, should avoid anything that could diminish the prestige of the socialist judicial system and the dignity of the Soviet judge, or raise doubts as to his objectivity and impartiality.

It must be said that the law sets fairly high requirements that the candidates must meet. Thus, as of election day a candidate must have reached 25 years of age and have a higher legal education. If he is being recommended for the first time as a people's judge, he must have worked in a legal specialty at least two years, undergo professional training, and pass the examination given by the qualifications collegium. And even higher requirements are set for candidates for judges of higher courts. They must have done at least five years of judicial work and, as a rule, served for two years as a judge. If one adds to this

the new procedure for electing judges, which, as the experience of the USSR Supreme Soviet shows, will probably not be merely pro forma, one can consider that the formation of the judicial corps in the country will be guaranteed against inappropriately qualified members.

Also new in the law is the fact that it provides for the yearly convening of judges' conferences in oblasts, okrugs, krays and republics. They will discuss questions of the application of legislation that have arisen in judicial practice, and generalize their practical experience. The conferences will direct proposals to the USSR Supreme Court or a union-republic Supreme Court concerning the provision of guiding explanations or the making of representations in the form of a legislative initiative, concerning the interpretation of laws, and concerning other matters, and will also elect qualifications collegiums for a five-year term.

Thus, both annual judges' conferences and the qualifications collegiums they elect are bodies of our judicial corps' public self-government that are called on to decide, on a democratic basis, many questions concerning the courts' work.

The grounds and procedures established by law for the recall and early dismissal of judges are an important guarantee of judges' immunity. Thus, judges and people's assessors may be deprived of their powers before the end of their terms for the violation of socialist legality or the commission of a discrediting act or acts incompatible with their lofty titles only on the basis of a recall by the body or constituents that have elected them, or by virtue of a court verdict against them that has been handed down and taken legal force. In this connection a judge or a people's assessor may not have criminal charges brought against him or be arrested without the consent of the union-republic Supreme Soviet or, in the period between sessions, of its Presidium. Consent for bringing criminal charges against judges and people's assessors of the USSR Supreme Court and arresting them will have to be obtained from the USSR Supreme Soviet or its Presidium. Moreover, not just the bringing of criminal charges and arrest, but even the initiation of a criminal case is restricted by a strict condition: With regard to a people's judge a case may be initiated either personally by the USSR Procurator General or by a union-republic procurator, and with regard to higher judges—only by the USSR Procurator General. On the invariable condition that consent to do so is given by the corresponding soviet of people's deputies or its presidium. The investigation itself of such cases may be carried out only under the supervision of the aforementioned procurators. Criminal cases against people's judges and people's assessors of rayon (city) people's courts can be tried only by the union-republic Supreme Courts, and cases against the judges and people's assessors of other union-republic and USSR courts may be tried only by the USSR Supreme Court.

Also note the following important guarantee of the immunity of those who administer legal justice: the law

forbids the arresting, taking into custody or imposition of administrative penalties against a judge or a people's assessor when they are performing their duties in court.

Incidentally, concerning people's assessors. By way of guaranteeing their job rights, the law establishes, in addition to requiring the observance of general procedures, that the dismissal of people's assessors during their term of service at the initiative of their management, or their transfer as a means of disciplinary penalty to lower-paid work is permitted only with the consent of the labor collective that has elected a people's assessor.

[Correspondent] The section of the Law on the Status of Judges in the USSR titled "Basic Guarantees of the Independence of Judges and People's Assessors" includes articles on liability for disrespect for the court and on the impermissibility of interference in the resolution of court cases. Moreover, the concept of liability for disrespect for the court is much broader than the one that is presently contained in the republic civil-procedural and criminal-procedural codes, which speak of measures taken against those who disturb the order in a court session.

[Smolentsev] After all, in general the manifestation of disrespect for the court, like actions indicating clear contempt of court, are usually directly connected with disturbance of the order in a court session and entail liability in accordance with the law. However, in existing legislation this institution is not developed. That is why the USSR Supreme Soviet has instructed the USSR Supreme Court to draw up a draft Law on Liability for Disrespect for the Court and Interference in the Resolution of Court Cases. That law will more fully regulate matters that should increase people's accountability for their treatment of the court and force them to treat this important and responsible state activity with greater respect.

Further, the law prohibits interference in the activities of judges and people's assessors in the administration of justice. And influence in any form whatsoever on judges or people's assessors with the aim of preventing the comprehensive, complete and objective examination of a specific case, or of achieving the issuance of an illegal decision entails criminal liability. In brief, this by no means pertains solely to those who threaten a judge, say, with physical reprisal. This will give serious pause to those who are fond of "law by telephone" and have developed the habit of "recommending" and "advising" which decision should be taken in a given case to please the local authorities.

[Correspondent] Incidentally, Yevgeniy Alekseyevich, about pressure. One frequently hears that an article in the press about some case or other is also a kind of "pressure," and the preparation of "public opinion." Isn't that the reason that the law establishes: "The mass media have no right to predetermine in their reports the results of the court trial of a specific case, or to otherwise influence the court prior to the time that a decision or

verdict takes legal effect"? And so now will it be impossible to write anything about specific cases until a decision or sentence has taken legal effect? And what is to become of glasnost?

[Smolentsev] First of all, this provision in no way contradicts glasnost and fully accords with the constitutional principle of the presumption of innocence. No one is limiting newspapers, magazines, radio and television in reporting the essence of the charges against a person, the course of a trial, and the positions of participants in the trial. It is another matter when the mass media call a defendant a thief or murderer, or say he is to blame for some other crime before a verdict has taken legal effect. Or when they say who is in the wrong in the trial of a civil case. That is the predetermined of the results of a court trial. In effect a newspaper, say, substitutes itself for the court. And that, after all, is a direct violation of Article 160 of the USSR Constitution, which establishes that no one may be deemed guilty of the commission of a crime except by the verdict of a court. Once a court has handed down a verdict and the sentence has taken legal effect, you are welcome to call the convicted person a murderer, swindler or criminal—of course, in accordance with the crime for which he has been convicted.

The printed word is a powerful means of influence over a mass audience. And if one adds to this the professional skill of the journalist, and his emotionalism. In short, I can say that sometimes it is hard for a court to make a fair decision when public opinion, under the influence of the mass media, has been formed in a certain direction in advance.

[Correspondent] But can it be that a journalist has no right to express his opinion in the press, if he sees that a judge is conducting a trial in a nonobjective manner?

[Smolentsev] I think that a journalist should not give in to subjective impressions and draw premature conclusions. Once a verdict or decision has taken legal effect, that is when the mass media have the right to draw conclusions on any question pertaining to judicial activity. The court cannot be a zone that is beyond criticism. Moreover, I should say that we sometimes, by way of oversight, demand court cases and correct judicial mistakes precisely in connection with articles or broadcasts in the mass media.

[Correspondent] Speaking of judges' independence, Yevgeniy Alekseyevich, it is impossible not to admit that to a certain extent it depends on the way they are provided for materially, which leaves a lot to be desired. What can you say if an "intractable" judge who does not suit the local soviet is forced to rent minimal lodgings or live in a dormitory for years?

[Smolentsev] Of course, that is a serious problem. The courts today are in a humiliating position from the standpoint of being financially and materially provided for and supplied with equipment. The wages of people's judges are substantially lower than the union average: in the countryside, they are 170-180 rubles a month, and in

the city they are up to 200 rubles. What are the consequences of this? Well, the fact that there is an outflow of the best-trained personnel from the courts. I think that in the near future we must expect changes for the better—the USSR Supreme Soviet has instructed the USSR Council of Ministers to resolve the question of improving material provisions for court personnel within a two-month period.

The Law on the Status of Judges in the USSR has also solved the important problem of providing housing for judges. Now the local soviets are required to provide a judge with a well-appointed separate apartment or house within no more than six months following his election. It will no longer be necessary for a judge to go "hat in hand" to the chairman of the local soviet ispolkom and wait for years until the ispolkom deigns to allocate him housing. The provision of an apartment or house is now the ispolkom's duty as established by law.

The question of the courts' material situation, the condition of their buildings and equipment, and the extent to which they are provided with office equipment is somewhat more complicated. Additional money is needed in order to resolve it. And where can it be gotten? Obviously, it is necessary to somewhat raise state fees and other costs associated with the provision of legal services to the population. Think about it yourself: the state fee rates were established in the 1920s and 1930s and have not been revised since then, despite a number of monetary reforms and repeated price increases.

[Correspondent] One often hears that the Soviet court is the world's cheapest. What this refers to is the extraordinary low cost of judicial proceedings for the parties in a civil proceeding.

[Smolentsev] That is true. Today, for example, one can pay state fees in the amount of 30 kopecks and involve oneself in court proceedings for years without sustaining any additional financial outlays. And one may, in the process, appeal not only to all levels of the judiciary—from the people's court to the Supreme Court—but to all other official entities, as well. In order to obtain the copy of a decision, a deponent must pay only 20 kopecks, regardless of the number of typed pages, even if there are 20, 30, 40 or more of them.

Calculations have shown that with a certain increase in court costs one could resolve all questions pertaining to the material welfare of the courts, of which there are more than 4,500 in the country. And not just of the courts, but also of the justice and procuracy agencies. Every court building should become a worthy House of Justice. After all, the prestige and authority of the court in many respects depends on it.

[Correspondent] And one last question, Yevgeniy Alekseyevich. Evidently, the long-standing dispute among legal specialists as to what the symbols of judicial power should be has been resolved. The law establishes that the judicial robe with the representation of the USSR State

Seal serves as that symbol in the USSR Supreme Court. But what about the union-republic, oblast and kray courts?

[Smolentsev] The law states, you see, that the symbols of judicial authority in the union-republic courts are established by those republics' legislation. They may also be robes, the union-republic seal, or something else—in short, whatever the republic legislation establishes. Incidentally, the Law on the Status of Judges in the USSR is itself the basis for republic legislation.

In conclusion, I want to note that the adoption of the Law on the Status of Judges in the USSR and the preparation of the whole judicial reform coincided, as a whole, with activities of the world public on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. And one provision in that declaration states that every person, on the basis of full equality, has the right to have his case tried openly and publicly, and with the observance of all the requirements of an independent and impartial court. That is precisely our chief goal and our chief objective.

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#### Commentary on USSR Crime Rate

90UN0347B Moscow CHELOVEK I ZAKON in Russian  
No 11, Nov 89 (signed to press 25 Sep 89) pp 9-14

[Commentary by Col of Internal Service B. Mikhaylov, candidate of legal sciences: "The USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs' Press Center Comments"]

[Text] The crime situation this year has been characterized by the predominance of negative trends in its dynamics and structure. In previous commentaries we have cited figures and arguments objectively reflecting these trends. An increase in crime has been noted everywhere. Its nature is defined by a rise in violence and cruelty. On the average, compared to the same period of last year, the number of murders is up 27 percent (from 8,000 to 10,200), the number of severe bodily injuries up 47 percent (from 17,400 to 25,600), and the number of rapes up 22 percent (from 8,500 to 10,300).

The increased aggressiveness of criminals is indicated by attempts on the lives of militia officers—more than 130 cases (including armed attacks). More than 400 cases of the theft of weapons and ammunition have been registered (a 25-percent increase). There have been cases of attacks on militia divisions.

Extremist activeness based on internationality conflicts is on the rise. Mass disturbances have been especially heated in Fergana and Novyy Uzen, as well as in Abkhazia and the western regions of Georgia. Tension persists in Nagornyy Karabakh.

In the overall structure of crime, there has been a growth in aggressive mercenary attacks, including those with indications of organization.

The increase in general thefts, robberies and thefts from stores and apartments has been from 1.5 to 3 times as high as the overall increase in crime.

The number of property crimes has increased by 217,000 and accounts for 81 percent of the total increase.

Thefts of state and public property and of citizens' personal property, including property from their apartments, are the most widespread.

As before, juvenile crime causes particular concern. It is secret from no one that the sources of all crime in the country lie in it. Statistics indicate that two-thirds of adult recidivists committed their first crime while still teenagers. The incidence of crime among minors is 2.5 times the rate among adults. In the past five years the number of crimes committed by minors has risen by 15 percent (from 153,000 in 1984 to 176,000 in 1988). The social makeup of juvenile participants in crime has remained practically unchanged. Among them, students make up 67 percent, employed juveniles—21 percent, and those who are neither employed nor in school—12 percent. The crime rate among students of vocational-technical schools is 13 times as high as the rate among schoolchildren.

Throughout the country as a whole, juvenile crime rose during the first six months of 1989 from 80,000 to 97,500 cases, or by 22 percent. Crime increased by 86 percent in Moscow, by 63 to 65 percent in Kemerovo and Kaliningrad oblasts, and by 55 to 57 percent in Novosibirsk, Murmansk and Kursk oblasts.

There were 93,000 juvenile participants in crimes, including 24,500 vocational-technical school students, 23,300 schoolchildren, and 12,500 who were neither working nor studying at the time of the crime.

The most characteristic trends in juvenile crime are as follows:

1. A marked mercenary orientation—nearly 70 percent consist of property crimes. In five years they have increased by 19,700 cases (up 19 percent).

2. A lowering of the age of the perpetrators of crimes. The proportion of persons ages 14-15 rose from 24 percent to 28 percent over the five-year period. In 1988 they accounted for more than half of the increase in crime.

3. An increase in the aggressiveness, brazenness and cruelty of group disturbances of public order. In 1988 3,600 teenagers took part in group fights. Recent tragic events in a number of regions showed that there were numerous juveniles among the participants in pogroms, violence and vandalism.

The problem of the socially useful employment of juveniles is particularly acute. In the past five years the number of teenage participants in crimes who were unemployed and not in school rose by 50 percent. Let us say bluntly that "cost-accounting selfishness" made their placement in jobs considerably more difficult.

Among juvenile lawbreakers with records in internal-affairs agencies, 250,000 have remained uninvolved in the activities of youth centers, clubs and sports sections.

Negative phenomena in the sphere of the economy have been increasing. Wheeler-dealer embezzlers, racketeers and speculators have been preying parasitically on mismanagement and exacerbated shortages. More than 2,000 manifestations of racketeering have been recorded (600 for the previous year).

More than 300,000 instances of criminally punishable speculation and 40,000 instances of petty speculation have been identified. There have been numerous cases in which shortages have been artificially created; 23 million rubles' worth of secreted goods have been established, and in the system of consumers' cooperatives, nearly 22 million rubles' worth of so-called surpluses created by machinations, false weights, and the deliberate miscounting of money have been identified. There are numerous attempts at speculation in the cooperative sector.

It must be stressed that throughout the country as a whole the cooperative movement, in accordance with the party's policy of developing cooperative activities and the Law on Cooperatives in the USSR that was adopted, has been rapidly gaining force.

Here are data from the USSR State Statistics Committee:

	Number of registered cooperatives (thousands)	Operating registered cooperatives (thousands)	Number of employed citizens (thousands)	Income from sales (billions of rubles)	Number of buying-and-selling cooperatives
1/1/88	24.3	13.9	152	0.35	316
1/1/89	135.6	77.5	1,396	6.06	4,418
1/4/89	177.8	99.3	1,953	4.3	5,448

According to specialists' estimates, in 1989, with sales of products and services reaching 25-30 billion rubles, 10-12 billion rubles will be spent for the remuneration of cooperative members (2.2 billion in 1988).

At the present time the basic contingent of cooperative members consists of working-age persons (88 percent), pensioners (7.3 percent), and housewives and students (4.7 percent).

## LAW AND ORDER

JPRS-UPA-90-001  
9 January 1990

Most persons employed in the cooperative sector of the economy strictly observe established procedures and make their contribution to eliminating shortages of a number of goods and services.

At the same time, a study of the state, dynamics and structure of **economic crime**, as well as the actual work of the law-enforcement agencies in preventing and stopping encroachments on socialist property, indicate that, along with positive factors, negative trends also continue to grow in the cooperative sector.

Individual wheeler-dealers from cooperatives, using this form of economic operations as a cover, commit criminally punishable speculative deals.

The people's court of Oktyabrskiy Rayon in Volgograd convicted Mamedov, chairman of the Kavkaz cooperative cafe, cooperative members Imamaliyev and Ayvazov, and an accomplice of theirs from Georgia named Gazilishvili; the cooperative members had bought up home-distilled liquor from Gazilishvili for 20 rubles a liter and sold it to cafe customers at the price of 40 rubles a liter. The amount of the established gain alone came to 3,200 rubles.

Crimes of that nature have been uncovered by the staffs of Departments for Combating the Embezzlement of Socialist Property and Speculation in the Uzbek SSR, the Chuvasht ASSR, Krasnodar Kray, Kuybyshev, Tyumen, Tula and Chita oblasts, and other regions of the country.

It should be noted that it is precisely the activities of cooperatives functioning as middleman-type cooperatives and buying-and-selling cooperatives that cause the greatest discontent among the public.

There are cases in which cooperative members have appropriated monetary loans obtained in banks. After receiving a loan in the sum of 10,000 rubles for the organization of a cooperative in the city of Alma-Ata, the cooperative's chairman disappeared. A criminal case was initiated in this case, and a search was declared. Unfortunately, such cases are not isolated.

The imperfection of the system of material supply for cooperatives prompts cooperative members to seek various means, including unlawful means, of supplying themselves with raw materials and other materials. Cases in which items of material value belonging to state enterprises are stolen and subsequently sold to cooperatives are becoming widespread.

Cases have been established in which the officials of executive bodies of authority, state enterprises and institutions have extorted bribes from cooperative members for performing their direct official duties in dealing with organizational and economic matters pertaining to the activities of cooperatives. There have been more than a few isolated cases in which cooperatives have been set up

under enterprises and organizations whose executives become members of the cooperatives, which promotes various sorts of abuses.

In the Georgian SSR a people's court convicted the former deputy chairman of the Akhmedskiy Raispolkom for taking a bribe from members of the Magiani cooperative for assisting in registering its charter.

Similar cases have been identified in the Latvian SSR and Leningrad, Poltava, Moscow, Krym, Lipetsk and a number of other oblasts.

There have been cases in which the funds of state enterprises have been stolen by reallocating them to cooperatives.

As experience shows, individual cooperatives, skillfully taking advantage of gaps in existing legislation, derive considerable nonlabor income within the framework of cooperative activities by using hired labor. The Sintez cooperative (Moldavian SSR), which consists of 16 persons, has hired 385 persons on labor contracts.

The prices for which cooperative members sell their products and provide services, and the absence of any protection of the consumer's rights with regard to the quality of goods and services have been drawing great criticism from the public.

Cooperative members cause the state considerable losses as the result of concealing their income from taxation. Cases of this sort have been uncovered by financial agencies in a whole series of regions of the country.

One reason for the negative tendencies in the cooperative movement is the numerous violations of Article 12 of the law, which forbids persons who have been previously convicted of mercenary crimes from serving among cooperatives' executive personnel. Spot checks have identified such persons in the Ukraine SSR and Kazakh SSR, the Kabardino-Balkar ASSR, Krasnodar Kray, and Rostov, Saratov, Leningrad, Tyumen and many other oblasts.

In carrying out party and government decisions pertaining to stepping up the campaign against nonlabor income, the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs and its local agencies have been doing specific work to combat crime in the cooperative sector of the economy. Business cooperation in this work with financial and other monitoring agencies is growing stronger. Party agencies, the soviets and economic executives are informed of negative manifestations in the cooperative sector.

Work is being stepped up to identify and expose persons who use the cooperative sector for nonlabor enrichment. Of the 1,500 crimes connected with cooperative activities that have been identified by the internal-affairs agencies, more than 40 percent have been thefts of state and public property committed through misappropriation, embezzlement or abuse of office, and more than 20 percent have been cases of speculation and bribery.

The USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs counts on the help of the public and the press in forming objective opinion of the work of the internal-affairs agencies in combating crime in the cooperative sector of the economy, and in developing in Soviet people a negative attitude toward embezzlers, bribe-takers and speculators who utilize this sphere to derive nonlabor income.

Statistics reflecting the danger of fires are of interest.

From year to year the situation with respect to fires in the country becomes increasingly tense. Fires cause significant damage to the national economy, and the severity of their consequences is becoming a real factor impeding economic development. But perhaps the most important thing is that people die in fires. Judge for yourself: in 1988 alone 139,872 fires were recorded, which caused losses amounting to 338,656,600 rubles. And think about this figure: 8,504 people died in fires! And that is in peacetime!

The bulk of fires (79.4 percent) and more than half of the losses caused by them (57.6 percent) are recorded in the residential sector, where in 1988 there were 110,590 fires with losses of 193,700,000 rubles. An increase in the number of fires in the residential sector has been recorded in 10 union republics and 55 autonomous krays and oblasts of the RSFSR.

Violations of technological requirements, worn-out equipment, and elementary ignorance and carelessness have resulted in an increase in the number of fires in production buildings, as well.

An alarming situation with regard to fire safety has developed in warehouses, depots and sales premises. In these places there were 2,929 fires last year in which 47,800,000 million rubles' worth of items of material value burned up.

Drunkards have caused and are continuing to cause considerable problems. For example, in 1985 more than 11,000 persons perished during fires, and 60 percent of these cases were associated with drunkenness. Granted, as the result of the comprehensive measures carried out in the country to combat drunkenness and alcoholism, starting in 1986 the number of deaths in fires steadily declined, which was helped to a certain extent by the creation of public opinion concerning such cases.

As to the causes of fires, every other one is caused by violation of the rules for the installation and operation of electrical equipment and carelessness with fire; one fire in eight is caused by children playing with fire; and one in seven is caused by violation of the rules for installing and operating heating systems.

The increase in the number of fires caused by arson (in all the union republics except the Latvian SSR) is cause for concern. In 1988 there were altogether 8,103 cases of arson in the country. This "playing" with fire cost our state 24,108,000 rubles and caused a number of major fires.

The statistics for the first six months of this year are much more distressing. During this period 70,049 fires have already been recorded. 196,753,800 rubles has been irrecoverably lost in fires, but the human losses are even more frightening: 4,370 persons.

The scientific and technological revolution, which has given rise to gigantic power systems, petroleum and gas pipelines, and numerous enterprises where fires and explosions are a hazard, has lately been showing its "burning underside" more and more frequently. Recall the recent explosions and fires at the Sverdlovsk and Alma-Ata railroad stations and, finally, the disaster of unprecedented scale in Bashkiria. All these events were accompanied by human casualties and colossal damage.

Firemen are also sustaining battle losses. Last year 47 firemen died in extinguishing fires, and many suffered serious illness, severe poisoning, burns and injuries. There have been casualties among firemen this year, too. Twenty-nine firemen have died in the line of duty. Especially severe cases have occurred in Alma-Ata, where 9 members of a fire brigade died, and at the Ionava Nitrogen Production Association, where in March 213 firemen suffered poisoning of varying degrees and one died in extinguishing a fire caused by the violation of technological requirements.

It would seem that experience, albeit bitter, should at least teach people. However, barely more than three months had passed when an analogous situation developed in a liquified chlorine storage facility in Khabarovsk. And once again someone's carelessness and indifference cost a high price—people's health. 70 people were taken to the hospital with symptoms of poisoning, and 27 of them were hospitalized.

And now situations where there is danger of fire are developing at very many facilities. Last year, in addition to their explanatory work, agencies of the state fire inspection service imposed administrative penalties on 509,000 officials and suspended the operations of 105,000 shops and sectors where a clear danger of fire had developed.

What we get is a paradoxical situation in which it seems that only the firemen have a stake in ensuring the fire safety of facilities. Yet in accordance with a decree of the USSR Council of Ministers (1988), responsibility for ensuring the fire safety of enterprises, institutions and organizations lies personally with their executives. Moreover, corresponding articles of the union-republics' criminal codes stipulate liability for violations of fire-safety regulations.

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**Latvian Customs Chief Outlines Republic's Counternarcotics Work**

90WD0096A Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian 23 Nov 89 p 4

[Article by N. Gusev, chief, Latvian Republic Customs Service: "The Declassified 'Lightning' Operation"]

[Text] Recently the central press, television and radio described a major operation conducted in Riga by the customs service. Associates of the Latvian Republic Customs Service took the most direct part in it as well. In the last 2 years its workers have already clashed with international drug trade. Within this time, almost 1.5 tons of drugs worth a total of \$25 million were confiscated from the drug traffic of the smuggling mafia. The operations were conducted jointly with associates from other countries.

As a result as many as 16 persons were arrested in the last operation, code-named "Lightning." They were all associated with illegal trafficking of drugs from Southeast Asia to Europe via the USSR, first to the Netherlands, and then to England. The operation, which was begun in the Latvian customs service, continued along the chain of services of the named countries.

The investigation is proceeding at full steam, and this is not yet the proper time to reveal all of the data obtained thus far concerning the tentacles of the drug trade in a large number of countries. But some of the long-range directions in the struggle against drugs by the Latvian customs service can already be discussed.

First of all we are waging a struggle against this evil in our own republic. And although in comparison with other regions ours cannot be classified among those having a "drug addiction problem" according to the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, we are keeping this problem constantly within our field of vision as one of the most important ones. It is, after all, easier to prevent disease than to treat it. An analysis of the situation shows that attempts at importing drugs into our country are still sporadic. But we understand quite well that such a situation could change at any moment. This danger has increased in connection with the sharp rise in the number of foreign civilians visiting our country, and with simplification of the procedures for processing Soviets out of the country. On the other hand we need to consider that the international drug mafia is attempting not only to organize a drug transit pipeline through the USSR but also develop its internal market. It is no secret to anyone, after all, including to international drug traders, that there are over 100,000 persons in our country using these potions, and tens of thousands are already drug addicts.

We are now perfecting an integral system for monitoring all possible channels of drug imports: sea, air, motor and rail transportation, and international mail. Without international cooperation, the effectiveness of the struggle against the domestic drug trade will not be

effective. This is why we need to strengthen our ties with foreign associates. We are improving our work and gaining experience in joint operations.

Thus for example, when our customs officials detained the first large consignment of drugs in freight addressed from Afghanistan to the Netherlands (over a ton of hashish was discovered in a load of raisins), a decision was made jointly with the Main Administration State Customs Control to establish contact with the corresponding Dutch services, and organize cooperation with them. Then representatives of the Dutch police visited Riga. They presented an official request from their government to hand the freight shipment containing the drugs over to their country. It was sent to Rotterdam, and from there the container was forwarded to Antwerp, Belgium at the request of the recipient. The corresponding services of this country waited for the recipients in vain—they never did appear for the freight. It was then that the drugs were destroyed.

Such was our first experience in interacting with competent services of other countries to detain a large consignment of drugs. Unfortunately we were unable to establish at that time the persons directly participating in the act of smuggling. But the experience of that operation came in handy in detaining the most recent consignment of drugs. This time an attempt was made to transport around 200 kg of marijuana from Southeast Asia to Belgium in a shipment of aquarium sand.

On that August day, an entire consignment of 20-40-ton containers on their way to Antwerp through our country's territory arrived at the terminal. Attentively studying the accompanying documents, the shipment routes, the manner in which the freight was packaged, and the names of the suppliers, a group consisting of Senior Inspector V. Samokhin and inspectors V. Dubovik, S. Liyepinsh and P. Fedotkov turned their attention to the containers of aquarium sand. The long route chosen for such freight seemed strange. A warning that the sand had been treated with special gasses and that consequently uncrating the freight was categorically prohibited alerted them as well. In the presence of a commission normally summoned in such cases, they removed the seal, opened a container without incident, and checked it out using the appropriate equipment and procedures. Heavy green metal barrels were found among the numerous bags of sand by the rear wall. Compressed bricks of marijuana in special cellophane packages were found in the barrels. Every secret hiding place was found and examined. A total of four such barrels half-filled with drugs were there.

At our request, workers from the Administration for the Control of Smuggling and Violations of Customs Regulations of the USSR Main Administration of State Customs Control arrived from Moscow, and they in turn established contact with Belgium. The joint plan of operations was agreed upon. The freight was allowed to proceed by vessel to Antwerp under observation. It arrived on time, raising no suspicions in the criminals.

According to comments of not only the Main Administration of State Customs Control but also Belgian specialists, our participants in the operation worked professionally, competently, and most important of all, efficiently. This is how, by the way, the operation came to be called "Lightning."

Joint work with partners from Western countries once again persuasively confirmed that the USSR is participating in the struggle against the international drug trade not just in words, but in actions as well. We came to the conclusion that the procedures we developed, on our own to a significant extent, for detecting and examining freight on routes of probable drug trade are effective. The efforts expended to introduce them and reinforcement of the staffing and the material and technical base of namely the indicated customs section, and of other subdivisions able to interdict possible channels of importation of drugs into our republic, are producing fully concrete results.

But we also understand something else, that the drug mafia is also making its conclusions from these losses, that it is also seeking ways to evade these barriers, and consequently the role of cooperation with all interested services, both inside the country and abroad, is increasing.

#### Narcotics Trafficking, Use in Armenian SSR Viewed

90WD0096B Yerevan KOMSOMOLETS in Russian 25 Nov 89 p 3

[Article by A. Muradyan: "Hydra"]

[Text] Drug addiction. We already know today that it has sunk deep roots not only in the West but also in our country. Even so, we do not know even approximately how many people in our country are using narcotic substances.

Naturally, drug addiction has penetrated into Armenia as well. And it's not that it had to penetrate—it simply walked right in and established itself rather tenaciously. There are presently 961 persons registered with the republic's drug treatment center; of them, 216 are recognized as being ill. Let me explain that: We have what is known as preventive registration, which is applied to persons who are not drug addicts but who have been convicted of casual drug use. Besides being put on record, such persons are also subjected to administrative punishment—a fine of 50 rubles. For Yerevan, these figures are correspondingly 487 and 100. The drug treatment center is generally an ordinary therapeutic institution; there are also therapeutic-vocational preventive treatment hospitals, to which people are sent by the court. Our republic also had an LTP [therapeutic-vocational preventive treatment hospital] once, but inasmuch as this is a cost-accounting institution, and the needed quantity of patients was never accumulated, it was dissolved. In the meantime those who need treatment in such a preventive hospital are sent to LTPs in

other republics. It might seem that there are not all that many drug addicts in Armenia, but we shouldn't be too hasty with our conclusions: There are no precise data, and there may be 10,000, 20,000, or even more persons who use drugs.

What do "domestic" drug addicts use? Hashish, morphine, some medical preparations. One "cube" of hashish costs from 4 to 10 rubles (a "cube" weighs around 1 gram, and is enough for one joint). A vial of morphine, they say, costs 50 rubles when purchased from drug traders. Besides "plant-produced" morphine, drug addicts also inject so-called "chernyashka" (made from opium poppy seeds). Incidentally, "dirty" morphine is made using acetone and ascetic essence; is this not why these products have disappeared from retail trade? Half a gram of "chernyashka" costs 50 rubles. Expensive, because hashish consumption has enjoyed principal "development" in the republic, as in the rest of the country as well, by the way. At least that's what is felt by those who are fighting the spread of drug addiction by the nature of their service.

This year (according to the results of 9 months) 52,130 square meters of hemp plantations were destroyed, and 7 kilograms, 275 grams and 33 milligrams of drugs were confiscated in Armenia during Operation "Hemp" conducted by organs of the MVD. This includes hashish, six vials of morphine, and other drugs. Consider the number of vials of morphine discovered in the possession of drug addicts. Where did they come from? Last year one medical assistant who supplied his "patients" was arrested. And how many such "medical assistants" are there in the entire republic? At the same time, as Deputy Chief R. Ovakimyan of the Administration of Criminal Investigation of the Armenian SSR MVD asserts, not a single report of missappropriation of medical preparations with narcotic action by workers of medical institutions was submitted to the republic's Ministry of Health in the last 7 years. What is this—poor control, or a reluctance to wash dirty linen in public?

Having gained the consent of the doctors of the drug treatment center, I asked one of the patients to describe how he became addicted to drugs. (As a point of information, there are five persons undergoing the cure in the drug treatment center, which has 20 beds.) Alas, I was unable to gain his confidence. Perhaps because he saw me as the enemy as he did the doctors and his own father, who brought him here. He is 20 years old, he lives in a village in Abovyan Rayon, and he began smoking hashish while in elementary school. He doesn't feel himself to be an addict; he is certain that he could live without this poison if he simply wished to. This is what is felt by all who have come here against their will. He knows of eight places where hemp grows, but he asserts that he was the only one who smoked, that none of his friends has supposedly ever suspected him of his "madness." But the grief-stricken father asserts the contrary—all of his son's acquaintances smoke, and it wasn't until too late that he discovered the truth. He was alerted by the fact that sometimes his son would start saying

strange things for no reason at all. He took him to a psychiatrist, to whom the youngster admitted using hashish. And he blames not himself but his father for winding up in the drug treatment center.

There are of course parents who unwittingly force their children into the "embrace" of drug addiction. Pocket money very often exceeding "average" wages and the all-permissiveness lavished upon those who have not yet matured but who have already experimented with all accessible and even prohibited pleasures and entertainments lead them to the desire to try hashish or morphine, which are "more prestigious." Is this not why many children from well-off families are among those who smoke, and why there are more of the latter among morphine users? Social injustice exists even here.

It was with great difficulty that I made my way into the company of drug addicts using hashish. Not because it is all that difficult in itself: They would not have accepted me, just a stranger wanting to come in contact with them out of curiosity, and I did not have any acquaintances who used drugs. I had to go through a chain of 9-10 persons to reach them. No them specifically, that is, but drug addicts in general. We met at a certain construction site in Yerevan late in the evening. There were five of them: one of elementary school age, and the others older. Four were smoking hashish, passing around a joint, while one talked with me.

"Why do we use hashish?" he echoed my question (it was agreed ahead of time that the youngsters would not identify themselves). "To get high. Hashish isn't expensive, and it's not hard to get."

"But aren't you afraid of getting caught?"

"No. First of all, no one is going to come snooping around this construction site this time of night, and second, you could always buy them off."

"Who?"

"Whoever needs to be bought off."

"And do you have to buy them off often?"

"...."

"Do you inject drugs?"

"No, that's too expensive, and those kinds of drugs aren't always available."

"But tell me really, why do you use drugs?"

"What else is there for use to do? There's nothing to spend even the money we make on."

I am not going to go into the details of our entire talk. It essentially boiled down to the fact that in the opinion of the speaker (he was their leader, judging from everything), these youngsters are bored: There is nowhere to go, there is nothing to do, and hashish does provide an

escape, albeit short-term, into a world without problems. It is easy to get hashish once you get in with the "in" crowd.

It is possible that they will be caught in the end, though you can't say that for sure, since drug addicts do not work anywhere as a rule, and they do not like to advertise themselves. And when the drug treatment center issues them a hospital pass upon termination of their treatment, there is no place to take it. But they still have to get into the drug treatment center first.

The work being done to reveal drug dealers and their victims was described to me when I visited the group against the spread of drug addiction operating under the Criminal Investigation Administration of the republic's Ministry of Internal Affairs: using specially trained dogs to inspect baggage arriving in Armenia with Aeroflot passengers from Krasnodar, Central Asia and some other regions of the country, and revealing drug dens (last winter two drug dens were discovered—neighbors complained of the excessive noise from the drug addicts). But it is extremely difficult to close the road to narcotic plants. They are brought in by train, by motor transport, and even by mail, in packages, by parcel post. Recently for example a parcel from Frunze containing drugs was detained by the post office. Much is being done by the militia, but nonetheless, this struggle is more reminiscent of chopping off the heads of a hydra. You chop off one, and another grows back in its place. And even if we assume that the militia will be able to catch all drug manufacturers and suppliers, others will appear in their place, since as long as the demand is there, the supply will exist as well.

I never did manage to gain the acquaintance of a morphine addict. Neither friends nor acquaintances could help, but I was able to make contact with a former addict, and even that was just luck. Last year I went away on business. I sat in the bus next to a person 30-35 years old. We got to talking, and he informed me that he had undergone treatment in the LTP, and that he had used morphine, which a certain physician, who was also caught, supplied him with. After his release he moved in with his parents in Yerevan, got married, had two children, and no longer uses drugs. So it was that I made his acquaintance, and as luck would have it, I still have his telephone number. He is now working in a cooperative, where he makes footwear, and earns a reasonably good living.

"You know," he said, "even now, after so many years, sometimes I still get the urge to take morphine. My wife is not a shrew, my children are smart, and my wages are respectable, but I still sometimes want to tune the world out."

"Why did you start in the first place?"

"Out of curiosity. There was always plenty of money—my parents earned a good living, and I wanted to find out what a real high was like. I think that many who become addicted to hashish are also drawn to it at first out of

curiosity. And so, when my children grow up, I will use myself as an example in explaining to them what the hidden cost of a high can be. Back then, to get money for morphine (I no longer had enough pocket money) I began stealing things from home. And they don't begin preventive work where I live until you're already a hopeless drug addict."

"When was the first time you used morphine?"

"In 10th grade."

This may sound strange, but there is not a single juvenile on record in the drug treatment center. Either they aren't caught, or they simply don't exist. But could that be true? Seda Dzhamalyan, the treatment center's chief physician and the chief narcologist of the Armenian SSR Ministry of Health, noted in an interview that almost all drug addicts who underwent treatment here began using drugs in school. In any case the first puff, the first shot was experienced while in school. Of course, not all who experimented with this poison subsequently became addicts; many didn't try drugs again, and rejected them, either because they understood what this could lead to, or the opportunity did not avail itself again, or they didn't have the money. Nonetheless the roots of drug addiction extend into the elementary school. At the same time no matter what school director you talk to, not one suspects his children of a predilection for drugs. Anything else, but not that. Off the record, however, they do admit students may be using hashish. While the U.S. President appeals to the country's young citizens on television to stop using drugs, we are afraid (why?) to admit that our schoolchildren also use drugs. There are none on record, and that puts an end to the conversation, as if the problem doesn't exist. And once there is no problem, there is no need for preventive steps, even though narcological physicians are urging us to begin preventive work at the school level.

You read in the newspapers about the colossal amounts of money the governments of many countries of the world spend in order to put an end to the drug mafia and to the spread of drugs, and you can't help wondering whether or not we are capable of such outlays, given our budget deficit. When the people lack food and the basic necessities, how can you think of drugs as a problem? And yet, food may become plentiful tomorrow, and mountains of laundry detergent will become available—the economy could be rectified, after all—but what about a person's broken spirit? Is it right for us to economize on the future?

Today our society needs a nationwide program against the spread of drug addiction as much as it needs air. It seems to me that this program should lay emphasis not on punitive measures but on prevention, on educating the young. Only we mustn't reduce this to just another campaign, putting up posters and slogans in the elementary schools, and even in nursery schools. And perhaps we need to begin by giving young men and women an opportunity to earn money through their own labor at

enterprises, in consumer services, or somewhere else. And let no one fear that juveniles would then have "their own" money, that it would become easier for them to get drugs. To think this is to descend to the level of certain kolkhoz and sovkhoz directors who blame the drain of people from the countryside on the presence of paved roads. How much longer is a hulking 17-year-old going to have to ask his mommy and his daddy for money to take his girlfriend to the movies, to a night spot, to a concert? And anyway, hashish costs less.... We can't go around assuring everyone that the young are the future of our country, and then hold them on a tight rein.

And one more thing. Many are firmly certain that their children will never start using drugs. The neighbor's children, yes, but ours, no. That is precisely what the father of the youngster presently undergoing treatment in the republic drug treatment center thought.

#### Azerbaijani MVD Chief on Organized Crime, Drugs, Interethnic Tension

90US0234A Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian  
10 Nov 89 p 4

[Interview with I.A. Mamedov, Azerbaijan SSR minister of internal affairs, by L. Polonskiy: "In the Service of the People"]

[Text] Today is Soviet Militia Day. In age, a contemporary of the Revolution, the flesh of the people's flesh, it has steadfastly stood guard over the conquests of October and has served the cause of socialist transformations. "My militia will look after me," wrote a poet of the Revolution. Today, we can far from always repeat these words. Society finds itself in complex conditions, the situation with regard to crime has grown sharply worse in the most varied regions of the country, and the burden placed on those called upon to ensure order has increased greatly. And, indeed, the time of stagnation, which we are having no little difficulty in overcoming, was not reflected in the best way within the militia.

On the eve of the militia holiday, a correspondent of BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY has met with and interviewed Azerbaijan Minister of Internal Affairs A.I. Mamedov.

[Correspondent] Aydin Israfilovich, what is the militia doing to celebrate the upcoming holiday?

[Mamedov] For us too, perestroika is a time of decisive, fundamental changes. The demands being placed on the internal affairs organs have increased extraordinarily. Along with the entire country, we are participating in the difficult process of forming a socialist state governed by law. The main thing for us is to fulfill the task which has been set by the party—to ensure the supremacy of the law and to create a stable foundation of real guarantees of the interests of society and the individual.

We have a complex program for the transformation of law-enforcement activities, which we are realizing under the direction of the Central Committee of the Azerbaijan

## LAW AND ORDER

CP. Our style and methods of work are undergoing change and the influence of sectorial services on the practical activities of city and rayon organs is increasing. A greater independence of units and services is manifesting itself and their responsibility in achieving operational and official goals is increasing. Structural changes have been made; a new department has begun to operate—for the struggle against organized crime—and an administration for preventive services has been organized. The staff is learning to work under conditions of expanding democracy and glasnost. Reports by our workers to labor collectives and at places of residence have become a matter of practice. Our contacts with the public and with the mass information media are growing ever stronger. As you know, summaries of what has happened during the week are being regularly published in the press and broadcast on television.

Although they are relatively modest ones, there have been hopeful results. The measures that have been taken have made it possible to halt crime growth rates: These are considerably lower in our republic than in many other regions. During the first nine months of this year, crime in Azerbaijan has increased by 11 percent, whereas for the country as a whole it has grown by 33.3 percent, in the RSFSR—by 34 percent, in Belorussia—by 37 percent, in Kazakhstan by 32.7 percent, in the republics of Central Asia—by from 18 to 40 percent, in the Baltics—from 26 to 75.7 percent, and in Armenia—by 38.6 percent.

I certainly am not speaking of this for reasons of self-complacency, but to give an idea about the danger of the attack which is being launched by crime on society. There are still many, very many, unresolved questions. It is destructive to deceive ourselves with hopeful prognoses, manipulating statistics. Analysis shows that the measures being taken have not succeeded in completely neutralizing negative tendencies in the dynamics and structure of crime. The number of serious crimes has increased by a third—of premeditated murders, of rapes. The situation with regard to thefts of state, public, and private property, attacks, and robberies is even more serious. The number of law violations among adolescents is particularly alarming. The level of “street” crime is high. The state of law and order on public transport is a cause of concern.

Besides economic and social reasons, the increase in crime is also connected with the fact that the principle of inevitability of punishment for crimes committed is still not being strictly applied here, with us. Clearly, we cannot proceed slowly in this situation. What is needed is a fundamental approach.

In August of this year, as we know, the USSR Supreme Soviet passed a resolution “On Decisively Strengthening the Battle Against Crime.” For purposes of uniting the efforts of all interested parties to ensure public order, this envisages the establishment of temporary committees for combatting crime within the republics, krays,

and oblasts. Our ministry has already presented its concrete proposals to the temporary committee.

[Correspondent] What is the place of the militia under conditions of more complicated interethnic relations?

[Mamedov] A difficult question. The events resulting from exacerbation of interethnic relations have become a serious test for the internal affairs organs. All sorts of unsanctioned actions, meetings of many thousands of people, manifestations of group hooliganism, and extraordinary incidents have demanded maximum mobilization from our personnel. Some units have passed this exam while others early on demonstrated confusion and a fear of responsibility. In the summer of this year, for example, in the Nizaminskiy Rayon in Baku, there was an attempt to provoke disorders. The personnel of the rayon militia department intervened and the ringleaders were arrested. A large group of people, incited by hooligan elements, intended to free them. In the rayon department, they did not submit to the threats, to the pressure. The directors of the rayon internal affairs department (ROVD) held firm, remained confident, were able to find convincing words, and the crowd dispersed. However, it was not like this everywhere. Militia departments in Sheki and Agdam and in certain rayons turned not to be on top of the situation and this resulted in tragic consequences.

We have drawn lessons from past mistakes and are focusing our attention on tempering militia personnel, both politically and morally, on improving their professional qualifications, and on raising their battle-readiness.

Using problems of an interethnic nature for their own ends, extremists and criminal elements are constantly supercharging tensions, are pushing young people into ill-considered actions. A considerable part of our forces are being deflected from carrying out their direct professional tasks in order to defend public order during mass actions. Here, we are being guided by the Leninist principle of the inevitability of punishment for crimes committed. Intensive work is being done to uncover crimes based on interethnic grounds; many extremists have been rendered harmless and large quantities of firearms, explosives, and ammunition have been seized.

Look, here is a fact from a report from one day in November. In Nagorno-Karabakh, while combing through the large forest tracts in the region of the villages of Kaladeresi and Yedzhevik, four suspicious citizens were spotted. Shooting, they hid themselves in a cave. When they were arrested, 6 cylinders of ammonal, electric detonators, a grenade casing, and Bickford fuses were seized from these people (Yerevan Pedagogical Institute students S. Tsakanyan, R. Khnakyan, and A. Uduumyan and Armenian CP Central Committee publishing house worker A. Arutyunyan).

Or here is another fact. On 8 November, an attempt was made to blow up the “Friendship of the Peoples of the Transcaucasian Republics” monument in Kazakhskiy

Rayon. Who would resort to such barbarism? Residents in Idzhevanskiy Rayon in Armenia—the senior priest of the Makorovanskiy monastery, S. Davtyan (the father of Stepan), A. Melikbekyan, and S. Badalyan, plus a native of the city of Kirovograd (Ukraine), A. Kozlitin. Two of them died in the attempt, two received injuries and were taken to the hospital. The monument remained untouched.

At the site of the incident, they discovered three hunting rifles, shells, and detonator caps. The Kazakhskiy Rayon procuracy is occupied with the investigation.

But I want to emphasize in every way that crime is extra-territorial and international, and therefore that only people who are internationalists by conviction can combat it effectively. We are striving to establish contacts with the law-enforcement organs of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Okrug (NKAO) and to cooperate closely in the interests of this matter. A meeting recently took place in Armenia, in which the directors of the KGB, the militia, and the soviet executive committees of the NKAO and the republic's rayons that neighbor the oblast participated. Definite practical results were achieved from this.

[Correspondent] Let's pause, Aydyn Israfilovich, on the problem of organized crime. Do you believe that, earlier, we did not have this?

[Mamedov] In fact, as I already said, the criminal world is exercising concentrated pressure on society. Criminal professionalism is growing and traditions of thievery are being revived. Criminals of all hues are consolidating and are equipping themselves not only technically, making use of electronics, computers and high-powered automobiles, but also tactically. Educational qualifications within the criminal world have grown. You now even find candidates of science there.

To achieve a break-through in the struggle against organized crime—this is not only a professional but also a political problem. It is directly related to solution of the problem of reducing the social tensions within society, with eradication of one of the serious criminal barriers in the way of normalization. Appropriate measure are being taken. The criminal penalties for extortion have been strengthened. In recent times alone, 5 groups of racketeers have been uncovered within the republic. A large number of criminal groupings have been neutralized, among which there are drug dealers, murderers, robbers, thieves, and dealers in the shadow economy. I note that, in the course of the first nine months of this year, 32 percent more large-scale and particularly large-scale thefts have been uncovered than during the same period of last year and that about 100 groups of thieves have been exposed. Money and valuables totalling more than 3 million rubles have been confiscated.

[Correspondent] Readers are interested in the details connected with the bold murder of the general director of the Bakpivo association, F. Shiralnev.

[Mamedov] TASS reported about this in the press. An investigation is underway. I will add that this crime is the handiwork of an established criminal group, consisting of ten persons, that was active over a period of almost 12 years in our republic, in neighboring Georgia, in Stavropol'skiy Kray, and in Voronezh Oblast. The interests of the investigation do not permit me to speak yet in detail about their crimes. I will say only that the criminals have on their account (and the group includes an engineer and a technologist) murder, robberies of cashiers, breaking and entering, etc. A Kalashnikov automatic weapon, two revolvers, weapons other than firearms, and three automobiles were seized from them.

Our employees, jointly with workers of the procuracy, operated in a professional manner; the arrests were very tense and were fraught with great risk. Unfortunately, for understandable reasons, I cannot give their names.

There are many such examples. Very recently, in Baku, we arrested participants in an inter-regional criminal group who, based on preliminary data, had committed a series of thefts and robberies in the capital of our republic and in Krasnodarskiy and Primorskiy krays. In Zakatalskiy Rayon, we arrested a large band of thieves that was responsible for 48 thefts of personal property from citizens in Azerbaijan and Georgia.

[Correspondent] You mentioned the uncovering of narcotic dealers...

[Mamedov] Earlier it was accepted to believe that this was a vice only of capitalist society. In fact, for many foreign countries, the problem has the nature of a national disaster. But this misfortune also has not bypassed us. If in 1985, for the country as a whole, there were 15 drug addicts for every 100,000 persons, then in 1988 there were already 25. However, it is necessary to take into consideration that available information is very approximate. The republic MVD recently conducted a study of the problem, obtaining a sort of socio-demographic portrait of drug addiction. A program of action has been developed to combat this evil that has infected us. About 4000 persons have been brought to criminal justice for crimes of this category. If in 1982, 277 kilograms of narcotics were seized from criminal elements, then in 1988 this figure was twice as large. The same tendency is being preserved in the current year as well.

As a rule, there is a widespread network in the narcotics trade. In Beylaganskiy Rayon a group was arrested with narcotic substances in its possession. In the course of the operation, criminal investigative workers came across the ties which this group had with the mafia that is active in Central Asia and Kazakhstan. Altogether, more than 670 kilograms of narcotics were seized. Dozens of criminals beyond the borders of the republic were brought to criminal justice; there is data concerning the corruption of officials in various institutions in Central Asia, including law enforcement organs, who entered into deals with the drug dealers.

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I would like to say that it is wrong, here, to place hopes only in the militia. It is necessary to more fully involve the efforts of public health and educational organs, of other ministries and departments, and of local soviets.

[Correspondent] If is far from easy to counter crime, particularly organized crime, using the means that our militia has at its disposal...

[Mamedov] Yes. The backwardness of our material and technical support is obvious; in this we cede a great deal to other countries. But measures are being undertaken on both an all-union and a republic scale. The Azerbaijan Council of Ministers, from its own resources, has allocated us dozens of Zhigulis, to strengthen our patrol and sentry services, as well as other vehicular means of transportation. More than a million rubles are being assigned for computerization in Baku and its rayons. The latest computers are being introduced. This is only a beginning. The final result, however, will depend upon a fundamental improvement in the supply of available technology, and also upon the material support given militia employees, on raising the prestige of people who are risking their lives in the name of law and order. We are also expecting a great deal from the law "On the Soviet Militia," which promises, along with a stiffening of control over the observance of legality, to provide for the social protection of militia workers, to give them more confidence in the fulfillment of their professional obligations.

It is with chagrin that I note that the resolution about improving the work of divisional inspectors is being poorly implemented within the republic: frequently in Baku, to say nothing about the republic's rayons, they are not being provided with housing, transportation and communications, and they are being sheltered in completely unsuitable office spaces.

Incidentally, about prestige. The overwhelming majority of militia personnel are young people; the officer staff has higher or secondary special education and the rank-and-file workers, secondary. All have a background of service in the ranks of the armed forces and work in production. We give preference to internationalist troops. Acceptance is based only along the lines of labor and army collectives. Mistakes, of course, are also not avoided.

[Correspondent] Have detachments for assistance to the militia recommended themselves well here, with us?

[Mamedov] These units were created in the republic in August on the initiative of the ministry. We studied Gorkiy's experience and went to the republic CP Central Committee with a proposal. They supported us. Now more than 1500 persons have joined the ranks of the workers' detachments and these detachments are functioning in 35 cities and rayons within the republic. In a majority of them are CP and Komsomol members and production leaders, and many have fulfilled their international duty in Afghanistan. A separate program of legal and special training has been developed for the detachments. The workers' detachments, whose members retain their average earnings in production work, are dispatched to defend public order and are being used for patrol and sentry duty. Already with their help 347 law-breakers have been arrested and 28 crimes have been uncovered.

[Correspondent] Several words about the best people in our militia.

[Mamedov] I would prefer not to single anybody out. For the most part our workers approach their professional duties with a sense of responsibility and their daily activities involve dangers and situations that demand enormous stress. For exemplary performance of their professional obligations, for demonstrating courage, bravery, and resourcefulness, 100 workers have been awarded state decorations and the badge "For excellent service in the USSR MVD" during the current year alone. If you insist, I will name certain names: Sergeant F. Ismaylov, awarded (posthumously) the Order of the Red Star for exemplary defense of public order in Baku, militia employees V. Abdullayev and M. Dzhafarov from Sabirabad, K. Alakkhverdiyev from Khanlara, S. Kuliyev from Ismailla, and V. Belibekov from Baku...

In conclusion, I repeat that we see our service and the essence of upcoming work in ensuring the security of the citizens of our republic, in reliable defense of the deepening processes of democratization and glasnost, and in strengthening socialist law and order and legality.

[Correspondent] I congratulate on the holiday of the militia!

[Mamedov] Thank you.

**Goskompriroda Chairman Vorontsov on Estonian Environmental Concerns**

*90US0187A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 20 Oct 89 p 4*

[Interview with N.N. Vorontsov, Goskompriroda chairman, by ETA correspondent E. Kapov: "Ecology Has No Borders"]

[Text] USSR Goskompriroda Chairman N.N. Vorontsov became the center of journalistic attention the minute he took the position. Many factors probably played a role—the fact that ecological problems are almost more acute than all of the others, the fact that N.N. Vorontsov has earned great respect as a scientist and a warrior for environmental protection, and finally, undoubtedly, the fact that he has become the first non-party member of the USSR government.

An ETA correspondent met with N.N. Vorontsov during his visit to northwestern Estonia, and asked him to share his impressions of the ecological situation in that region.

[Vorontsov] Even before this visit, I knew that Kokhtla-Yarve was one of a hundred cities in the Soviet Union in a most alarming ecological situation. The basic problems here are related to the pollution of the air supply. I am not going to quote figures—they can be found in reference books, and the city's residents know them better than I do.

In just one breath of the air, one can sense a fairly high concentration of both a sulphur anhydride and touches of ammonium hydrate. In general, there is an acid rain source here. Besides everything else, there is the worrisome fact that a big manufacturer—Slantsekhim—uses up a large amount of the water. And the fact that no process for biologically cleansing the water has been established only deepens the worry, even though we have been told that Slantsekhim is looking for a solution.

From an ecological point of view, the Kokhtla-Yarve and Narva rayons are the most alarming regions in Estonia. Here, the westerly winds prevail. This facilitates the transport of significant amounts of pollution to the Leningrad, Pskov, and Novgorod oblasts. Our neighbors, Finland and Sweden, are very alarmed. It is completely clear that the country needs the products that are manufactured in northwestern Estonia. We understand that oil shale is an extraordinarily cheap source of energy. This is all true. But along with this, we must calculate how much this will cost us in shortened life expectancy, and in a decrease in the work capacity of this region's inhabitants; how much this will cost us in shortages of agricultural produce or in the marketing of agricultural produce that is not of the quality that we would want. For these reasons, it seems to me that this entire large rayon is in need of a very serious study, which must be conducted systematically. We must examine the entire complex of ecological, energy-related, and national-scale economic problems. And if I were to say which was more important, I would say that it is the task of protecting the

health of the environment, which is a condition for protecting the health of the nation. This must become the priority in fulfilling the tasks of planning for the national economy.

[ETA] Nikolay Nikolayevich, do the country's people's deputies, or do you, as the director of USSR Goskompriroda, have, today, a working mechanism for counteracting departmental tyranny?

[Vorontsov] Let us discuss it this way. When people build, not listening to the people's demands and not considering the ecological capacity of the land—this is departmental tyranny. Here, construction went forward during the years when there was no concept of ecological capacity, and when, in general, a different system of priorities was in power. How did they think? Where do we have oil shale? Here. So let us utilize it as completely as possible: let us burn it for electrical energy, and let us be careful to utilize a high percentage of the ash. We saw the implementation of this sort of policy in Narva. In Kokhtla-Yarva, the percentage of precipitated ash is very high. In order to decrease the emissions of dust, we must think what is cheaper—either introducing new cleansing methods, or restructuring production on some kind of completely different principles. Once more, I repeat, the approach must be systematic and comprehensive.

Besides this, we must not take a position of regional egoism. Saying that if the country needs ammonia, then let someone else produce it, just not us. Discussing the issue in this way is also impossible. But some kind of balance must be maintained. And it is completely clear that the monstrous saturation of ecologically dangerous enterprises in one corner of Estonia is an abnormal phenomenon; this is a classic example of the completely utilitarian way of thinking that I referred to earlier.

[ETA] Estonia is preparing to switch over to economic accounting on 1 January 1990. Both in the republic and in sessions of the USSR Supreme Soviet much is being said about property and sovereignty relating to, among other things, the land and the water...

[Vorontsov] Ecology has no borders. We must protect the biosphere together. Incidentally, here is an interesting example that concerns the protection of the Baltic. Czechoslovakia does not border on the Baltic Sea, but the Elbe has its source in Czechoslovakia, in the Sudeten Mountains. And, accordingly, the question of cleansing the Elbe and the adjacent portion of the Baltic is impossible without the inclusion of Czechoslovakia, which we have traditionally looked upon as a Danubian country. In connection with this, I want to underline that I welcome Estonia's transfer to economic accounting in every way, but I want also to call for a certain, shall we say, restraint. Sovereignty over the land and mineral resources—yes. But when we are speaking of air and water supplies, the establishment of republic, rather than union-republic, sovereignty, could strike strongly at the interests of the republic, itself. It is enough to remember

that many rivers that flow through the Baltic republics have their sources in the Russian Federation, Belorussia, and other republics. The state of the air in one republic affects the way the people in the neighboring republic breath. In a word, ecological problems are everybody's problems, and we must solve them together.

### Need for Authorities to Respect Local Environmental Concerns Stressed

*90US0187B Moscow PRAVITELSTVENNYY VESTNIK No 20, Oct 89 p 9*

[Article by A. Tsygankov, USSR Council of Ministers Administration for Affairs Department of Territorial Development of the National Economy and Capital Construction deputy head: "Anywhere But Here...—Sometimes Issues on the Location of New Enterprises Are Decided in the Union Republics According to This Principle"]

[Text] Now it is a secret to no one that the traditional natural habitats of many of our country's peoples have been violated. Small nations, threatened by complete assimilation and the loss of their national character, feel this especially acutely.

The national symbols are waning—those such as, for example, the khutor [family farm] and its related landscaping for the Estonians, hunting grounds and reindeer pastures for the Evenki, the forest for the Russians who live in the northern regions, the Aral Sea for the Kara-Kalpaks.

The reasons are well-known—a precipitous growth in the demand for resources, caused by the country's industrialization, coincided with the establishment of command methods of administration. At the same time, research on the interdependence between nature and society was broken off.

The democratization of public life has given people an opportunity to shout out their indignation towards the predatory exploitation of nature. Let us recall the events of the last years. In Armenia, people demanded that chemical manufacturers in Yerevan be closed. In Estonia, they demanded that phosphorite mining be stopped. In Latvia—that the cellulose and paper factory near the resort town of Jurmala be closed, and that the shipping of petroleum products and chemical freights in Ventspils be discontinued. In the Ukraine—that the construction and utilization of AES in the Crimea, Nikolayev Oblast, and Rovno cease.

The country's government has carefully examined these demands, and has adopted decisions on eliminating the sources of the public disaffection that is caused by ecological issues. But the branch ministries, in their pursuit of departmental interests, have not been quick to carry them out, even after government decrees have been issued. Certain circles have used this to heat up the national mood even more. Healthy, constructive measures have been presented as a concession from the

center, from Moscow, while the principle of a public division of labor has been intentionally ignored. This kind of agitation has sparked local egoism, and has encouraged the artless logic: "Anywhere but here." A logic that says, let electrical energy, metals, and chemical products be manufactured somewhere far away, but let them be brought to our region punctually and at a suitable price.

New ecological problems are developing, as well, that may cause national complications if steps are not taken in time. Bringing on line the alluminum factory in the city of Tursunzade, in the Tadzhik SSR, without fully cleansing the gasses emitted has led residents of the contiguous territory, the Surkhan-Darya Oblast of the Uzbek SSR, to protest the harmful effects of flourine compounds on grape and vegetable crops. The suggested diversion of a part of the river Karkara's water, which flows between Kazakhstan and Kirghizia, into Lake Issyk-Kul has been the source of complaints from the Kazakh population. In both cases, government-commissioned competent committees are examining the problems of environmental protection that affect the interests of the various nations, and, one would think, will find acceptable solutions.

But local problems must be solved on the basis of general principles. They are mentioned in the CPSU platform "On the Party's National Policy Under Contemporary Conditions," adopted by the CPSU Central Committee Plenum. The land, its mineral resources, lumber, water and other natural resources are the property of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and of the union republic. The center's task is to assure the steady development of the entire state. It coordinates and stimulates forces for the protection of the country's single natural complex, coordinates these forces with other countries and with inter-nationality cooperation, and establishes all-union bases for the utilization of natural resources, taking into consideration republic and general state interests.

The republic, on its side, must take effective measures to protect the environment and for the rational utilization of resources, in the interests of both its own population and the entire country, which is developing the national economy based on the principles of a public division of labor. In practice, this means that the reform of the environmental protection system will continue, with the goal of transforming the republic committees on environmental protection into active organs that control and administer the utilization of natural resources. Transferring full responsibility to them will make necessary a switch from centralized—on the USSR Gosplan level—to territorial planning by republic planning organs of measures that concern environmental protection and the conservation of resources.

In its turn, the USSR State Committee for Environmental Protection [Goskompriroda] is being transformed into a union organ, called upon to determine the strategic course of environmental protection, including a

single all-union economic mechanism for resource use, a single information system on the state of the environment and natural resources, the development of inter-governmental cooperation, and, naturally, the drafting of the fundamentals for all-union legislation. If this sort of delimitation can be carried out in the very near future, then accusations of excess centralization will lose their meaning. In the recent USSR Council of Ministers resolution on Measures for the Belorussian SSR's Switch to New Conditions of Accounting on the Basis of Self-Administration and Self-Financing, other relationships between USSR Goskompriroda and the republic state committee have already been established, permitting a significant broadening of the sphere of operations for local environmental protection agencies.

In this case, the center will assure the implementation of especially large-scale environmental protection measures that affect the lives of many republics.

The degradation of the natural complexes that people consider their own national property sharpens the relations between nations. For this reason, we need to reexamine environmental policy, and direct it towards a renaissance of national cultures. It is not enough merely to preserve certain historical and cultural monuments; the entire natural landscape must be restored, as it provides the backdrop for the everyday life of many of our country's nations and peoples. We must seriously begin the creation of national natural parks—many of them actually exist only on paper. Here, much depends on the republic Councils of Ministers and local Soviets of People's Deputies.

In answer to the public protest to a union government decision, construction of a new medical industry factory in Uman was called off, because it might have placed the unique Sofiyevka park on the brink of catastrophe. But we cannot, in deciding the fate of each natural monument, wait for an order from above. In the RSFSR, the restoration of the unique natural and historical complex on Valaam Island is moving extraordinarily slowly, and very little is being done towards creating the "Russian North" national park. The Soviet Cultural Fund and its chairman, Academician D.S. Likhachev, are fighting for a national park in the region of Vodlozero—we have been given, perhaps, a final chance to recreate the original Russian culture. And what is happening? In answer, the loggers are cutting trees down in this region at greater speed. But it is exactly here, in the forests that are full of strength and dignity, where along the road one meets temples built with love by distant ancestors, that you can feel a part of the powerful Russian culture and history. And if all of this disappears unnoticed, what will happen to the nation and its soul?

We know that Lake Sarez, which was formed several decades ago as the result of an earthquake, presents a potential threat to millions of residents of Central Asia, especially Tajikistan. Despite a series of government decisions, no real progress in preventive measures has been achieved. A proposal has been made to the Tadzhik

SSR Council of Ministers to create, under the conditions of a switch to self-sufficiency and economic accounting, a production or scientific-production subdivision that would be occupied exclusively with this problem. We have the experience—it was in exactly this way that protection against the mud flows was organized. In answer—there was an attempt to pass the concerns to the shoulders of the union departments, and to evade responsibility for one's own nation, even though it is obvious that without the forces of Tadzhikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, this threatening danger cannot be eliminated.

The restoration and preservation of the environment is a complicated and difficult aspect of our economy's development. After all, the criteria here are not just the amount of allotted funds and a decrease in harmful emissions. Any forces in this area must be accompanied by the nations' desires to preserve their own national characters.

#### Official Explains Plan to Use Pollution Fines for Ecological Funding

90US0195A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 8 Nov 89 Second Edition p 4

[Interview with N. Lukyanchikov, director of the Main Administration of the Economy and the Organization of Natural Resource Use, by O. Plakhotnikova: "A 'Tax' to Benefit Nature"]

[Text] Together with USSR Gosplan and the USSR Ministry of Finance, the USSR State Committee for Environmental Protection has ratified a resolution on the creation of local, republican and state funds for environmental protection. We asked N. Lukyanchikov, director of the Main Administration of the Economy and the Organization of Natural Resource Use, to comment on this:

Now nobody will dispute the obvious truth: that real improvement in the state of the environment will become possible only when strict economic sanctions are applied to the polluting enterprises. From 1991, all enterprises, regardless of their departmental affiliation, will pay a kind of ecological "tax" on harmful waste products. Not even those factories that conform with the norms for acceptable waste products are exempt, as all manufacturers unavoidably cause damage to the state of the natural environment. The sum of the payment will rise by many times if an enterprise allows existing norms to be exceeded, or in the case of an accident at the purification facilities.

The funds that enterprises will pay for polluting the environment should go towards environmental protection. The largest portion will remain at the disposal of local organs of authority, and may be spent on the construction or reconstruction of purification facilities, on the restoration of small rivers, on the creation of a monitoring system, on preparing environmental impact statements—in a word, on solving the most urgent problems in one or another region. In cities where cases

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of illness related to the degradation of the natural environment are becoming more frequent, it is possible that it would be useful to finance the construction of medical facilities partially out of "ecological" funds.

A portion of the monies from local environmental protection funds will go into republic and state funds.

An experiment on approval for the new system is already being conducted in 22 regions of the country. Among them—Perm, Zaporozhye, Kemerovo, Kostroma, Chelyabinsk and Yaroslavl. The first results may be given, as well: in Chelyabinsk, for example, 6.5 million rubles have already been accumulated.

### Press Conference on State's Progress Toward Environmental Protection Plan

90US0195B Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in Russian 31 Oct 89 p 6

[Article by A. Gasparyan: "The Right and Opportunity to Live: Ecologists Outline a Program of Action"]

[Text] The first press conference on actual questions of ecology has been held, organized by the VNIITs [All-Union Scientific Research Institute Ecology Center] at the request of the USSR Supreme Soviet Secretariat. Journalists met with K. Salykov, Committee on Questions of Ecology and the Rational Utilization of Natural Resources chairman; V.M. Desyatov and A.A. Denisov, members of the Committee and people's deputies; N.N. Vorontsov, USSR Goskompriroda [State Committee for Environmental Protection] chairman and people's deputy; Professor V.I. Akovetskiy, from Goskompriroda; and A.A. Chernoyarskiy, director of the VNIITs.

It is superfluous to say that questions of ecology are among those of paramount importance. In the agenda for the USSR Supreme Soviet, discussion of questions of environmental protection is the 34th point. And will it remain altogether beyond the work of the parliament in this session?..

Today, it has become obvious that the great discussion of ecology is only beginning. The new USSR Goskompriroda chairman has taken his post, and in the Supreme Soviet a Committee on Questions of Ecology and the Rational Utilization of Natural Resources has been created. The new mechanisms are only beginning to gather momentum...

We must also consider that in the parliamentary committee we have a completely new structure, which has no practical experience at all. All the same, the people's deputies intend to provide all possible support to Goskompriroda, to the scientific and practical ideas of specialists, and to informal associations.

So what has changed in these weeks?

In the Committee on Questions of Ecology, a first reading of the State Program for Environmental Protection has already been conducted. But many of the

resolutions in the Program are still in the deciding stage—after all, they affect not only general government issues, but the interests of many departments, as well. And it is for this reason that working on the Program is by no means an easy task. A draft Law on Environmental Protection has already been examined in the Goskompriroda collegium, and has passed through the Ministry of Justice. Now it will be presented in the USSR Council of Ministers and, in accordance with the established resolution, will go on to the Supreme Soviet, to the Committee on Questions of Ecology.

The interest felt by the meeting's participants toward this normative act is completely understandable. After all, until now we have not had a single, comprehensive law on environmental protection. And we have needed one for a long time—it is no secret to anybody that there is a crisis situation in this country. We have begun to feel it in our own health; living like this is not only hard—it is dangerous, as well. To count on the consciences and civic responsibility of the department heads who, either directly or indirectly, are responsible for our lives, is impossible. We need severe legal sanctions.

The question, when our lives and the lives of our descendants are put on the table, has no patience for bustle or haste. And there is no need to build illusions that it can be decided easily and quickly. Not one department is going to yield its positions just like that. If, at the Fall, 1990 session, the government presents a definitive new law to the Supreme Soviet—then we will be able to talk about a first victory. After all, there is one principal aspect of the law: the ecology takes priority over the economy. If this position is preserved, we can count on positive changes. Here, Goskompriroda has great hopes for receiving aid from the parliamentary Committee on Questions of Ecology, the members of which have offered their assistance in writing a draft law.

We seem to have become accustomed to the fact that when conversation turns to the zones of ecological catastrophe, the list begins with Chernobyl, with the recent additions of enormous expanses of Belorussia. The map of the densities of liquid and gaseous waste products in the atmosphere, shown to us by N. Vorontsov, is enough to frighten even the most inveterate technocrat. According to world standards, if more than one ton of sulfur dioxide alone falls per square kilometer, that region is considered unsuitable for agriculture. But Krivoy Rog has 1,000 tons of various waste products per square kilometer. We might as well add the Donetsk and Dnepropetrovsk Oblasts, where the amount of waste products are, respectively, 112 and 80 tons per square kilometer, to the list of zones of ecological catastrophe. It is frightening to think that we are speaking of the most fertile black-earth zones in the country!

Enormous funds are needed to remedy the situation that has developed in the zones of ecological catastrophe, alone. The new State Ecological Program provides that the percentage of the gross national income spent on environmental protection will rise from 1.38 to 2.5. But

this, of course, is not enough. Even a rise to 5 percent of the gross national product would only stabilize the situation. And in order to solve the problems of the zones of ecological catastrophe, it would have to rise to the 10-percent level.

But the problem is not the allotment of funds—we need to organize them. For example, out of the funds allotted for the construction of purification facilities and other facilities for environmental protection, only 30-40 percent are being used.

For next year 13.3 billion rubles have been allotted to environmental protection. Of course, this is not a small sum. But once we pay for urgent improvements in technology, what is left over for the integrated program? The provision of information, without which we cannot even dream of normal work, costs how much? We are not really counting on Goskomgidromet [State Committee on Hydrometeorology]—the main “holder” of ecological information. In December of this year, the first report on the state of the environment in the USSR for 1988 will be published. However, the circulation of this publication is depressing—only 20,000 copies. The traditional explanation is given—no paper...

Opinions on the status of Goskompriroda have diverged sharply. Some think that it should not be taken out of the government structure, an executive organ that possesses financial sources. Others think that a committee within the Council of Ministers will not be able to move this matter from square one, since it will be pressured with the necessity of fulfilling the plan. In other words, would it be better for the committee to be subordinate to the Supreme Soviet?

...One of the halls of the hotel Moscow, the size of a small room, accommodated an exposition, as well, which visually demonstrates the state of environmental protection in this country—from the scale of the pollution of the environment to the scale of expenditures on environmental protection. There was something novel here—two personal computers with a data bank on the state of the environment and the population's health in 120 of the country's cities. Indisputably, a useful item, especially for the work of the deputies at the session.

Of course, it is still early to speak of absolute agreement between the Committee on Questions of the Ecology and Goskompriroda. But today we have that rare situation, where goals coincide completely. They are that we might live under normal circumstances, and that we might leave to our descendants that which is most important—the right and opportunity to live.

#### **Uzbek SSR: Renewed Calls for Siberian River Diversion Project**

90US0195C Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 46, 15 Nov 89 p 2

[Article by Vyacheslav Tsoy: “Corrections to the Epitaph”]

[Text] The writers who composed one line each of the epitaph for the “Sibaral” project obviously believe that its fate is decided. It turns out that their evaluation is premature.

Fact number one. On September 28 in Tashkent, the regular meeting of the Committee for Saving the Aral was attended by A. Kiyatkin, Ministry of Water chairman. In a conversation with a correspondent from TASS, he announced, simply: “We have no doubt that it is inevitable that the “Sibaral” project will have to be resumed.” Afghanistan, pointed out A. Kiyatkin, takes a small amount of water now, but we must consider that it will be taking more, and that Central Asia will essentially lose the Amu-Darya and the Syrdarya. For this reason, we must inflict a preventive blow upon the impending water shortage—with the aid of Siberian water. As confirmation of his own—and, evidently, those of the entire Ministry of Water—observations, the head of the department quoted Philipp P. Miklin, a professor at West Michigan University, who published an extensive article in the journal MELIORATSIYA I VODNOE KHOZYAYSTVO (No 2, 1989).

The essence of the article may be summarized as follows. The USSR is experiencing a hopeless water resource crisis in Central Asia—one. Solving the problem through the manipulation of regional water resources is impossible—two. The government of the USSR will need to return to the “Sibaral” project not for economic reasons, but for political ones.

Professor Miklin lists 15 consequences of diverting a portion of the rivers' flow: 10 are negative—all of them concern the RSFSR exclusively; and five are positive—all of them concern Central Asia exclusively. Item seven, for example, on the list of negative consequences, is the violation of the tenor of life, culture and traditions of the peoples of Russia. Let us compare it with item four on the list of positive consequences: preservation of the tenor of life, culture and traditions of the inhabitants of Central Asia. It is probably an understatement to say that we have before us something more than a simple displacement of water...

The next link in the chain of events surrounding the visible resurrection of idea of diverting the rivers is the speech of G.P. Bogomyakov, Tyumen CPSU obkom first secretary, in Tashkent, at one of the events put on for Tyumen Days in the Uzbek SSR. On October 26, the highly-placed guest assured the gathering that he understands the vital necessity of the project perfectly, and that he is doing everything possible for its realization. “Specifically,” he emphasized, “from the tribunal of the 28th CPSU Conference, I intend to speak on exactly this subject.”

And, finally, on October 28 at the Tashkent party obkom plenum, I.A. Karimov, Uzbek CP Central Committee first secretary, pointed out that population growth in the republic will remain, as before, very high, and that by the year 2000 the population will exceed 30 million. Under

these conditions, the republic party organization leader concluded, it will be impossible to solve the produce problem without Siberian water.

So what about the epitaph? Should we make corrections...?

### Details of Chernobyl Disaster Fund, Projects

*18001707 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 29 Sep 89  
Morning Edition p 2*

[Article by A. Protsenko, IZVESTIYA special correspondent: "Money for Chernobyl—It Has Been Collected by the Entire Country. How Has It Been Spent?"]

[Text] While examining documents on the Chernobyl epopee in USSR Gosbank, my attention was attracted to a letter from one A. Astafev in Monchegorsk. "In contrast to many who are indifferent about where their sometimes small contributions go, I want to know on what my money is being spent," he wrote. "To be honest, my money will not be noticed at Chernobyl. It may remain unused, and subsequently be used to restore some village in Tuamotu, suffering from floods...130,000,000 multiplied by just 5 rubles (the average) equals 650 million rubles. One does not have to be wise as Solomon to understand that this money would last Chernobyl for a century..."

This letter was sent when donations were being gathered. Of course, this may not be pleasing: A person who has not even given a kopeck is already asking whether somebody is getting rich from his ("average") five rubles. However, it must be agreed that, first of all, a person has the right to know how his money will be spent, for what purposes and how it would be most useful. Secondly, A. Astafev did not receive an intelligent answer—at that time the bank workers themselves did not know where the donations for Chernobyl were going.

The question remains. It makes sense to turn to it.

Recall that there were three main sources of charity for Chernobyl: The Soviet Peace Fund, the USSR Red Cross and Red Crescent Fund (SOKK i KP) and Account Number 904 in USSR Gosbank. The first two funds always accept contributions for charitable purposes; the third was specially created. How much was obtained from each fund and how was it spent?

It was most difficult to obtain information from the Soviet Peace Fund. L. Nabatnikova, the chief bookkeeper, reported that there was not a separate account named "Chernobyl Money" for the general flow of donations. She thinks that some money came in—considerably less than the 500,000 rubles which the fund transferred to Account Number 904 in 1986. My attempts to learn the total of donations the fund received during 1984-1986 were unsuccessful. Without authorization from the leadership, the chief bookkeeper did not provide it. The leadership was not available.

I report my conversation with L. Nabatnikova only to bring up an obvious point: When voluntary contributions to a charity fund are involved, there can be no service secrets. Such information must be known to all workers in these funds (and not just to the chief bookkeeper) and must be given to the first person "off the street" asking about it. This money does not belong to the fund; the fund only disposes of it.

The next fund is the USSR Red Cross and Red Crescent Fund. It received 13,586,914 rubles and 83 kopecks for Chernobyl, and from the very first had a special account.

In 1986 8.5 million rubles were spent: 4.5 million were transferred to the Ukrainian Red Cross and 4 million to the Belorussian Red Cross. As A. Tyulyandin, deputy chairman of the USSR Red Cross Executive Committee, explained, this money was used to pay accident victims. There was also 200 million rubles in state help. Some received more, some less, the exact payments were determined on the spot.

The remaining money was not immediately spent by the Red Cross, but, as was made clear, it was spent properly. The true scale of the catastrophe became known considerably later. When it became necessary to have mobile laboratories with diagnostic equipment to examine the population in regions with increased radiation, the Red Cross was able to spend a million rubles from its "Chernobyl Fund." After the accident the All-Union Scientific Center for Radiological Medicine was set up in Kiev. The Red Cross gave it 300,000 rubles last year and another 200,000 rubles this year.

Children require special concern. In May 1987 the Red Cross allocated 1.05 million rubles to pay for flights to the south for children, adolescents and their mothers from the regions of radioactive contamination in Gomel and Mogilev oblasts. Last June 250,000 rubles were allocated to mothers of preschool children who took them from the affected regions in Gomel Oblast last summer (after the deadlines for paid travel).

One can, of course, ask many questions: Why was the money paid to inhabitants of these oblasts, and not others, why this amount and not more? The answer is very simple: they paid as much as was given. For example, on 5 February 1988, A. Grakhovskiy, chairman of the Gomel Oblispolkom, asked the Red Cross for 1.5 million rubles. The Red Cross could only give a half million, while the Mogilev Obliskom only received 250,000 rubles for these same purposes. This year these oblasts were only able to get 250,000 rubles each to help the indigent. Considerably more is needed, but where can it be found? After all these Chernobyl expenditures the Red Cross had 1,016,914 rubles and 83 kopecks left.

True, the meticulous reader can add these figures up and ask: what happened to the other 20,000 rubles? They were spent in 1986 when inhabitants of the zone, afraid, without money or possessions went to other republics, to relatives and friends. The local Red Cross organizations paid 50 rubles each to these refugees awaiting state help.

The only condition was that they have some proof that they were from the Chernobyl area.

The Russian Red Cross was too late in ascertaining that it had received money for Chernobyl, therefore it did not set up a special account. It is reckoned that 114,000 rubles of such money were received. Therefore, the Russian Red Cross did not ask the Executive Committee of the USSR Red Cross and Red Crescent for money; its divisions paid about 200,000 rubles to people in the Chernobyl area.

It remains to ascertain where to spend the remaining million rubles. In the executive committee they think that rather than spending it on assistance to individuals it would be better to spend it this year organizing the evacuation of children under 7 years old out of the affected areas during the fall months.

Finally, there is the largest of the Chernobyl charity accounts—Number 904 at USSR Gosbank. Its receipts total 542,922,662 rubles and 77 kopecks. Here they are, by republic:

Republic	Donations
RSFSR	316,065,364 rubles 86 kopecks
Ukrainian SSR	128,735,924 rubles 66 kopecks
Kazakh SSR	22,232,297 rubles 5 kopecks
Belorussian SSR	17,316,660 rubles 88 kopecks
Uzbek SSR	12,352,290 rubles 44 kopecks
Moldavian SSR	8,104,106 rubles 70 kopecks
Latvian SSR	6,481,547 rubles 77 kopecks
Georgian SSR	6,261,171 rubles 7 kopecks
Azerbaijan SSR	5,877,869 rubles 40 kopecks
Lithuanian SSR	4,491,852 rubles 85 kopecks
Kirghiz SSR	3,342,649 rubles 58 kopecks
Armenian SSR	2,869,996 rubles 35 kopecks
Turkmen SSR	2,505,502 rubles 15 kopecks
Tajik SSR	2,001,095 rubles 4 kopecks
Estonian SSR	1,886,122 rubles 31 kopecks
Vneshtorgbank	2,397,581 rubles 16 kopecks
Total	542,922,662 rubles 77 kopecks

The donations from the Russian Federation include 92,341 rubles and 21 kopecks in coins, valuables and household objects made from precious metals. Valuables to the Chernobyl Fund were contributed mainly by Muscovites and Leningraders, however there were also such gifts from other union republics, and Canadian gold coins donated by Yukimoto, a citizen of Japan, are valued at 143 rubles 97 kopecks.

Then there is the contribution of Vneshtorgbank [USSR Foreign Trade Bank]. One would think that it could have been considerably larger. However, our arrogance then was considerably greater than our good sense, on 6 May 1986 the following report appeared: "Tass is authorized

to report that the Soviet Government expresses its sincere gratitude to all who expressed their sympathy and offered assistance. At present the main needs to eliminate the consequences of the accident are being met by our own resources..."

Stubborn foreigners nevertheless sent money. V. Lyulchev, deputy chairman of the board at Vneshekonombank (formerly Vneshtorgbank) reported that foreign donations, in hard currency, totaled 1,783,283 rubles and 94 kopecks, about 2,767,000 dollars. The remaining receipts were in currencies of the socialist countries.

Such were the sums entering Account Number 904. On what was this half billion rubles spent?

In 1986 all resources needed to clean up after the accident, assist the population and for other needs were paid out of the state budget. As V. Grudnev, deputy administration chief at the USSR Ministry of Finance, reported, the total costs to our society from the Chernobyl accident during 1986-1988 were 8,591,000,000 rubles: 3,570,000,000 were losses (the fourth block and its equipment, plus the energy it generated, etc), the remaining was expenses:

Payment of individual lump sum assistance to the victims and compensation for lost property: 1,750,000,000 rubles;

Construction of housing and municipal and service facilities for evacuees from the zone: 1,163,000,000 rubles;

Direct expenditures for dealing with the accident and its consequences: 2,108,000,000 rubles.

I cite these figures in order to stress the main point: All money going to Account Number 904 went to compensate for state expenditures on the Chernobyl AES.

USSR Council of Ministers Ruling No. 2640 on 30 December 1986 states: USSR Gosbank and USSR Stroybank are authorized to pay 395 million rubles to Ukrainian SSR ministries and agencies and 30 million rubles to the Belorussian SSR to cover additional capital investments to eliminate the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl AES. These are to be paid from money in USSR Gosbank Account Number 904..."

The next day the Ukraine received 125,200,000 rubles for Stroybank and 269,800,000 rubles for republic Gosbank. This money was divided among republic Gosagroprom, Minleskhoz [Minister of the Timber and Wood Processing Industry] and Minvodkhoz [Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources], that is, the agencies constructing houses and municipal facilities for people evacuated from the zone.

Thus, 30 million rubles transferred to Belorussian Gosbank were used for indemnification.

## ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS

The next withdrawal from Account No. 904 was made on 17 March 1987; it totaled 23,100,000 rubles. This money was used to compensate the state for payments to citizens in the affected regions of Kiev, Zhitomir and Gomel oblasts for property they lost. There were an additional 7 transfers from Account Number 904 totaling 12,120,106 rubles and 44 kopecks.

Specially important in this series are two additional withdrawals from the Chernobyl account. In March 1987 a court authorized the return of 308 rubles to a citizen who was able to prove that his irresponsible, mentally incompetent mother-in-law contributed all the money in his home to Account Number 904 and that he was not able to feed his children. In September the USSR Council of Ministers authorized the transfer of a much larger sum—65,853,136 rubles and 60 kopecks—to the Ministry of Atomic Power to compensate it for expenses on the fourth energy block. (We note that this was a lump sum compensation for production expenses. All preceding payments were to the population in the zone for housing, food and clothing...)

Strictly speaking, this ends the history of People's Account Number 904 at USSR Gosbank. The money remaining, about 17 million rubles, was transferred to USSR Zhilstroybank [Bank for Housing, Municipal Services and Social Development]. I telephoned A. Shirayev, chief of the Operating Administration, to learn where the money went. The answer deserves to be repeated verbatim: "I consulted with a lawyer and can say that according to the Gosbank charter, all banks should keep their accounts secret. Information on money in them and expenditures from them can be reported only in answer to a written question from law enforcement organs, public control organs and control-audit services."

In answer to my objection that this is supposed to be a public, charitable account, Aleksandr Ivanovich replied: "Every account has an owner. This one is owned by USSR Minfin [Ministry of Finance]. Go ask them."

At Minfin they eagerly told me that 11.1 million rubles of "Chernobyl money" remained in the account and that it could be considered spent to decontaminate housing in the zone.

Now we can return to A. Astafyev's letter from Monchegorsk. First, to report to him that there has not been revealed a single fact showing that even a kopeck of the money for Chernobyl collected from the people went for any other purpose. Secondly, the money collected for Chernobyl was not only not enough for "a century," but was not even sufficient for a half year.

However, another question remains: Could the money have been spent in a better manner?

Let us change the way the question is formulated: What would have happened if, right after the accident, the people had not offered their help and had not begun to collect money for the victims? I think that the answer is

clear: Equally extensive measures to resettle people from the zone and to supply them with new housing, food, work and other things would have been implemented. The assistance and compensation would have been the same. Who then was helped by this general public collection of donations?

The answer is not easy. Over five and a half billion rubles, the cost of cleaning up after the accident, is a huge sum. It would have been impossible to find it without serious loss to other sectors of the national economy. The state has only one purse, consisting of various departments: So much for guns, so much for butter. In the final account, even if we are not responsible for this accident, as citizens of the state in which it happened we are obligated to share the burden. We did share it, because the state simply had no money other than ours.

I am not interested in where Minfin got the money spent on Chernobyl. However, the 542 million rubles the people put into Account Number 904 is money of a different kind. It was not an obligation, but was donated out of kindness not by all the Soviet people, but only by some. The donors had the right—there should have been a law—either to judge where and how to spend their voluntary contributions, or at least to select who disposed of it.

Incidentally, A. Astafyev by no means refused to give any money for Chernobyl, but only asked for the address of medical or childrens' institutions to which he could send money or gifts with the firm knowledge that it would get where he wanted it to go.

This is not just about formalities—whether this or that person is in charge of an account. People in the older generation remember how the state asked them to subscribe to loans on a voluntary-mandatory basis: ("either be a patriot—or..."). Nobody dared to ask where this "loan" money, by no means spare cash to every family, went. Today the situation has changed. Nobody is forced to donate money, but the principles of distribution remain the same.

First of all, such a "transfer" cannot help but have an effect upon a normal person's charity: He will give once and even twice without knowing for what, but he may think about the third time.

Secondly, today we are only beginning to see the long term consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe. People (some of those were working on the scene after the accident) are getting sick even though according to physicians they should not get sick. They have nowhere to turn other than to the state. There are also needs for foreign currency—if only to buy individual dosimeters for everybody who "acquired" any amount of rems and should be careful not to get any more inadvertently. There are also those needing additional treatment, food and rest far away from the zone. However, the state has no money to spare, the charitable funds are too small and the flow of people's donations to Account Number 904 dried up long ago.

In other countries such funds live long and even profitably: Some of the donations are invested in businesses where there is a guarantee of success (as a rule such profits are not taxed). The donated money grows and so do the possibilities of helping people

We have already used up these possibilities.

Judging from some information, after Chernobyl and the Armenian Earthquake, the participation of our citizens in various charitable funds has become considerably less than it was even quite recently. This is possibly because there are too many funds or possibly because we are no longer able to maintain people's inclination to be charitable. It would probably be more lasting if those who donated their hard earned money knew precisely where it was going.

**Results of Opinion Poll on 'Societal Tension'**

*90UN0168A Moscow VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA in Russian 11 Oct 89 pp 1, 4*

Interview with A.V. Dmitriev, deputy director of the Sociology Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences (ISAN), editor in chief of SOTSILOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA [Sociological Research] Magazine, and doctor of philosophical sciences, and V.O. Rukavishnikov, chief of the ISAN social groups dynamics study section and doctor of philosophical sciences, by N. Kuznetsov: "Social Tension"]

[Text] Three quarters of the Moscow residents surveyed consider it a reality. More than 90 percent list conservative elements in the apparatus as the greatest danger for perestroika. Almost half of our fellow countrymen express the opinion that strikes are a legitimate form of protest. Thirty five to forty percent are not satisfied with the mass media's coverage of events in the nation's "hot spots."

Recently many commentators and USSR people's deputies are writing and talking about social tension in society. We hear assertions that it is increasing. Is that actually so? Our correspondent turned to the leaders of a sociological research project that is conducting a corresponding survey of the population of the entire nation—A.V. Dmitriev, deputy director of the Sociology Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences (ISAN), editor in chief of SOTSILOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA [Sociological Research] Magazine, and doctor of philosophical sciences, and V.O. Rukavishnikov, chief of the ISAN social groups dynamics study section and doctor of philosophical sciences. This is what they said about the results of the survey of Moscow residents.

[Correspondent] First of all, just what is "social tension"? What meaning does this term have when studying public opinion?

[Dmitriev/Rukavishnikov] In our opinion, the concept "social tension" denotes a special state of society which is distinguished by the worsening of internal contradictions. This phenomenon is characterized by a mood of dissatisfaction that is forming in the broadest circles of the population by price increases, unresolved housing problems, total shortages, the ration card goods distribution system, the increase in crime, etc. Confidence in the authorities and elected bodies is eroded by this dissatisfaction with the social order, irritation, aggressiveness, and psychological fatigue increase especially among women, and a feeling of faith in tomorrow and in personal safety is lost, etc.

[Correspondent] How was the survey of Moscow residents conducted? To what extent were your assertions confirmed?

[Dmitriev/Rukavishnikov] We used a mail survey method of those Moscow residents who expressed a desire to participate in ISAN research and in VM

[VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA] social service during the "Face the Consumer" survey and we also used traditional survey—interviews.

Furthermore, the completed questionnaires were frequently accompanied by letters which permitted us to find out more about the positions of various people. Our hypothesis, what the concept "social tension" means to various groups of the population, was completely confirmed.

[Correspondent] How do Moscow residents assess the situation which exists today?

[Dmitriev/Rukavishnikov] We need to certify a dismal fact: No less than three quarters of those surveyed think that social tension actually exists in Moscow.

[Correspondent] In the opinions of Moscow residents, what sort of recent events are affecting the psychological atmosphere in the capital?

[Dmitriev/Rukavishnikov] Honestly speaking, we expected that the issues associated with consumer goods and housing shortages and similar local problems would turn out to be in first place. And although they do occupy a noticeable position, Moscow residents primarily referred to the events in Tbilisi, in the Baltic and the Transcaucasus, in Moldavia and Fergana, in Novyy Uzen, and in the mining regions: This says that the perception that sometimes exists about the purely local nature of these phenomena is not confirmed. Moscow residents consider themselves to be parties to all events in any part of the nation.

[Correspondent] Social tension is fraught with various conflicts right up to bloody conflicts as events in Uzbekistan and Nagornyy Karabakh have shown. Such manifestations of dissatisfaction as strikes are also possible. What are the opinions of Moscow residents in this regard? What does their mood barometer show?

[Dmitriev/Rukavishnikov] We will refrain from making "precise" predictions but we will talk about the trends which we can determine based on the survey's results. This question was asked during the survey: "Do you consider it justifiable to conduct strikes and other actions of protest in extreme forms (for example, hunger strikes) in our nation?" About 50 percent of Moscow residents tolerate such actions and just about as many oppose them. Twenty-two percent of Moscow residents stated that they know about such cases in Moscow or in the rayon where they live.

Proponents of strikes think their conduct is justifiable in those cases when all other methods of resolving the conflict have been used, when striker's activities do not threaten the health of other people and their vitally important interests and also in the event a strike of solidarity is being conducted.

Opponents of strikes think that workers will not achieve anything with such methods but will only damage the nation's prestige.

[Correspondent] According to Moscow residents, what social forces and what management methods can bring the country out of the crisis and reduce social tension? What forces can interfere with this?

[Dmitriyev/Rukavishnikov] Many Moscow residents, up to 36 percent, think that only informal groups, people's fronts, etc., are capable of undertaking real steps and decisively conducting a policy to improve the state of affairs in the country. However, three-fifths of those surveyed do not agree with this assessment.

Seventy-eight percent think that the struggle and opposition of various social forces that are part of perestroika are harmful since at this stage all of this can give rise to a serious conflict and therefore we need to jointly look for a way out of the crisis.

Moscow residents (about 80 percent) are alarmed by extremist circles' separatist plans within informalist movements in the union republics which are covering up their actions with slogans about protection of republic sovereignty and that lead to cases of withdrawal from the USSR. Therefore, we also understand the moods in which these opinions are reflected such as "everything will sort itself out if there is a strong center" (up to 64 percent for and 27 percent opposed) and "enough talk, we need strict policies and discipline" (up to 70 percent for and 25 percent against). However almost 90 percent think that the use of force against democracy is intolerable.

More than 90 percent think that "conservative elements in the party, government, and economic apparatus pose the greatest danger" and that they are "secret enemies of perestroika." Only three percent do not agree with this.

[Correspondent] In May-June, the Soviet parliament began its glasnost work for the first time in our nation and the majority of its representatives were elected USSR people's deputies from national territorial regions. They showed that in principle we can withstand the conservative elements...

[Dmitriyev/Rukavishnikov] Analysis of numerous deputies' speeches, include those of Moscow residents and representatives of the so-called Moscow group, was also conducted within the framework of our research. During the research, we discovered a hierarchy of problems that, according to the deputies, cause social tension in our society. Without discussing this issue in detail, we will point out that this hierarchy of problems does not completely coincide with the opinions of the Moscow residents we surveyed.

Obviously, well-known flaws in the new election law, elections from social organizations and district meetings that were sometimes conducted in violation of the law and on anti-democratic principles affected the formation of the deputy corps. In other words, Moscow residents must be more attentive and hypercritical toward candidates for a deputy mandate during the forthcoming elections to local and republic soviets.

[Correspondent] Judging by the survey's results, the picture we are getting is far from rosy...

[Dmitriyev/Rukavishnikov] The mass media could help here, however only 10-20 percent of Moscow residents are satisfied with their objectivity and timeliness and with the completeness of the information about events in our nation's "hot spots." From 35 to 40 percent are dissatisfied with their work. Of course, the fact that a law on the press has not been adopted has an impact but you as a newspaper reporter and all of your colleagues on radio and television need to devote some attention to this.

[Correspondent] Considering the complicated situation in society and in Moscow which your research also discusses, all deputies, social forces, and state structures need to be as careful as possible when they make decisions since they know about these negative moods and the extent to which they have spread among Moscow residents.

[Dmitriyev/Rukavishnikov] Yes, this is an objective and essential need. But we need to say that it is also impossible to delay certain decisions since this is fraught with social crisis and permanent conflicts.

In conclusion, we would like to thank all Moscow residents for participating in the study. If they express the desire, we are ready to also make other materials available to VM's sociological service which are associated with such complex phenomena as social tension. And those who wish to participate in our joint research through mail surveys must send us their first name, patronymic, family name, complete address, age, sex, and occupation.

FROM VM'S SOCIOLOGICAL SERVICE: We would like to report to those who desire to become more familiar with the results of this and other research that the studies will be published next year in SOTSIS (Sociological Research) magazine. The magazine's index is 70934. An annual subscription costs 15 rubles 60 kopeks. It is a monthly magazine.

#### Academician Likhachev Outlines Proposals For Development of Culture

90UN0306A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 16 Nov 89 Morning Edition p 3

[Article by D. Likhachev, chairman of the board of the Soviet Culture Fund: "Thoughts on the Culture of the Future"]

[Text] No matter how surprising it may seem, our country has no general plan for developing culture over the more or less long term. Constructing such a plan is no easy matter and should be begun by thinking about what the culture of the future ought to be like.

### The Need for Culture

It seems to me that the direction in which culture ought to develop is clear. In general terms, this direction corresponds to the spirit which is beginning to hold sway in "European thinking"—the thinking of the progressive strata of the European intelligentsia—to the extent that it has been defined, for example at the meeting of the ministers of culture of the European nations held in early November in the French city of Blois. The most important thing involved here is the primacy assigned to human values: a return to the humanities, arts, and spiritual riches; the subordination of technology to the interests of humanitarian culture; the development of the individuality of each person; freedom of human, individual development in the direction which is most conducive to the realization of talents, which are always individual, always "unexpected", the fostering of human individuality and opposition to depersonalizing "mass culture." All this leads naturally to another extremely important direction: the preservation of ethnic individuality in all spheres of culture. The road to true internationalism lies through acknowledgment of the value and independence of all national cultures.

The Soviet Union, and Russia within it, was and will remain an association of national states, with a culture that developed through interchange of the cultural experiences of the enormous number of peoples and nations that compose it. There is no other country in the world that has such diversity and such interpenetration of cultures as ours.

### The Overall Structure of Culture

We judge the culture of any people on the basis of its peaks, not of its low points, or even its average manifestations. Russian culture is represented by Pushkin, Lermontov, Dostoyevskiy, Tolstoy, Mussorskiy, Chaykovskiy, etc., etc. It is precisely this highest level of culture that provides the primary delineation of a nation and a people. This is very well understood by tourists, who seek out museums, theatrical life, the masterpieces of architecture, and the history of cities in the countries they visit.

What is necessary for the existence of culture in its highest manifestations? First of all, the representatives of this higher culture require the right environment. Meetings, personal relationships, exchanges of opinions, discussion of works of art on the highest level are essential. And if these are to take place, there must be various associations, societies of artists, circles, and similar places where people can meet and get to know each other; free exchange of creative ideas in a hospitable environment. The organization of cultural life is not only a matter for official, but for unofficial institutions. This is, first and foremost, the job of the culture funds, in which all people with creative initiative must feel themselves to be at home—masters and not supplicants.

One should not be afraid of the existence of an elite culture in a country. Elitism is extremely dangerous only

when it is supported by protectionism, based on the "services of the parents" or a person's own official position, in which the elite set themselves off from the rest of humanity with prizes, degrees, or even simply age or position. But an elite culture of talents and educated people absolutely has to exist in a normal cultured society.

### The Goals and Nature of Education

Culture must be instilled in people starting during the earliest years of life. And these first years are the most important: nurseries, kindergartens, elementary schools! If we can clearly assign higher educational institutions the task of imparting knowledge and occupational skills, then primary and middle education should be devoted, above all else, to instilling culture.

What precisely should be instilled? Morality in the broad sense of the word: a moral attitude to other people, other nations, work, etc.

The predominantly humanitarian disciplines and the arts have educational significance. Understanding art and the development of one's own creative talents, if only rudimentary ones, in the arts not only facilitates stability of character and raises general intellectual level, but also fosters the development of intuition, which is so essential in all areas of human activity. Art is the primary way that intuitions are developed, intuitions which no computer can match. This is why the most prominent mathematicians and physicists were musicians, had an interest in poetry, and loved to read the classics. From this it clearly follows that when literature is taught, it is essential to focus on developing understanding of artistic prose and poetry. The ability to reinterpret one or another work on the syllabus in accordance with the required line, does not instill love for literature. Rather the opposite! Teaching is a creative endeavor demanding that the teacher have talent, that he teach broad knowledge. The teacher must have some freedom to focus on what he himself loves and considers essential for his pupils. In the nineteenth and early twentieth century, the teacher of literature was the dominant influence on youth and that is what he must become again in the future.

It is also essential to understand that nothing educates youth morally like music, and especially participation in a chorus. A chorus awakens the feeling of one's own connection to other people, of unity with them.

Logic must be taught in the schools. One of the most striking things in the life of our society is the absence of cultured disputes, argumentation, and defense of ideas. And yet it is essential for us to raise generations of people with convictions and principles; people who are not merely honorable before society, but before themselves, and who possess a consciousness of their own worth.

Schools must nurture human individuality. And to achieve this, it is particularly important to read the classics, to know literature, art and the specifics of

history—with people and events, heroes and criminals. Schools must differ from each other, each with its own specialty. Perhaps this is elitism, but it is based not on the official position of the parents, but the identified abilities of the pupils themselves. Without such schools we will not produce good specialists in any areas. I can imagine elite schools in which the pupils have shown special interest in various crafts, botany, etc. Until now we have thought only about schools specializing in mathematics or foreign languages.

By the way, on the subject of foreign languages: it is a mistake to think that schools ought to concentrate on the spoken language and prepare pupils for meetings with foreigners. The main thing is mastery of the grammatical system of the language and the ability to read with a dictionary. Aside from its practical value and the opportunity to become acquainted with other cultures, teaching of foreign language develops pupils cognitively, helping them better master the ins and outs of their own language. An intelligent person must not limit himself to the knowledge available in his own language. He must be well informed about everything. It is no accident that when people want to emphasize how well-educated someone is, they mention how many languages he knows.

In general, freedom of choice among various schools, various curricula, the establishment of schools with their own individuality—is an essential condition for the development of culture in this country.

### On Science

Science is the most important part of culture. I will not discuss all of science, only that portion which is directly related to culture—philology, art criticism, and history. These fields have fallen into neglect and their prestige has fallen because of their politicization.

To a significant extent, literary criticism has turned into journalism. It is supposed to explicate authors and works only from the specific standpoint of today. They have forgotten about the existence of those fundamental disciplines for which Russians have won special renown: philology, text analysis, study of sources, prosody, etc. Certain of these disciplines, accused of committing mortal sins, were submitted to the judgment of fools. Comparative literature was accused of cosmopolitanism (and this in the country, where one of the greatest authorities in this area, Aleksandr Veselovskiy, lived and worked!) Poetics and prosody were accused of formalism. People stopped working in text analysis and the study of sources. Study of fine books was shoved off the table of the academic presses.

"Not timely?" And yet they attempt to pass off as timely multivolume works that no one reads, which are put on the shelf and only rarely referred to as references...

In science, it seems to me, one should strive for the same universal goals as in public education. In the basic sciences, we must cultivate various movements and the

formation of scientific schools. For this purpose, the present scientific societies often are too large, too weighed down by incompetent researchers, who interfere with the work of their competent colleagues. Scientists are frequently busy with the fulfillment of gross plans. I am referring primarily to the humanitarian institutes, where researchers are judged not on the basis of scientific discoveries, but by publications on specified topic, flooding the publishing houses with verbose works.

The formal reference (of the type given out by the local trade union committees) has eclipsed scientific reputation when it comes to election to the academy. The very concept of "reputation" has ceased to exist here, although without scientific reputation it is difficult to imagine the creation of any kind of scientific school or movement. We for too long have assumed that in science we must achieve "unanimity," must hold the same point of view on the solution of problems. For too long have we viewed the dissident scientist as a cross between an "enemy" and a heretic.

In summary, I should emphasize that it is essential for science that there be all kinds of diversity and concern about obtaining the "unexpected" and not previously stipulated results.

### On Our Legacy

At the meeting of the USSR Supreme Soviet's Committee on Science, Public Education, Culture and Education, D.A. Granin proposed the creation of a list of monuments of culture, (containing even as few as the 50 most urgent cases) that must be saved without delay. And it is true that the rate of destruction (especially in the area of the Armenian-Azerbaijan conflict and in other areas where ethnic uprisings have occurred) is so high that in only a few decades we will have annihilated our own culture. And our descendants will study its foundations, as we now study the foundations of churches in Kiev and Smolensk built before the Mongol invasion. It would be a good idea to compute the rate of destruction decade by decade. This rate is accelerating no less rapidly than the rate of destruction of forests and of water pollution.

If we could save only 50 monuments, a mere 50... But let us preserve or restore them as soon as possible and, what is even more important, let us do a good job.

This list must be compiled in 1990; this is not something that can be put off.

It would be wrong to apply to culture the overworked formula with which official documents and addresses begin: "In order to further the development of..." Initially, we must think not about "further" development, but about salvation, preservation, and restoration. For this reason during the first few years of our cultural program, there must be the maximum possible expenditure of resources on mass conservation of cultural monuments: we must build shelters for them, protect them from destruction. Conservation is vastly less expensive

than restoration, which requires research, sifting through archives, compilation of complex documentation. Furthermore we do not have enough specialists in restoration.

Where can we find the resources to preserve and restore cultural monuments? Various ways can be proposed. One of the most effective would be to have large enterprises and institutions be patrons of one or another monument. Another way would be to establish societies of friends of a certain park, garden, palace grounds, historical settlement, or ancient site. Participants in these societies, like the enterprises that volunteered to be patrons of the monuments, might be granted certain preferential rights to build apartments, dachas, and vacation facilities near their proteges.

#### Morality and Culture

The level of morality in society is intimately linked with the level of culture, and it is continuing to fall. But what can be done to raise the level of morality as quickly as possible? Or to ensure that the effects of culture on society are felt even at the earliest stage of its rise? Or to make sure that the increase in morality in society becomes identified with raising the level of culture and vice versa?

It would be totally unrealistic to hope that government organizations acting alone would be able to cope with this task. Today social initiative is as essential as air. The Soviet Culture Fund is ready to support all sorts of undertakings. But this is not enough. We must awaken extensive initiatives to create various societies, associations, and clubs. As an example let me cite possible types of associations: "The Society of Friends of Pavlovskiy Park" (by the way, there is such an association in the U.S., but none in Leningrad), societies devoted to the study of local lore, circles devoted to restoring the work traditions of the peasants of one or another locality or to studying the work traditions of the urban working class, circles known as "sewing circles" for group activities after work (knitting, sewing, lace making), choral organizations.

And I think that it would be beneficial to form voluntary societies, without rigid organizational structures, in which members (especially adolescents) would vow, primarily to themselves, to "live according to what's right," to observe "honor and worth," not to pass a "day without a good deed" (here it would be good to have self-ratings, diaries of good deeds, attention to goodness). I am sure that such associations would enjoy a certain success—goodness is contagious. Young people, experiencing the happiness of goodness, truth, honor, and worth, would retain this approach to life throughout their years.

I would also particularly urge that organizations be established for various group activities for people of retirement age or simply of advanced years. The knowledge that they were doing something useful for society

would make thousands of the elderly happy and, I venture to say, would prolong their lives.

#### Archives, Museums, Libraries

It is essential that we merge the leadership of all archives (if only within the RSFSR). A statute on archives appropriate to today's epoch of glasnost must be developed. They say that one is being written, but will it contain the most important point of any of the European archives: accurate dating followed by declassification of everything, without exception, in the archives? Even if this takes 30-40 or even 50 years. If this does not take place, than the archives will be subject to the despotism of the archive "directors." Access to archival material is currently granted to one scholar, and not to another. Given this practice, it is not possible to verify, when necessary, whether archival documents are being used properly.

In general we need to introduce some kind of rules at the level of legislation that would require the directors of archives, museums, and libraries to report to the Supreme Soviet on how they are preserving the treasures entrusted to them by the people. They should be forbidden to sell, exchange, or transfer our national treasures to other institutions, or to send them abroad for long periods of time. Is it acceptable that now the majority of museums, archives, and libraries, and also the institutions under whose authority these repositories fall (ministries, republic or Soviet academies of science) consider it possible to decide arbitrarily who gets access and who does not, or to send large amounts of material abroad for exhibitions, depriving our citizens of the opportunity to satisfy their cultural needs for long periods of time.

Is it acceptable that the All-Union Museum of Pushkin, unique in the treasures it contains, has lain in boxes in Leningrad for many years deprived of the opportunity to educate, to teach or simply to help people know our greatest poet?

Alas, I could cite many examples of whole categories of cultural works that remain inaccessible to researchers and the people.

#### Culture and Religion?

There is no doubt that religion is a manifestation of culture, that for thousands of years, human history developed primarily within the framework of various religions. This pertains to morals, customs, and rituals, and also music, architecture, and fine and applied arts. For this reason the study of religions as cultural phenomena is an essential portion of the education of each person. Remember that without knowledge of the major events of the Old and New Testaments, the lives of the saints, just as without knowledge of historical events and historical figures, one cannot visit a single museum of fine arts. Knowledge of religion, and especially the religions of one's own people, is essential to a people's self-knowledge and is not necessarily associated with faith. For this reason, pupils should be given an idea of

the "mythology" of various religions, if only in history lessons. As for the teaching of dogma and religious preaching then these must be conducted in church buildings. This is essential when preaching, charity, and instilling of morality based on faith is one of the basic requirements of religion (as, for example, in Christianity). Adherents of various religions must be given extensive opportunities to perform good deeds, to organize shelters for minor children or the terminally ill.

Teachers absolutely must instill respect and tolerance for the beliefs and convictions of others, of course including atheism. Emotional (primarily, association with negative emotions) attitudes to beliefs and convictions may have unpleasant consequences, up to and including national enmity.

#### Hearths of Culture

I have offered various proposal concerning how, in my opinion, culture must develop. What idea underlies all these proposals? I think that it is the idea of "hearths of culture." Not simply decentralization of culture, but an attentive treatment of its least manifestation. Culture sprouts in the insignificant, burns like a flame, and if it ceases to burn, all that is left is ashes and a charred place, a place where people lived a long time ago. The fire of culture is not a conflagration, but rather individual hearth fires and bonfires, lighting up our life.

Without culture, life cannot continue. There was a great culture of the Russian peasant: including work skills, knowledge of nature, and agriculture, decorative arts that added color to daily life, folklore, music, from chastushka [humorous folk verses] to church singing. All this made country life happy and tied the peasants to the land, on which they remained in spite of all the temptations of city life.

It is not only literacy which has defined human culture. Peasant culture was very high, especially in regions where serfdom did not exist, where the land worked by a peasant belonged to him and he knew that it would pass down to his children.

I dare to assert that the working class had already developed their own culture of work and human relationships in the 19th century. I have encountered the tenets of working class morality in old type setters.

And although the new must be based on the good traditions of the old, nonetheless the new must be created primarily from what is new, from new relationships in society. This new must be diverse and heterogeneous, so that each person can find in it what he requires, so that a person not only grows up free, but also can freely choice what most suits his nature. Freedom in culture is not whim, but the opportunity to find what best suits one within the diversity of existing culture. Without this diversity, without good and varied secondary schools, without individualized teaching of the sciences, without the variety of theatrical life, without

free university curricula, without diverse schools of art and thought—without all this, culture cannot develop.

Culture must not merely be directed at people, but at people with diverse, unpredicted capacities and talents, and it must offer them the opportunity for free development.

#### From the Editors

D. Likhachev's remarks were undoubtedly dictated by his sincere interest in the problems of culture development in our multinational country. This outstanding scholar and educator is deeply involved in the search for ways to preserve and increase the cultural heritage of the people. We have published this article in the hope that our readers will discuss it thoroughly. We are looking forward to your responses.

#### Revitalization of Kazakh Culture Urged

18320014D

[Editorial Report] Alma-Ata QAZAQ ADEBIYETI in Kazakh on 27 October carries on page 3 a 300-word article entitled "Let Us Be Complete Kazakhs" comprised of the speech given by Abdilda Tazhibayev before the recently convened organizational meeting of the Kazakh "Mother Tongue" Society. It is part of a group of three, interconnected articles published under the series title "Breath for Our Own Language, Space to Develop for Others." In his speech, Tazhibayev, described as an "aqsagal," or Kazakh "distinguished citizen," takes a strongly nationalist stance, strongly praising the Kazakh mother language and stressing its overwhelming significance for the culture and society of the republic. In terms of the program to make Kazakh the official language of the republic in fact as well as in theory, Tazhibayev goes on to set five public goals. He first of all calls upon Kazakhs to be "complete Kazakhs," with all the linguistic and other trappings of Kazakh culture. He also calls upon Kazakh parents to send their children only to Kazakh schools, since only through this can they become truly Kazakh. Thirdly, he calls for a revitalization of these schools, now in a sad state, as part of a broad effort to raise cultural levels. Fourthly, he demands greater development of Kazakh higher education, and the use of Kazakh in science and in other key areas of national life. Finally, he calls for a "Kazakhization" of all areas of republic life, from top to bottom. The prominent reproduction of this among many speeches given at the organizational meeting in the pages of QAZAQ ADEBIYETI strongly suggest that journal editors agree with Tazhibayev's goals.

#### New Census Notes Increased Growth of Kazakh Population

18320022 Alma-Ata QAZAQ ADEBIYETI in Kazakh  
17 Oct 89 p 15

[Interview with noted demographer Maqash Tatimov recorded by Beybit Qoysybayev: "How Many of Us Are There?" ]

[Text] It is well known that demographic facts are being taken into account carefully in the planning and carrying out of measures for the development of our vast nation, of every national territorial unit, and the socio-economic life of every oblast and rayon. Today, while planning committees are using the results of the All-Union census carried out at the beginning of this year, and taking their guidance from them, by and large these results are unknown to the broad masses. With the intention of compensating for the deficiency in this area, our reporter made a special trip to see noted demographer Maqash Tatimov and recorded the information given below.

[Question] *What were the growth rates and what are the present numbers, according to the last census, of the nationalities and peoples living within the bounds of our soviet federation?*

[Tatimov] The USSR State Committee on Statistics has issued its evaluations of the results of the 1989 census. Compared with the figures for the last census of some 10 years ago, the total population of the Soviet Union has grown by 9 percent and has reached 287 million. Let us look at growth rates for the most important nationalities of our nation. I report them since they are of interest to readers. Russians, the most numerous people in the Soviet Union, increased in numbers by 5.6 percent, to a total number of 145.1 million. Ukrainians were 44.1 million and grew 4.2 percent compared to the last census. The Uzbeks are third in total numbers in our nation and they increased by 34 percent, to a total of 16.7 million. Belorussians are now 10 million, this is up 6 percent over the previous census. Kazakhs are in fifth place. They grew 24.1 percent in 10 years and have reached a number of 8.14 million. Azerbaijanis are next, with a total number of 6.8 million (24 percent increase). Tatars—6.6 million (7.4 percent increase), Armenians—4.6 million (11.5 percent increase), Tajiks—4.2 million (45.5 percent increase), Georgians—4.0 million (11.6 percent increase), Moldavians—3.4 million (13.0 percent increase), Lithuanians—3.1 million (7.6 percent increase), Turkmen—2.7 million (34.0 percent), Kirghiz—2.5 million (32.5 percent), Germans—2.0 million (5.1 percent), Chuvash—1.8 million (5.0 percent), Latvians—1.5 million (1.4 percent), Jews—1.4 million (representatives of this nationality decreased in numbers by 21.8 percent in our republic compared to the last census), Bashqurt—1.4 million (5.7 percent increase), Mordvinians, 1.2 million (3.2 percent), Estonians, 1.0 percent (0.7 percent). These are the figures for the principal nationalities of our nation.

[Question] *What did the census say about the Turkic nationalities of our nation?*

[Tatimov] The number of Turkic-speakers in the Soviet Union is 49.5 million. As is known, of the 53 national-territorial structures in the Soviet Union, 18 belong to Turkic peoples. Among them are 5 union republics, 9 autonomous republics, 3 autonomous oblasts and 1 autonomous okrug. Some Turkic peoples—the Qyrymschaq, Gagawyz, Qarayym, Shor and Tofa have still not

formed their own territorial units. In terms of dynamics of demographic development, the total number of representatives of Turkic-speaking peoples will reach 70 million in 15 years. In the future, Turkic-speakers will form one-third of the population of our nation by the end of the next century.

[Question] *What do census data say about the ethnic composition of our own republic?*

[Tatimov] The total population of Kazakhstan increased by 12 percent during the 10 years and now amounts to a total of 16,473,000. The ethnic composition of the republic's population, in terms of census data, is as follows: Kazakhs—6,532,000 (23.5 percent growth), Russians—6,226,000 (3.9 percent growth), Germans—956,000 (6.2 percent), Ukrainians—896,000 (0.2 percent), Uzbeks—322,000 (26.1 percent), Tatars—328,000 (4.9 percent), Uighurs—184,000 (24.8 percent), Belorussians—182,000 (0.6 percent), Koreans—103,000 (12.2 percent), Azerbaijanis—90,000 (22.8 percent), Poles—60,000 (2 percent decrease), Sheshens—50,000 (29.4 percent increase), Turks—49,000 (90.8 percent), Greeks—4,600 (6.4 percent decrease), Bashqurt—33,000 (9.4 percent increase), Mordovians—30,000 (4.4 percent decrease), Dungans—30,000 (33.1 percent increase), Tajiks—26,000 (32.2 percent), Kurds—25,000 (a 43.7 percent increase over the last census).

[Question] *How are the people classified by language?*

[Tatimov] Turkic-speaking peoples are now in first place in the republic in numbers. They number 7,612,000. This is 46.4 percent of the population of Kazakhstan. Slavic-speakers number 7,366,000, or 44.9 percent. The remainder, speakers of other languages, a total of 1,484,000, are 8.7 percent of the republic's population. According to demographic projections, the proportional weight to Turkic-speakers in the republic will increase year by year. There will be 9.5 million in the year 2000, when Turkic-speakers will form 53 percent of the republic population. Slavic-speaking peoples will also increase in numbers. Their numbers will reach 7.5 million. This will be about 42 percent of the total population of that time.

[Question] *What can you say about the total numbers of Kazakhs in the Soviet Union?*

[Tatimov] There are a total of 8,137,878 Kazakhs in the Soviet Union. Of them, some 80.3 percent, or 6,531,921, live in Kazakhstan. However 19.7 percent of all Soviet Kazakhs, or 1,605,957, live in various republics. These include Kazakhs living in Uzbekistan—808,090, the RSFSR—635,083, Turkmenistan—87,595, Kirghizia—37,318, Ukraine—12,120, Tajikistan—11,371, Belorussia—4,530, Georgia—2,545, Moldavia—1,933, Azerbaijan, 1,638, Latvia—1,044, Armenia—608, Estonia—424.

[Question] *There are to be sure Kazakhs in various countries of the world.*

[Tatimov] The total number of Kazakhs in the world is 9,800,000. By the spring of 1990 there will be 10,000,000. We should celebrate as a considerable event our achieving of this round figure of 10 million.

[Question] *This would be reasonable. We should note the event through planning and carrying out strong actions that would guarantee, to the greatest possible degree, with the interests of life in our republic foremost, the spiritual and cultural needs of our country men everywhere, in the fraternal republics and in foreign countries. Thank you.*

### Estimated Illegal Immigration Figures For Estonia

18150100

[Editorial Report] Tallinn NOORTE HAAL in Estonian on 22 August 1989 carries on page 2 a 1000-word article headlined "Reply On A Current Topic" by O. Jõeäär. The article states that 7.5 million people have gone through Estonia over the last 30 years, adding: "In no other European country has the ratio of indigenous population diminished as rapidly as it has in Latvia and Estonia over the last few decades." The article continues:

"What struck me during discussions of the Election Law in the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium was that Arnold Rüütel's estimate of the number of people left without voting rights in Estonia differed considerably from those of the Strike Committee. Arnold Rüütel estimates that approximately 16,000 to 2,000 people will be left without voting rights. The Strike Committee puts this figure at 80,000 (this was spelled out at the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium session). What accounts for such a diversity of opinion? Obviously, the president's estimate is based on the fact that a total of approximately 16,000 people have been registered for entry into the Estonian SSR over the past two years. But where does the Strike Committee get its 80,000? Would they really dare to inflate the figure without any basis, bluff without honor or shame? I find that hard to believe. It is more likely that we are dealing with pure simple-mindedness. They added up the number of workers in Union-run enterprises with less than two years of residency in the Estonian SSR. That would have been a simple matter for the functionaries of the Joint Council of Work Collectives. And that's how the total of 80,000 was arrived at. But, in doing that, they forgot to check how many of these 80,000 were duly registered in the Estonian SSR." After admitting common knowledge of immigrants who have entered illegally, imported as workers by the Union-run industry, the question is raised: "How many of them are there? Apparently they number 80,000 - 16,000 = 64,000 people."

The article goes on to multiply 64,000 by 16,000 rubles, coming up with a total of 1,024,000,000 rubles in immigration fees owed to the local government by the Union-run industry.

The article maintains: "The residency requirement did not scare the management of Union-run industry only

because some newly immigrated people will be deprived of their voting rights, but also because it would mean much stricter enforcement of the passport laws, and substantial monetary penalties for those enterprises found to be in non-compliance." It continues:

"President Rüütel cited the familiar figures once again: according to official data, there are approximately 60 per cent Estonians and 40 per cent other-nationals now living in Estonia. But calculations for these percentages did not include military personnel and persons without registration. Incorporating these figures would bring the total of other-nationals up to 810,000 or 820,000 people. There are approximately 970,000 Estonians in Estonia. According to these estimates the percentage of Estonians would only be 54. The percentage of other-nationals would be 46."

"This is why we should be very attentive, and resolute!" the article concludes.

### Uzbek SSR: State Plan for Curing Fergana Valley Unemployment Problem

90US0242A Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian  
4 Nov 89 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Speeding Up the Social Development of the Fergana Valley"]

[Text] It was noted in the USSR Council of Ministers decree adopted 28 October that for a long time the urgent problems of the social development of the Fergana valley have not been resolved. The population's immediate needs are not being satisfied. The material basis of the non-production sphere is badly lagging. The consumption of basic foodstuffs remains extremely low. The situation is exacerbated by uninterrupted growth in the size of the population (especially of the rural population) not employed in public production.

The decree states that the situation which has been created is the result of shortcomings which have been allowed by the Uzbek SSR Council of Ministers in the management of the national economy and the development of the republic's productive forces. The narrowly departmental approach of the union ministries and departments which did not concern themselves with the creation of a social infrastructure also played an unseemly role. The natural result was the manifestation of dissatisfaction on the part of a significant portion of the population.

Immediate measures are now needed in order to effectively resolve the acute social problems of the Fergana valley. It is above all necessary to guarantee its thousands of residents stable work and growth in real income, and to eliminate as rapidly as possible the consequences of the well-known events in Andizhan, Namangan, and Fergana oblasts. These are the measures intended by the USSR Council of Ministers.

In noting that single-minded work is now being carried out in Uzbekistan for the recovery of the socioeconomic situation in the valley, conditions are being created for stabilizing the situation; the USSR Council of Ministers adopted the republic's proposal on accelerating the construction of a number of light industrial facilities, and work on them will commence not in the next 5-year plan, but in 1990. The Kirovskaya cotton wadding factory and the Yangikurganskaya knitwear factory in Fergana Oblast, and the knitted outerwear factory in the village of Shakhand, Namangan Oblast must come on line in 1991-1992. They will be built by Uzbekistan's Gosagro-prom and Gosstroy.

From 65,000 to 70,000 people will also be able to find work at the enterprises in operation in three oblasts—if the existing capacities are loaded as they should be, and the shift coefficient is raised. On this score, the Uzbek government in conjunction with the union ministries and departments developed measures approved by the USSR Council of Ministers. Even in 1989-1990, about 14,000 new work positions should be created by these means, with a growth in production output of R116.7 million annually.

One more very long-term means of increasing employment is the creation in cities and villages of small enterprises, branches, and shops for turning out science-intensive and labor-intensive productions. Together with the Uzbek government, the following union ministries will be concerned with this from 1989-1991: the electronic, defense, electroelectronic, radio and communications, chemical, and petroleum processing industries. For example, the Ministry of the Defense Industry will, with its technical culture and resources, assist in expanding production of consumer goods, as well as with equipment for this branch, for example, in Namangan and Kokand (the expansion of the "Kokandtekstilmash" plant). New electronics industry plants will emerge, and old plants expanded in Leninsk, Chust, Besharyk, Yapan, and Kuva. The development of the "Uzlektroterm" leading plant in Namangan, the "Algoritm" plant branch in Tashbulak, the radioelectronic service and repair center in Kuva, and the national galoshes shop at the "Fergananefteorsintez" association will be speeded up.

This must yield over 5,000 working positions in the coming 2-3 years. The Uzbek SSR Council of Ministers is entrusted to allocate the corresponding limits on contract work at the sites indicated.

Deputy I. Karimov, first secretary of the Uzbek CP Central Committee, recently spoke at a USSR Supreme Soviet session of the need to fortify in the republic the development of individual housing construction with funds and resources. This is not a simple problem: everyone knows how meager and tense the country's budget is. Yet all the same, the union Government has ordered USSR Gosplan to increase in 1990 earmarked credit resources for individual housing construction in

Andizhan, Namangan, and Fergana oblasts. USSR Sberbank must ensure the issuance of loans for these purposes upon the population's application.

In addition to the state sector, the cooperatives are contributing to the resolution of the valley's social problems. In 1990, Tsentrrosoyuz envisages the construction here of 35 facilities for producing goods for the people. These are small enterprises, yet ones necessary for improving the villagers' everyday life. These are non-alcoholic bottling lines, ice cream production, conserved foods shops for container filling (approximately 1-3 million cans annually), confectionery and sausage-stuffing lines, sewing and joining shops, and small bakeries with their own bread stores.

The planned program will require a significant strengthening of the construction base. USSR Gosplan and the Ministry of Finances must consider the matter of allocating supplementary capital investments in these facilities for 1990, and present its proposals to the union Government. In addition, the USSR Ministry of Finance must consider the matter of allocating an supplemental R100 million for reconstruction work in Andizhan, Namangan, and Fergana oblasts.

#### **Uzbek SSR: Unemployment, Need for Skilled Labor in Namangan Oblast Contrasted**

90US0242B Tashkent *PRAVDA VOSTOKA* in Russian  
15 Nov 89 p 1

[Report by UzTAG correspondent N. Khodzhayeva: "A Deficit During a Surplus: Not 'Just Workers,' But Well-Trained Worker Cadres Are Required"]

[Text] Pamphlets, appeals, and posters with the word "required" and a detailed list of work specialties can be seen practically in every corner of Namangan Oblast. But it seems strange: How can this be? We speak of unemployment, but at the same time, there are not enough workers?

#### **To Train Them From the School Bench**

There are no contradictions here. This is how Abduvalkhob Absusamatov, the director of the oblast center for the population's labor resources, retraining, and professional orientation explained it:

"The surplus of the able-bodied population is still not a guarantee for covering a deficit of working hands. The majority of those seeking work do not have, as they say, anything to offer, other than the scanty knowledge received in school, and the desire to be set up with work. But the factories and plants need people who have at least some small command of the basics of their future specialty, who have an idea of what that is."

According to recent data, 1,462 working positions are vacant in the oblast. There are several times more than that number seeking work. But again, vacancies cannot be filled within an hour. Of course, some little position will

be found for the versatile worker. But first and foremost, workers of certain specialities are needed. These are qualified stone workers, plasterers, painters, welders, secretary-typists, bookkeepers, economists, and people of the various professions. There is no one even to train youth.

At the same time this does not mean that setting up the population with jobs presents a problem which cannot be solved. According to the statistics for 9 months, of the 18,555 people registered in the center, 17,947 were provided with work. The remaining clients were either dissatisfied with the positions offered, or did not themselves possess the necessary qualifications.

There are a great many people in Namangan Oblast who do not have work. By first approximate estimates, there are over 60,000 of them. So here, the measures planned by decree of the USSR Council of Ministers to increase the population's employment are considered to be very timely, and are heartily approved.

"However, in my opinion, we should not begin with new industrial construction, but by expanding existing enterprises, putting them under a full load," feels A. Abdusamatov. "In fact, such a path is planned in the union Government's decree as the most long-range one. And not in vain: The development of the functioning factories and plants is a major reserve for involving even more people in production. Keeping this goal in mind, we must be concerned with inculcating kids with the elementary skills necessary for the valley's industry even while they are learning in school. Then the profession titles on the information lists that begin with 'required' will not be alien to them..."

#### When There Are Not Enough Capable Hands

Exactly a year has passed since the Namangan footwear factory received association status. How much has this improved the utilization of labor resources? Here is the opinion of general director Akhmadali Akbarov:

"From an enterprise which aimed at turning out primarily women's and men's fashion footwear, we are turning into purveyors of a broad assortment."

Even so, returns of almost all product types are coming in.

High quality products cannot be achieved because of the workers' poor qualifications. Mentors, experienced engineers, and foremen are needed to teach the workers. There is an acute shortage of them. Housing for specialists has already been constructed at the expense of share participation together with the gorispolkom OKC [oblast construction commission]. But even that does not help attract the necessary cadres...

On the other hand, of course, expanded assortments have helped to employ more than a few people. But all the same, the fully-qualified cadres are not there. The staff shortfall at a leading enterprise is 70-80 people.

Only 65 percent of the capacity of the Tashbulakskiy branch has been assimilated. The training of 30 workers for the Kasansayskiy branch has begun. They will come into production in the near future—the branch's introduction is planned for December. With time, they will acquire the skills, but when?

In a word, the association's capacities are growing day by day. The population, especially the rural population, is satisfied that production lines requiring a work force are being added in their area. All of this is very good, but under one condition—production must be provided with a sufficient supply of literate working cadres. "We do not have this," said the general director. "The shortage of engineering-technical personnel is especially keenly felt in the rural areas."

And as a result, the production of really high-quality footwear is not always achieved.

They have tangled with this problem for a long time now. They have appealed to various departments for assistance, yet the situation has hardly changed.

Yes, it is possible and necessary to create more work positions. Yet in no case should we lose sight of such an important task as preparing the appropriate conditions, among which providing future production with qualified cadres is in the first place.

#### Islamic Communities Registered, Mosques Opened in Azerbaijan

90US0302A Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian  
24 Nov 89 p 4

[Interview with R.N. Abdullayev, plenipotentiary of the AzSSR Religious Affairs Council under the USSR Council of Ministers, by Azerinform correspondent: "Believers and the Law"]

[Text] Perestroika, glasnost, and the renovation of Soviet society have opened up many possibilities for believers and for satisfying their religious needs. Now, when a state based on law is being created, when Soviet laws are being brought into accord with international treaties, those citizens of the USSR who are believers hope that they will obtain guarantees for the satisfaction of their religious needs, that they will not be deprived of the right to believe in their own ideals. Positive changes in this sphere genuinely reflect the process whereby life is being democratized in our society.

At the present time the Draft Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations has been submitted for consideration by the USSR Supreme Soviet. But until it is passed, the old laws regulating church-state relations are still in effect, and quite a few complicated situations have arisen. For example, there have been more frequent requests by believers to have mosques opened, as well as on other matters.

**In the interview with an Azerinform correspondent printed below R.N. Abdullayev, plenipotentiary of the AzSSR Religious Affairs Council under the USSR Council of Ministers, talks about these problems.**

[R.N. Abdullayev] First of all, it should be said that the most convincing proof of positive changes in our state's attitude toward the church is the opening, after restoration work paid for by believers, of 19 mosques over a year's period in various regions of the republic. The public knows about this from items published in the republic-level newspapers, as well as from television broadcasts and radio announcements. A religious educational institution—a medrese—has begun to function in Baku. And religious literature is being published.

And, although quite a few mosques are now in operation, there are still many appeals to state organs, local authorities, and to our apparatus, persistently requesting that new houses of worship be opened.

[Correspondent] But this obviously reflects people's genuine spiritual needs, doesn't it?

[R.N. Abdullayev] Most assuredly so. However, I'd like to mention that those persons making such appeals frequently lose sight of the necessity for a certain amount of work to be done within the framework of the existing legislation before a house of worship can be opened. Thus, for example, prior to opening a mosque, a religious community must be registered. At least 20 believers must direct a request regarding this to the local Soviet of People's Deputies. The ispolkom arrives at the appropriate conclusion at one of its sessions and then sends it along to our apparatus for registration. Only after the community has been completely registered do the believers have the right to demand that they be granted that space be made available to them in order to satisfy their religious needs, provided that there is a vacant house of worship. And if there is no building available, then the local Soviet allocates a section of land for construction after the republic's Council of Ministers has given the appropriate permission.

This statute is not observed at times. The Mingechaursk Gorispolkom, for example, officially registered a certain committee for building a mosque in the city, although Soviet officials ought to know that such a decision is illegal because building an institution of worship is the concern of the constituent founders of the religious community themselves.

[Correspondent] Rafik Nadzhafovich, just how many communities have been provided with literate clergymen?

[R.N. Abdullayev] The personnel problem with regard to clergymen in this republic is one of the most urgent in this sphere. It is a known fact that this problem did not arise just overnight. Over the course of many decades for many reasons the number of clergymen declined sharply, and the Spiritual Administration of Transcaucasian Muslims has experienced great difficulties in providing

clergy even for those religious facilities which have been officially registered and are now functioning in this republic. It's undoubtedly true that a positive role in solving this problem will be played by the medrese which was opened this year, but its first graduation will not occur until 1994. Therefore, taking our cue from the situation which has actually evolved, we must proceed to register new Muslim communities with more deliberation, carefully weighing all factors. We must not permit random, casual persons in our mosques; there is only room for truly believing, well-trained clergymen.

It's obvious that there have been serious omissions here on the part of our apparatus and the local soviets in campaigning for legislation regarding religious bodies. We must not forget that the church is separate from the state and operates on the principle of self-financing. People frequently direct appeals to us requesting that new mosques be opened, but, unfortunately, it is likewise often the case that such initiators, having achieved their goal, are subsequently not to be seen among the parishioners. For example, in Baku's Nizaminskiy Rayon the application for registering a community in the settlement of Kishla was signed by about 30 persons, but only 3 or 4 persons regularly come to the mosque for prayers.

[Correspondent] Recently in Baku and in other regions of the republic various kinds of religious items have turned up for sale....

[R.N. Abdullayev] Yes, nowadays you can see persons selling items which supposedly will save their owners from the Evil Eye, pendants bearing an image of the Prophet Muhammed, and samizdat literature containing suras from the Koran. Their trade goes on with complete openness at the Central Kolkhoz Market in the Nasiminskiy Rayon and next to the House of Furniture on Bailova in Baku, as well as in one of the bookstores in the settlement of Khyrdalan, Apsheronkiy Rayon. These illegal acts obviously do not bother the law-enforcement organs, even though it is known that the manufacture and sale of religious items and literature is the exclusive prerogative of the spiritual centers.

It is assuredly necessary for us to cooperate more actively with the mass media in elucidating such a delicate topic as the activities of religious centers and communities. The television programs "Dalga" and "Chay desgyakhy" sometimes popularize the actions of those believers who occupy the deserted rooms of former mosques and who, having occasionally remodeled them, report from the television screen that they have (according to them) restored a house of worship. If the authors of these programs had consulted with specialists ahead of time, they would have found out that there are 37 functioning Muslim communities located on the territory of this republic, and it is wrong to propagandize unregistered ones. Mention could also be made of demonstrating prayer, moreover, with schoolchildren participating in unregistered mosques in the settlements of Govsan, Ordzhonikidzevskiy Rayon, and Pirshaga, Leninskiy Rayon.

Unfortunately, the press organs do not always remember the law either. Here's just one example. Taking into account the needs of believers, the Spiritual Administration for Transcaucasian Muslims is at present printing the Koran along with a two-volume tefsir (interpretation) of it in Azerbaijani, written with Arabic script, and a translation of the Koran into Azerbaijani, written with Cyrillic script. But the newspaper YENI FIKIR, proceeding on the basis of ideas obviously known only to the editors, is printing excerpts from the second sura of the Koran. But, after all, the Koran is not a work of fiction, and it is wrong to reproduce a partial sura in print. However, the main thing in this case is that there has been a violation of the Spiritual Administration's exclusive right to publish sacred books.

The apparatus of the plenipotentiary on the Religious Affairs Council has the duty, together with the local soviets of people's deputies, of monitoring the implementation of the legislation on religious bodies in Azerbaijan. And in its subsequent activities it will strive to satisfy the needs of believers as fully as possible in strict accordance with the law.

#### Economic Restructuring of Belorussian Medical System

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[Article by V. Kazakov, Belorussian SSR deputy minister of health: "Expanded Rights Entail Expanded Responsibility: The New Economic Mechanism in Health Care"]

[Text] The quantity and quality of medical help today satisfies neither the working people nor the medical staff members themselves. Losses from diseases are not decreasing, people's lives are not getting any longer, there are not enough beds in the hospitals, and the burdens on physicians in polyclinics are too great....

Just what are the causes of this situation? They are determined by the system which evolved for planning, financing, and administering health care, a system which does not key medical and pharmaceutical staff members to a high end result—qualitative improvement of the population's health.

The foundation for restructuring the system of administering health care was laid by the adoption of several party and government documents and, above all, by the "Basic Directions for Restructuring and Developing Health Care in the 12th Five-Year Plan and During the Period to the Year 2000." A series of measures has been implemented with regard to expanding the economic independence of health-care institutions, measures which have accorded expanded rights to their leading officials for spending the funds allotted to them for health care, for establishing staff norms, developing criteria for evaluating work quality, as well as improving the organization and remuneration of medical and pharmaceutical personnel.

But this did not prove to be enough.

On 14 August of this year the Commission for Improving the Economic Mechanism under the BSSR Council of Ministers approved a statute on the new economic mechanism in the BSSR's health-care system; it also defined the procedure and conditions for converting all health-care institutions to working under the conditions of the new economic mechanism, beginning on 1 January 1990, primarily in accordance with the territorial principle of administration. The basic goal of converting to the new economic-management conditions is to more fully satisfy the population with skilled medical help, as well as to make more effective use of staff, material, and financial resources. Certain inhabitants of our republic and even medical staff members have already spoken about the danger that the new economic mechanism might be based on the principle of medical service "for a fee." It is nothing of the sort! The fundamental principles of Soviet health care—treatment which is free for the patient and accessible for all classes of the population—remains inviolable.

What, then, does the new economic mechanism envision?

First, it means a radical change in the financing of health-care institutions, a conversion from their allocating funds from the budget for individual items of expenditures to financing in accordance with long-term economic norms which comprehensively reflect the purposeful thrust of these institutions' activities (medical help and services on a per-capita basis annually, for treating patients suffering from a variety of diseases and categories of complexity, etc.). At present there are no scientifically developed norms or quotas, and for 1990 they will be formulated in accordance with the expenditures which have evolved. But subsequently they will be worked out so as to take into account the increase in the population's needs for medical help, as well as reimbursement for the material and equivalent expenditures of the health-care institutions, including that for the rendering of medical help (services, projects, the formation of funds for paying salaries, the establishment and strengthening of a medical-and-technical base, the social development and provision of material incentives for work collectives, etc.

Second, it means combining the budgetary financing of the health-care institutions' activities with the performance of work according to contract agreements with enterprises, organizations, and institutions on a cost-accounting basis, along with the development of services to the population for which fees will be charged.

Included here, moreover, will be additional sums allocated by the local soviets and levied by the sanitary-epidemiological service on enterprises, organizations, and citizens for damage inflicted on the health of working people in connection with violations of the sanitary and anti-epidemic norms and regulations. They will also include funds for reimbursing expenditures for

treating persons whose illnesses have been brought about by on-the-job injuries and poisonings, road-transport accidents for which transport organizations and private individual are to blame, a portion of the funds saved as a result of reducing the disease rate with a temporary loss of able-bodiedness, along with voluntary payments from enterprises, institutions, and organizations, charity funds, cooperatives and individual citizens, etc.

Moreover, it is not permitted to reduce the magnitude of the budgetary allocations for health care by replacing free services to the population by those to be paid for.

Third, development of independence and initiative on the part of the work collectives at health-care institutions in solving the basic problems of production activity and social development.

Fourth, establishing a close dependence of the dimensions of the funds for the health-care institutions' production and social development and the remuneration of each staff member on the end results of the institutions' (or subdivisions') activity, as well as the quantity, quality, and effectiveness of the work performed.

Fifth, using various forms of economic management, including intra-system leasing relations, effective (in the established procedure) individual labor activity, and expanding flexible work schedules.

Nothing stated above primarily changes the administrative structure. What are being set up are new institutions—territorial medical associations (TMO's). They may include any health-care institutions: polyclinics, hospitals, first-aid stations, etc. In this connection, the leading role in the TMO (territorial medical association) is being assigned to the polyclinic. Receiving normative budgetary allotments on a per capita basis annually, it distributes them among teams of sectional physicians (midwives, pediatricians, and combination-type mid-wife-pediatrician-therapists). And they take charge of the funds earmarked for paying for medical help to the patients attached to these teams. The remaining subdivisions of the polyclinic and other medical institutions—hospitals, consultative and diagnostic centers, first aid, and specialized medical services "earn" funds for themselves, obtaining them from the teams as payment for the services rendered.

The entire concern and responsibility for people's state of health thus rests on the polyclinic and on the sectional physician. This is a path leading to implementing the principle of the family physician. On the other hand, all the other institutions are compelled to function very well under these conditions, since the sectional physician, as well as the patient, will have the opportunity to select the institution where medical care is most intensive, where optimum favorable conditions are present for the patients.

In such a way we will have a healthy competition among other health institutions which should benefit the population.

Is it possible that the sector doctor , in order to save money will not send the patient to the hospital and on the other hand the hospital in order to earn more will treat the patient longer than necessary? The opponents of the new system have other apprehensions. Let us try to dispel them.

Each citizen has the right to choose his physician within the limits of a single polyclinic. He can be treated as indicated in any clinic without referral, and, and the polyclinic where he is registered will pay for the treatment.

Other mechanisms have been developed to safeguard the rights of the patient. With new managerial measures providing for a multi-stage system of quality control, we are able to safeguard people's health not only and not so much by measures of administrative influence, but, above all, by material measures—to be directed against persons who are to blame for certain mistakes.

As we have already said, the new economic mechanism provides for a change in the structure of the administrative organs. Pilot-type, territorial medical institutions can be established in the cities, and the city health-care divisions can be eliminated. TMO's can also be set up at the centers of rayon-level health-care divisions in cities. Other changes in the administrative structure are also possible. Stations for blood transfusions, a bureau of forensic medicine, and others function independently or become part of specialized medical associations and function in tandem with TMO's sanitary-epidemiological stations, as well as among themselves on the basis of reciprocal accounts. The conversion of other health-care institutions, clinics, scientific-research institutes and centers, medical institutes for improving conditions, medical and sanitary units, as well as the treatment-and-preventive-medicine institutions of other departments to the new economic-management conditions will be conducted in accordance with standardized principles, regardless of the type of institution involved.

It must be emphasized that savings on expenditures for maintaining health-care institutions will not be withdrawn and put back into the budget, as was the case previously. They will be channeled into the funds for development and economic incentives in accordance with the established norms; and this provides an impetus for the work collectives to be thrifty and economical in spending the funds allotted to them.

New criteria for evaluating activity are being introduced for all types of institutions. Above all, these are indicators which reflect the effectiveness or degree of achieving specific end results in rendering medical assistance (in accordance with models worked out for each type of institution or subdivision). Serving as an important factor will be satisfaction of the population, since, in the first place, this is one of the principal tasks for the entire health-care system and, in the second place, it is one indicator of the quality of the work performed by medical personnel.

Evaluative criteria are determined in a similar way for all other institutions. And the remuneration of the staff members at health-care institutions and their material incentives will be made directly dependent on the quality and quantity of their work, on their personal contribution to the achievement of end results, nor will any "ceiling" be placed in this regard.

Conversion to the new economic-management conditions in this republic is not occurring in a vacuum. We are taking as our basis the developments and positive experience in several regions of the country, where, by way of an experiment, the points of the new economic-management mechanism in health care have already been operative for two years. A large group of health-care organizers, economists, and practicing physicians traveled to Kemerovo and Kuybyshev oblasts, as well as to the city of Leningrad. From 25 to 29 September of this year scientists from the Kemerovo Medical Institute and health-care organizers of Kemerovo Oblast, headed by

N.N. Burdin, the oblispolkom's division chief—organizers who had accumulated a great deal of experience—held a four-day seminar-conference with our republic's health-care organizers (a total of more than 1,000 persons took part therein). But the main work lies ahead. The effectiveness of converting health care to the new economic-management conditions will depend upon intensive economic training in the localities, upon an in-depth analysis of the activity being engaged in by each institution, on a thorough study of the presently existing system, and on specifying the future optimal structure of each region's health-care institutions.

It should be borne in mind that, along with economic feasibility, the main principle is to solve the high-priority problems of Soviet health care—heading in the direction of preventive medicine, as well as improving the quality of medical help together with the universal development of all its aspects.

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